War and Grain

Ukraine’s most important successes currently are the result of drone and missile attacks, the most significant of these being three strikes in seven days on Russian arms depots in Crimea. The latest, the result of a Storm Shadow, has caused local evacuation and a shut down of train service between Crimea and Kherson region. These attacks negatively impact supplies of weapons to Russian positions further north which are defending against Ukrainian offensives. There have also been strikes on Moscow which have caused damage to uninhabited buildings, including one that belonged to or was close to a building owned by the MOD. The Kremlin says that this will not have an impact its currenct actions in the SMO. There have been Ukrainian drone attacks on settlements in the otherwise Russian controlled area of the Donbass behind front lines. Russia has attempted an intercept of a ship headed for Rostov on Don from Odessa that is stuffed with explosive. One should expect that this will be targeted by Russian missiles (I have no up to date news on this, mentioned on the Military Summary channel earlier today but not revisited in a later broadcast).

There has been increasing use of cluster munitions by Ukraine on the battlefield, including against a group of Russian journalists who were making a documentary about cluster munitions. One journalist was killed; several were wounded. Putin says that Russia has been very careful so far in its use of cluster munitions but warns Ukraine that Russia has much larger stocks of more advanced cluster munitions.

Russia has hit grain stores at the far west Ukrainian river port, Reni, on the Ukrainian bank of the Danube and on the border, therefore, of Romania, a member of NATO. Reni is one of the points to which Ukraine is planning to direct the grain shipments that would otherwise - before the ending last week of Russian consent to extension of the grain deal - have left from Odessa by ship. There are reports also of Russian hits on the nearby Danube port of Izmail, where up to 30 ships are said to have dropped anchor, possibly in response to the strikes.

If there were continuing attacks there is quite a good chance that such missiles would land in NATO territory, and this may be the first time that this has happened since the beginning of the conflict and it may indicate that NATO countries are not going to respond if there are such attacks on or very close to the border (but I don’t pin much faith on that hope).

The grain deal had been quite profitable for Turkey because it took raw grain and transformed it in its mills to flour. Turkey has now lost that source of income. This has further (negative) implictions for the chances of a possible improvement of relations between Russia and Turkey. Although most of the grain involved in the grain deal was actually going to China and Europe and not the Global South, there will likely be an impact on grain prices around the world, possibly in the order of 10%, although I am inclined to think that the bountiful harvests experienced this year by major grain producers such as Australia and Russia will provide so much additional grain this that this increase may lead to a reduction of prices sufficient to compensate for the grain deal effect.

The main loser is Ukraine, first because the war has badly impacted the volume of its grain production this year; secondly, of course, because the costs of having to divert exports from ships to rail to the Danube (which, as we have seen, are vulnerable to Russian attacks; and thirdly - because of continuing opposition from Polish, Romanian and Czech farmers to competition from Ukrainian grain - the governments of these neighbors of Ukraine have placed limits on the amount of Ukrainian grain that it will permit into their territories.

An overnight four-pronged Ukrainian attempted advance from Novosanylivka, in the southerly direction Robotyne and Tokmak - an area referred to on the Military Summary channel (based in Belarus) as the Bradley Square has been badly savaged by Russia in what was possibly the worst calamity for Ukraine since the beginning of the offensive. The Military Summary channel describes it as suicidal. Russia was ready and Ukrainian forces were completely defeated.

Further north and particularly in the Kupyansk area the Russians are extremely active and appear still to have the advantage. There was no direct encounter between the rival troops: the damage was done by artillery and bombs. Many advanced Ukrainian armored vehicles, including Leopard IIs and Bradleys, were destroyed, and many vehicles in good condition were abandoned on the ground for the benefit of Russia. Another attempted Ukrainian advance in the same neighborhood suffered comparable losses. A total of 30 to 40 armored vehicles were lost altogether, and several hundred troops killed or wounded. It looks as though Ukraine has not yet benefitted from replacement western vehicles. There does not seem to have been any air support for Ukraine.

Elsewhere, Ukraine appears to have lost several hundred soldiers along with equipment in various points along the front lines. In Vuhledar Russia has published photos of several successful Russian hits with guided bombs on buildings that Ukrainians were using as a stronghold. In January, Russia was badly repelled by Ukraine at Vuhledar so the situation there is now clearing changing in Russia’s favor. Bakmut has been fairly quiet and Klishchiivka appears to be still in Russian hands despite numerous recent Ukrainian attempts to take it, the latest taking place last Friday when Ukraine did manage to take some fortified positions where they still are, according to a Russian commentator cited by Mercouris. This source thinks it unlikely that Ukraine could go much further and, if it did, it would get only to western Bakhmut and the Bakhmutka river and this will not result in any great breakthrough. Russian advances in the north are of greater strategic significance. The Russian MOD says only that Ukraine tries to stage advances in various areas, including Klishchiivka, that are repelled by Russian forces.

Further north and particularly in the Kupyansk (which is on the Oskol) and Kreminna-Svatove areas the Russians are extremely active and appear still to have the advantage. Russia appears to be the process of heading for and retaking the Oskol river. There have been recent noteworthy Russian advances near Novoiehorivka and Nadia and Kovalivska.

Mercouris today describes what is going on now as a Russian advance through Ukrainian defenses, pushing towards the Oskol. Russia at least appears to see this an advance of some six kilometers and of a disintegration of Ukrainian defenses. It is part of a larger Russian offensive around Lyman and Kupyansk. Russia pushed further towards Kupyansk, but the advance on Kreminna-Svatove is something separate.

Russia has put to very effective use its Lancet drones and now has access to Switchblade drone technology following its capture of these American weapons. Russia claims that it is now producing the same amount of weapons in one month as they produced in an entire year in 2021. Across the full range of its weapons Russia is developing and modernizing. In another half a year, Russia will have another army.

Russian commentators now believe that Ukraine is unlikely to sustain the offensive beyond the end of August after which it will begin to peter out. Even the really useful tanks will be in short supply: Leopard IIs, Challengers, and the Abrams (which will only arrive in a few weeks’ time). Mercouris cites The New York Times report last weekend on the great challenges faced by the Ukrainian army; in one unit the NYT journalists heard that the entire manpower has had to be replaced, twice. The overall picture conveyed was one of dreadful losses and stalemate. Mercouris is critical of the term “stalemate,” as it camouflages a real discrepancy of capability between the two sides, and serves as a tool for western commentators to excuse their failure to face a reality which will almost certainly end in defeat for Ukraine.

Continuing the Mercouris account, he notes with light amusement how Blinken talks of Ukraine being about to launch another big event and about how it has recovered 50% of the territory that Russia had once taken. (As I suggested yesterday the nearest thing to a likely “big event” would come not so much from Ukraine but from Poland - see further below). As for the amount of territory recovered, this seems like some rather odd mathematics, perhaps counting the territory that Russia traversed in the first weeks of the war when troops surrounded Kiev. Naturally, Blinken says that he thinks Ukraine will eventually win. He is not in very good company. More realistic Washington voices are inclined to believe in a Korean-style “frozen conflict” solution which would leave 85% of Ukraine under Kiev control, would keep Ukraine out of NATO for the foreseeable future and allow Washington to focus on China.

We have seen for some time that Russia will not find such a solution particularly attractive given that the Russian economy is growing, even to the point that the central bank has just raised its interest rates to 8% so as to dampen demand. The reality for Russia is that for the west, the war has been a major debacle. Any terms it is likely to consider will likely go well beyond whatever it would have accepted during the negotiations of March 2022 which were brought to an end at the instructions of Boris Johnson on behalf of the collective west.

The danger of splitting up Ukraine would just leave a rump Ukraine being stuffed with western weapons (when these come back on tap) that would forever be a pestilence for Russia. Back in April at the meeting between a group led by Richard Haas and Lavrov it was clear that Russia expected to walk away with the Donbass, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, and Crimea, and Medvedev who is in charge of the war economy has recently written an article that makes it clear that Russia will not settle for either a March 22 type solution or a frozen conflict but that Russia has an extensive agenda that includes a final resolution and an agreement about the general security situation in Europe. Mercouris thinks that Washington realists need to become a little more realistic. A Foreign policy scholar and a man of some influence, Edward Luttwak, is moving in this direction. He says it is not the real war that the USA needs to be fighting. The real challenge is the one from China. (This position, of course, and as I have argued persistently, is totally loony if the idea is that the west must end up fighting a war with China. But it may be that Luttwak seems mainly concerned with prising China away from its relationship to China. In return for giving some concesstions to Russia, the USA can switch its attention to China.

Why either Russia or China would think that this is a good idea defeats me: Russia knows it cannot trust the USA in the long term, and China also understands that it must maintain its alliance with Russia as a matter of self-preservation. The strength of both Russia and China lies first and foremost in their friendship, and friendship is located within EuroAsia and within the BRICS which is the most promising beacon of hope that there will be a transition from US hegemony to multipolarity.

If Russia is going to be persuaded to the negotiation table it has to be offered something that would really be in its interest, something big, such as the removal of US troops from Europe. But nobody in Washington appears to be remotely capable of such thinking, even in the so-called “realist” camp. One problem is that those who might be seen as wanting peace with Russia may be open to the accusation that they are supporters of Trump. But a defeat in Ukraine could be an even greater problem for those who would support Biden in 2024.

Scott Ritter notes today that Poland is already extensively involved in the war to the extent of 15,000 men, under the leadership of Polish intelligence services. Poland is also the most important logistical hub, with Romainia, for support to Ukraine, and there are a lot of dead bodies going back to Poland. Poland is supplying tanks (PT1s) to one of Ukraine’s nine counteroffensive brigades, which is currently being deployed on the front lines with a view to attacking the Russian fortifications that have so far been impenetrable for the Ukrainian UCO - which has not managed to get beyond the zone of control that lies in advance of the lines of fortifications.

Zelenskiy and Duda have on many occasions talked about a union between the two countries that would eliminate the border between Poland and western Ukraine. Ukraine is desperately looking for a path to survival. Western Ukraine was once part of Poland, and this was where 110,000 Poles were murdered by Ukrainians in the 1943-45 period. The concept of a union between Poland and Ukraine could prepare a response to the likely massive displacement of Ukrainian refugees that would follow Ukrainian defeat on the battlefield. Western Ukraine would in effect become a humanitarian area of refuge to contain migration from a further drift of refugees towards Poland proper, something that Poland would find it difficult to absorb.

There has been some ambiguity over whether, if Poland invaded western Ukraine, Russia would take action. Lukashenko says that if they did, then Belarus would go to the aid of resistance to Poland in Ukraine. Putin says that if Poland invades western Belarus, then Poland will find itself at war with Russia, and it sounds to my ears that he is saying that if Belarus is attacked by Poland in Ukraine then Poland would, again, find itself at war with Russia. Lukashenko claims that Wagner forces on his territory are clamoring to go to war against Poland. Mark Sleboda on the The Real Politick today argues that that is not going to happen because such an action, of course, would trigger Article 5. So Wagner is not going to hit Poles in Poland, but it would certainly hit Polish forces in Ukraine. Behind Poland,in such an instance, there would be support from the Baltic States but Sleboda doubts that other NATO nations would get involved.

Mercouris also talks today on The Duran about the migration problems for Europe as a whole to which the Ukraine conflict contributes considerably. There are many tensions brewing between locals and immigrants in Germany (which received 1.3 million last year alone, many of them Ukrainian), Sweden and other countries of Europe. Many Swedish cities, he says, now have “no go” areas. In France too there are such areas within cities which the police do not generally enter, and which are controlled by other elements. This is something Charles de Gaulle warned about many decades ago.