The Dialectics of US Aid to a Collapsing Ukraine
The Battlefields
In Ocheretyne, Russian forces control upwards of 50% (estimates vary from 30% to 70%) or more of the settlement, and large parts of the remainder lie in the gray zone. Dima of the Military Summary Channel, as reported in my post yesterday, says that Russians encountered Ukraine’s 115th Brigade close to Ocheretyne and, on encounter, the 115th broke and abandoned its positions under massive Russian fire.
The Ukrainian authorities hurriedly redeployed the 47th Mechanized Brigade from Berdychi (a little ways to the south of Ocheretyne); when it arrived, this brigade, which has been fighting on front lines since June of last year, refused to redeploy into the settlement and insisted that it be allowed time to rest and recuperate. In response, the authorities withdrew the 47th Brigade, and tried to redeploy another brigade which, when it arrived on the scene, said that Ocheretyne was impossible to defend and that it would be suicide to try. At that point it seems that Russia was given a green light to proceed to take the entire settlement.
The 115th, 47th and other brigades of the Ukrainian army appear, therefore, to have disobeyed orders, following comparable incidents that I mentioned in my post yesterday involving the 79th Brigade, 25th Brigade, the 57th Brigade and the Third Assault Brigade in recent days and weeks. Put together, all these issues point to some deep problems in the Ukrainian military following the replacement of General Zaluzhniy with the much less popular General Syrsky (a former Russian, and disciplinarian) following the change of command earlier this year. (It is unclear whether Zaluzhniy has actually taken up residence as ambassador for Ukraine in London or is under house arrest in Ukraine). The incident involving the 79th Brigade had to do with complaints from regular soldiers that they had been abandoned, without any supplies, even food and water, and left in the western end of Novomykhailivka. The sergeants who ordered the retreat from their positions were subsequently arrested.
Russian forces have moved south of Ocheretyne, which is on high ground, to the villages of Novobakhmutivka and Solotove which, when taken, will likely secure the end of combat over the west of Berdychi and the collapse of Ukrainian defense lines west of Umanske and Natailove and further south and, to the northeast of Ocheretyne, Novokalinivka and Keramik, or northwest to Pavlograd and/or Pavkrovsk. The fall of Novomykhailivka, as explained yesterday, will make it easier for Russian forces to move west to the settlement of Kostyantynivka, and, further south, to interrupt the main supply route to Vuhledar which, when it falls, will probably mean the collapse of Ukrainian fortified positions in the south of Donbass and, perhaps, of positions southwest to Dnipro, Orikhiv and Zapporizhzhia City. Ultimately, we might see the formation of a united Russian front line incorporating Avdiivka and Bakhmut, creeping northwards through Terny towards Lyman and Kupyansk.
Reports (possibly false) of 1,000 French troops being sent to Odessa and of US Special Forces being sent to Kiev, increase the likelihood of direct Russian attacks on non-Ukrainian NATO personnel. The more formal and visible NATO’s presence becomes and the closer that it’s presence takes the form of combat roles, the greater the chances for escalation. Mere statements to the effect of a more visible NATO presence are themselves escalatory.
The Rump Ukraine
As mentioned in my previous post, there are indications of large concentrations of equipment ready to be moved into Ukraine from Poland once the new US aid package is passed by the US Senate and signed off by Biden. Alexander Mercouris today notes that however large these may appear to be, they will not be sufficient to make up for all of Ukraine’s losses. Artillery, shells, drones, long-range missiles and air defense missiles are only among Ukraine’s most urgent needs. Given that some of the new US aid allocation has already been spent, and given the rate at which Ukraine burns up equipment, it is inevitable that the latest appropriation will have little long-term impact on the battlefields.
Noting also that a majority of Republicans in the House of Representatives actually voted against the aid package, that it passed only because of Democratic support, and that even though Trump had quietly supported House Republican leader Mike Johnson in bringing the aid package to the floor for a vote, it seems unlikely that Zelenskiy or his successor can go back to the trough under a Trump administration or even during the final months of the current Biden administration, especially if Mike Johnson will have been removed by that time.
A detachment of US special forces sent to Ukraine may be intended, as suggested by Dima yesterday, as a bodyguard for Zelenskiy, or, as suggested by a source cited by Mercouris today, they may be engineers intended to assist Ukraine in the building of new fortifications west of the Dnieper. If so, then this is a recognition by NATO that they cannot ultimately win against Russia east of the Dnieper. This in turn, despite my skepticism yesterday, suggests that perhaps Russia could make a dash for the Dnieper from the Avdiivka-Bakhmut front - although, without a peace agreement there would still be many ways in which a NATO-Ukraine force on the west bank of the Dnieper could harass advancing Russian forces in alliance with pro-Ukrainian forces still east of the Dnieper, with ATACMS and similar long-range missiles.
Merclouris claims that west of the Dnieper does not constitute an economically viable entity, especially if it no longer has access to the sea; loss of access to the Dnieper would deprive Kiev and a rump Ukraine of a key artery, and still render a rump Ukraine vulnerable to Russian artillery and other fire from the east bank. As such, and without an agreement with the Russians, the country would ultimately die.
This is an interesting but highly contestable argument that presumes that geopolitics is sovereign over the potential for economic and political alliances with neighboring NATO countries and for a reconfiguration of industrial and agricultural activity. It also reifies the concept of “viability,” which in fact is highly subjective.
Offensive Options
In my post yesterday I have suggested that in place of a Big Arrow offensive, Russia may instead decide on the safer route of continuing attritional warfare. The most likely alternative to this, anticipated by many commentators, is an offensive from the northern border on Kharkiv. Russia has constituted a new army division based in Belgorod; there have been major Russian attacks on Kharkiv energy and air defense systems around Kharkiv, there has been bombing of Kharkiv by the Russian air force and the bombing of Kharkiv’s television tower. So yes there is plenty of evidence for a possible offensive on Kharkiv.
If Kharkiv falls, a city of one and a half million in normal times, it will be the largest of Ukrainian cities to fall to this point in the war. Ukraine is redeploying available reserves towards the northern border, where Russia has been busily clearing the minefields between Belgorod and Sumy in possible preparation for an offensive. This tells us that an offensive on Kharkiv will not be a picnic.
Another strong alternative among possible routes for a major offensive is for Russia simply to continue the offensive that it in fact has already begun by breaking through in places like Bakhmut towards Chasiv Yar, or Marinka towards Novomykhailivka, or Avdiivka towards Umanske and Ocheretyne, the areas where there have been recent major signs of breakdown of Ukrainian brigades. This would have the advantage over Kharkiv given that the population concentration is much less.
It is also possible that Russia could stage several offensives simultaneously.
War by Sanction
Blinken’s upcoming visit to Beijing speak to China’s foreign minister Wang Yi is a possible prelude to another round of US sanctions against Chinese financial industries and other entities, on the pretext of Chinese support for Russia. The real target may be to discourage countries of the Global South from seeking membership of China’s new global financial and trading architecture. China’s foreign ministry spokesman has lambasted the hypocrisy of US complaints of Chinese trading relationship with Russia and notes that China is not a party to the conflict in Ukraine and that China’s trading relationships with Russia and other countries are perfectly legal and comply with a basic right Of all sovereign nations to trade. The US, he counsels, needs to observe WTO rules.
An unsigned article in Global Times complains of US ratcheting up of tension with China. There has been speculation that the US may be considering cutting China out of the interbanking system SWIFT, a European system, as it did with Russia (which has now instituted its own version; China has its own system already).
The problem with this approach to foreign policy by the imposition of sanctions - other than the fact that they ultimately don’t work - is that once imposed, they are difficult to remove, leading only to escalation in their use. Yet the US and its allies are busy imposing new sanctions on Iran, Venezuela and China, while Sweden is seeking to sanction Russian oil tankers. China has been busily stockpiling gold and everything else they need in preparation for the upcoming US sanctions aggression.
For the collective West, commitment to a foreign policy of sanctions will interrupt trade flows and thereby put greater pressure on inflation. Given that China is, by far, the world’s foremost manufacturer, the cutting of trade links with the collective West is far more likely to hurt the collective West than it is to hurt China, especially as more and more countries, like former US Latin American ally, Colombia (encouraged by Lula’s Brazil) are looking to a future within the folds of the BRICS alliance.