Triumphal Reports from Ukraine

This is a brief report for now, this Sunday of the last day of August 2024. I note there is particularly triumphalist reporting from Ukraine, and that it squarely favors Russia. The note of triumph is founded, to some extent, on empirical reality.

There are few surprises: the main development is that military actions are following in the same directions as I indicated in my previous post from Friday. That is to say: a gathering acceleration of Russia’s advance on Pokrovsk, west of Avdiivka, which is the single most important Ukrainian hub for transport and communications in the Donbass; an even more serious Russian threat to the high-rise city of Vuhledar and its mines to the south of Pokrovsk; a considerable Russian advance to the north of Pokrovsk in the areas of Niu-York and Toretsk. In other importat points of the combat lines of the Donbass, Russia appears to be poised to launch major assaults on significant towns and cities such as Chasiv Yar, Siversk and Kupyansk.

In the surprising area of Ukraine’s offensive in Russia’s Kursk oblast (an invasion which is tantamount to direct NATO involvement in the war, for which evidence is gathering with respect to NATO participation in the arming, planning and execution of this manouever), the invading forces appear to have been contained by a strong line of Russian fortification from Ryl’sk to Kurchatov and in many places to have been pushed back, as in the west of Korenevo.

The note of triumphalism, however, is worrying. The war is not yet won. For all the talk of Russia’s move to the Dnieper, I note:

(1) Ukraine’s continuing ability to fall back from losing positions and to build new lines of fortification (although they do not have sufficient time or resources, in my estimation, to make very strong or resilient lines), and that there remain a large number of towns and villages between where Russians currently are and the Dnieper.

(2) I note the continuing demonstration of recklessness by Ukraine, as in its drone attacks on the Kursk nuclear power plant (which lacks the containment dome that was installed on Chernobyl nuclear power plant after the near catastrophe of 1986 - a catastrophe that eventually contributed to the break up of the Soviet Union) and on the Russian-controlled Zapporizhzhia nuclear power plant

(3) I remain concerned about the scope for further Ukrainian attacks across the border into Russian or Belarussian territory, and the continuing mischief that it inflicts through missile and drone attacks on high population areas of Belgorod.

(4) While the West appears to be still holding off from giving the green light for the use of long-range missiles across the full territory of the Russian Federation, a consideration that is dividing Europe (some of whose members will rightly wonder if these long-range missiles, such as British Storm Shadows, are anywhere near as devastating as their sponsors would have us believe), I consider that Washington is perfectly capable of pushing this through, especially if provoked by the prospect of an imminent and humiliating NATO failure, or even by Western dismay in the face of successful Russian destruction of the latest Western wonder weapons such as F16s and JSSM missiles.

(5) There continue to be concerns on both sides of an escalation of the war to nuclear exchange. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov this week has told the US that it should not consider itself protected by the Atlantic ocean. This is not a message that Washington can fail to appreciate, but it is a message that needs to get across to the American people whose anger with the neocon cabal that has long seized control of US foreign policy may yet be unleashed. I am not in a position to assess the adequacy or extent of US defenses against any form of Russian nuclear attack, but none of these systems are infallible, especially in the era of hypersonic missiles.

(6) In short this is a long war and I am not hopeful that it will get any shorter. The longer it lasts the more scope for catastropic surprises. As I have many times argued, a better path to successful resolution would be acknowledgment by all parties that this is less a war between the US and Russia and more a war between a weakening West and an ascending Global South. If the world can fix its attention on what the war is really about, and stop fiddling about with mediocre and unworkable treaties, then the sooner we can reach out for a far more optimistic future for the world. This will take considerable wisdom and courage, especially on the part of the US, but so too for Russia and China. A slice of real leadership from the UN would not come amiss.

I will provide more detail in my next post on battlefield conditions; disarray in Europe; evidence of persistent Washington and NATO meddling in the affairs of sovereign nations.