Who Wags the Tail?

In consideration of the possibility of an attack by Israel on Iran, the relationship between Russia and Iran and the relationship between Russia and Israel seem critical.

In explaining, over the past few days, why Israel has so far not attacked Iran I have resorted to a variety of different considerations namely:

(1) Israel is already attacking Iranian interests both in Gaza and in Lebanon;

(2) Iran may now have shown itself more powerful than Israel had previously understood - possibly having developed the nuclear bomb (who can be sure?); along with vast stocks of missiles and capability with great precision, as demonstrated by its ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1st and also by its ally Hezbollah in its recent attack on one of Netanyahu’s houses in Caesarea;

(3) the threat capacity of the close proximity of the signing of a “strategic partnership” between Russia and Iran;

(4) the leaking of US intelligence about Israeli’s planning for an attack on Iran which would surely require a period of adjustment by Israel;

(5) and new data confirming low rate of Western weapons production capability (across most categories of weapons, though not, perhaps, in drones) and the fast increasing rates of Russian and Chinese weapons production and production capability - all of which suggest that Israel cannot possibly survive a war of attrition.

There has been considerable discussion about the extent to which Iran has received weapons from Russia. It seems highly likely that Iran has benefitted from the provision by Russia to Iran of ballistic and hypersonic missiles.

But at the same time we should recall what we know with a fair degree of certainty was Iranian supply of drones to Russia earlier on in the war between NATO and Russia over NATO proxy Ukraine and, possibly, of cruise missiles since then.

In recent posts I have visited the theme of Iran’s own impressive prooduction of advanced weapons, including the equivalents of S-300 air defense systems. An important part of the background to this is the enormous flow of US weapons to Iran that occurred during the US-Iranian partnership during the era of Shah Pahlavi (1941-1979), when the US provided the Shah with almost anything he wanted, even a path to nuclear weaponry through the cultivation of nuclear energy, long before Israel signified anything very much for US geopolitical power in the region.

Given the long life-span of weapons systems I think we can take it for granted that not only did Iran, following the Islamic revolution of 1979, continue to draw on these vast stocks, but that it was also able to reverse-engineer many of them and modify them over time.

These considerations might suggest that Iran is less in need of Russian military support than is often assumed. We dont really know.

It is certainly relevant to try to factor into the calculation the strange story of Russian aid to Syria in the period 2015-2017 when Russian intervention (primarily from the air) was absolutely critical to the survival of the Assad regime against extremist jihadists, supported by the CIA, Qatar and Saudi Arabia (amongst many other players incudling of course the usual nefarious games of the British, French and Dutch), in the form of Al Qaeda, Al Nusra, ISIS and other proxies, it turns out, of the collective West.

Also of considerable influence in defense of Damascus interests were Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards - a reminder therefore that Russia, in the very recent past, has fought alongside, or in parallel with, both Iran and Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon. All these forces had legitimate presence in Syria as they were invited into the country by Damascus. (Unlike the case with either Turkey or the US, which we will get to in a moment).

Russian intervention, as I say, was critical to the survival of the Assad government, although the state of Syria has remained in dire condition since the end of the main fighting, as a result of (1) unforgiving, cruel, US sanctions (under the Ceasar Act), worse even than the US economic war against Cuba over many decades, and (2) a form of US intervention in northeast Syria whose 1,000 or so American troops work in collaboration with Kurdish forces that provide some protection of the Kurds from Turkish troops and allow the US to benefit from the seizure of Syrian oil and the best of Syria’s agricultural produce. We should be mindful of the impact of Israeli aggression in Lebanon on the movement of Syrians resident in Lebanon back into Syria, along with migration flows of Lebanese citizens into Syria which merely exacerbate the economic disaster that is Syria.

In northwest Syria Russia has been an important player in establishing and policing, along with Damascus forces, a Turkish-instigated buffer zone that provides protection to large numbers of the aforementioned jihadists under Turkish protection around Idlib.

Russia’s participation in the Syrian conflict has enabled it to sustain its Meditteranean naval base in Tartous, Syria, and its two air bases. There is regular chatter about a pending agreement between Syria, Turkey and Russia that would arrange for the return of Syrian refugees (one or two million, I believe) to Syria, and for the ending of the Turkish presence in Syria (subject to certain conditions governing Kurdish behavior). We have yet to see how this is going to unfold, just as we have yet to see whether the US will ever withdraw from northeast Syria where its forces provide a litmus test for threats to US interests from the various anti-US militia of the region.

It is more than strange that in the years subsequent to the main fighting in Syria, Israel has continued on a very regular basis to bomb targets in Syria that it claims are Hezbollah or Iranian Revolutionary Guards (how does anyone know who they are?), and which have included high-profile installations such as airports near Damascus. It appears, but I dont believe there is evidence of formal agreement, that Russia has adopted a live-and-let-live policy with respect to these Israeli incursions which are, of course, totally illegal and murderous. Because these attacks have impacted high-profile targets they also suggest that, other than Russian defenses of its own assets in Syria, Russia has not provided Damascus with suitable air defense systems that could help Damascus protect itself against these Israeli strikes.

This does at least raise the question as to why would Russia shower military beneficence over Iran, when it has not done so for another important ally in the region namely, Syria? What we don’t know in all of this muddle is probably greater than what we do know, but it does make the military calculus for the region as a whole even more challenging than it already is.

I am relieved to see, so far, that there has been no apparent action from Israel, Ukraine or the US to torpedo the BRICS summit in Kazan by means of some form of terrorist strike, in a bid to humilitate Russia (which is the current chair of the BRICS), the BRICS itself and Iran (whose president is at the BRICS and which has just become a member). Russia may justly take credit for playing a major role within the formation of the BRICS, its New Development Bank and for a move of profound importance towards a more accelerated process of de-dollarization of international trade, and the creation of a pluri-centric world order. But, at the same time, we should expect that Russia will always give primacy to Russian interests, however these may defined at State level.

The question of an Israeli strike has also helped feed a growing debate as to whether Israel is the dog and Washington is the tail that the dog wags, or the other way around.

Seeing Israel apparently attempting to lure the US into fighting a war against Iran on behalf of Israel might seem to support the former position, alongside the widely acknowledged distortion of US foreign policy by the impact on how Washington works by AIPAC, and by the strong suspicions that supposedly American two-passport statesmen are working for Israel before they are working for the US (suggesting that the US government has been deeply penetrated and manipulated by Israel).

Alternatively it could be argued that the seemingly unstoppable flow of arms to Israel is not primarily a function of Israeli influence, but of the working of capitalism, the octopus character of the National Security State economy, and the influence of major corporations, including weapons manufacturers, on the political process.

In this perspective, Israel becomes just another narrative that obfuscates the nature of extreme capitalism and the need for the US to dominate every world region by means of proxies so as to secure the best environment for corporate profit-making.

In any case, it is unlikely to be an either-or issue and more likely, as most such issues are, to be a bit of both.