NATO on the Ground in Ukraine It has been generally agreed by more astute commentators (e.g. Jack Rasmus, whose recent article I summarized earlier this week) that a large proportion of the recently approved US aid package for Ukraine will be used in payments for equipment that has already been sent to Ukraine and may already have been deployed on the battlefields where, as today’s post avers below, Russia continues to make impressive gains west of Bakhmut and Avdiivka (although one should always bear in mind that on a large map these occupy what seems a very modest addition to Russian-controlled territory when taking into account the 150 to 200 kilometers that still separates Russian forces from cities such as Dnipro and Zapporizhzhia). Ukraine’s capacity for causing further trouble for Russian forces should not be underestimated - see below for example, for the details of an upcoming Ukrainian offensive, yet again, in the Krynky area of Kherson which could be a major distraction to Russian forces in the event, say, of a Russian offensive on Kharkiv, or, on the other hand, might just end up as just another meat-grinder to churn up the lives of less experienced and less well supplied Ukrainian troops, whether or not directly aided by NATO military advisers.
How Does it End?
How Does it End?
How Does it End?
NATO on the Ground in Ukraine It has been generally agreed by more astute commentators (e.g. Jack Rasmus, whose recent article I summarized earlier this week) that a large proportion of the recently approved US aid package for Ukraine will be used in payments for equipment that has already been sent to Ukraine and may already have been deployed on the battlefields where, as today’s post avers below, Russia continues to make impressive gains west of Bakhmut and Avdiivka (although one should always bear in mind that on a large map these occupy what seems a very modest addition to Russian-controlled territory when taking into account the 150 to 200 kilometers that still separates Russian forces from cities such as Dnipro and Zapporizhzhia). Ukraine’s capacity for causing further trouble for Russian forces should not be underestimated - see below for example, for the details of an upcoming Ukrainian offensive, yet again, in the Krynky area of Kherson which could be a major distraction to Russian forces in the event, say, of a Russian offensive on Kharkiv, or, on the other hand, might just end up as just another meat-grinder to churn up the lives of less experienced and less well supplied Ukrainian troops, whether or not directly aided by NATO military advisers.