Subsonic, supersonic, hypersonic and nothing-onic.
Major Takeaways (Part 1) of Alexander Mercouris Broadcast for January 15 (Mercouris 01.15.2023)
Latest Missile Attacks
Over the past day there has been a two-wave Russian attack on Ukraine, the first using ballistic missiles of some sort, which went undetected in advance by Ukraine. Ukraine has said it is unable to intercept ballistic missiles.
There is no information from Russia as to what kinds of missile were used. There are reports that Russia has imported ballistic missiles from Iran. Perhaps, if so, these were used in the first wave in this most recent attack (in and around Kiev); or these could have been Russian built missiles (Russia is a major manufacturer) of the Iskander family. There is little information as to what were the targets of this attack, or what damage was done.
The second wave of the Russian attack used cruise missiles. There is unusually muddled information about this, how many missiles were involved (28-80 is the range that Mercouris has seen) and so forth, but it seems quite a substantial attack on targets all across Ukraine, with four cruise missiles reportedly used in one instance against a single target.
The tragic aspect of this drama is the KH22/32 missile that struck a residential building in Dniepro, located on the Dnieper river in central eastern Ukaine and which is a major industrial center and logistics hub. There has been no Russian acknowledgment of this. Alexei Aristovich, Zelenskiy’s spin doctor, says that the KH22/32 was intercepted by a Ukrainian missile causing it to deviate from its course and, as a result, to hit a residential building. This account has been denied by a number of other sources denying that the missile was intercepted. A spokesman for Ukraine’s high command, Mr. Igner, has since said that Ukraine lacks the ability to intercept the supersonic KH22/32 missiles.
Mercouris consider it very unlikely that a cruise missile would be used to attack a residential apartment building of no strategic significance. He notes that the British MOD has said that these missiles are not always reliable. It may be that Aristovich’s original message was indeed true.
KH 22/32 Missiles
The KH 22/32 is a very big missile, much bigger than the subsonic missiles that Russia generally uses. It was originally designed in Soviet times in the 1960s to intercept and destroy US naval carriers. It is very fast, flies (or can fly) at very high altitudes and, when it detects a target, takes a vertical drive at a speed multiple times the speed of sound, not quite hypersonic but close to being so.
Why are the Russians using it? The 32 variant was introduced by Russia a few years ago with a different engine, electronics etc. - new wine in an old bottle. They don’t seem to have used very many but have tested them out at various points over the course of the war. The British MOD claimed that the reasonthat Russia was using it was because Russia was running out of cruise missiles but this is not at all credible given that since then Russia has used hundreds of subsonic cruise missiles. So the British claim cannot be true.
The more obvious reason for using a KH22/32 is because there are some targets that require this kind of force. Another reason is suggested by John Helmer’s coverage of Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy system. These, he has argued, were designed to elicit information about the energy system so that Russia could use its missiles more effectively in an upcoming major offensive. The same may be true of these KH22/32 strikes namely, to see what level of damage they cause, and to test out Ukrainian air defense responses.
What is all this working up to? A recent interview with a prominent war journalist brought up the question of the advantages to Russia of the destruction of the bridges over the Dnieper river. The KH 22/32 might be an ideal missile for this purpose. The Russians may now know that Ukraine cannot intercept these missiles or have great difficulty in doing so. Russia could also use Kinjal missiles which are stationed in Belarus, and there are also the Zircon missiles, both of these being supersonic. The Zircon is a particularly lethal system because of its extraordinary speeds (MAC 8 or 9), which create a plasma field that shields them from radar. Western powers presumably have the capability of tracking these missiles, but they struggle with supersonic, and it will take them some time to catch up with the technology to detect and intercept supersonic cruise missiles, even if, as in the case of the KH 22 / 32, these are not the most advanced missiles in Russian arsenals.
Damage of the recent missile strikes probably includes ammunition dumps, air defenses and the like.
Soledar and Bakhmut
On the battlefields, Mercouris notes that the neocon Washington-based Institute for the Study of War appears to have effectively admitted that the Russians are in control of Soledar. Ukraine continues to deny this, insisting that they are holding out. The Institute says that there may be a few Ukrainians holding out around the outskirts of the town. It is generally acknowledged that Ukrainian counterattacks have failed.
What is going on around Bakhmut, which is the main focus of the battle? Lots of discussion but few reports. For some days Mercouris has been talking of Russian control or close to control over the roads going into and out of Bakhmut on three sides, and the real risk that Ukrainian troops in Bakhmut may be caught in a cauldron with no option but to fight to the death or surrender. Even the Washington Post is now making the case that it might be better for Ukraine to withdraw from Bakhmut. A curious Financial Times article hints at something similar. There have also been reports that the Pentagon has actually advised Ukrainian authorities to withdraw troops from Bakhmut in order to preserve them. The Washington Post’s spin on this is that Ukraine risks burning up its reserves if it stays in Bakhmut and that its troops would be best used for a counteroffensive elsewhere.
The cited Financial Times report is described as one of the most bizarre articles that Mercouris has ever read on the war. It seems to flip reality on its head [I call it mirror propaganda]: Bakhmut and Soledar are seen as a war of attrition but it is not the Russians who are waging this war on Ukraine, it is the Ukrainians grinding down the Russians. It claims that this is what happened in the Severadonetsk and Lysychansk battles in the summer, that this weakened Russia so as to allow Ukraine’s subsequent Kharkiv and Kherson offensives. [The unlikelihood of all of this will not be lost on most readers]. Mercouris notes that most of Russians fighting in Severadonetsk and Lysychansk were in any case local people republics’ militia and in Soledar it was primarily the Wagner group. The idea that the Russian forces have suffered losses in these places that equals or exceeds those that Ukrainians have suffered is incredibly far fetched, badly wrong, and contradicts all other credible parties. In short, it is nonsense, like the western media claims of “waves” of inexpert Russian soldiers being thrown into the conflict and slaughtered. Former CIA analyst Larry Johnson has pointed out that all the film of Wagner fighters in Soledar showed that they were highly trained, knew how to move between buildings, cover one another etc., and just does not support these western claims.
What we can be sure of is that there are now massive Russian reinforcements appearing all along the front lines. Even the Financial Times is driven to ask: who is actually experiencing the attrition - is it Russia, as they would like to believe, or is it Ukraine? Even when there is an attempt to spin the story, turn it around, to make it look as though Russia is losing, these news agencies find themselves in collision with reality.
Putin has said that Russian operations in Ukraine are going to plan and appears very confident that things are going the way that Russia wants them to. It does seem that Ukraine at some point soon will pull out of Bakhmut and will pull out of Marinka, near Donetsk City.
Western Weapons to Ukraine (sigh)
There is still talk of a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Spring, and there are still reports of more western weapons to Ukraine, the latest being 12 Challenger 2 tanks from Britain, which will merely complicate Ukraine’s overstretched logistics and supply system. In Germany, Matal, manufacturer of Leopard 2s, says it has a small number of Leopard 1 (1960s) and Leopard 2s in stock but that these will require extensive refurbishment and even if the decision to send these was taken today (which would likely irritate the German army) they would not arrive before the end of 2023. Finland has talked about sending some of their Leopard 2s (it has around 200) but there is internal opposition because each Leopard 2 is assigned a position along Finland’s very long border with Russia.
Nevertheless, in a few months Ukraine will possibly begin to receive tanks from different countries, operating different systems, and they may add up to 300 - the number General Zaluzhnyi said was needed in his December interview with the Economist.
A Wall Street Journal article notes that Ukraine is using twice the amount of artillery ammunition that the US manufactures and is able to replace (some sources places Ukrainian consumption of ammunition at a much higher level), and that this is now creating problems within the US itself in the event that the US needs ammunition in other theaters of war.
Time Window
There will be a time window in which Ukraine will be very short of ammunition, even as Russian sources of ammunition are growing. Brian Berletic, Scott Ritter, Col. Macgregor all consider that problems of western equipment will get worse: Germany can provide onluy a few Leopard 2s before 2024, and the same applies to US Patriots and so on. Russian forces, meanwhile, are building up, in men, missiles, tanks, ammunition - even western mainstream media admit this and even as it becomes clearer that promises of western weapons are unlikely to be realized in 2023.
Even the Financial Times’ and Washington Post’s attempts to flip the script have to admit that attrition is not working for Ukraine. Is it not time to draw obvious conclusions from this? Political crisis in the US will escalate in 2023. It will be more difficult to hold the focus on Ukraine. A congressional committee and other investigatory machines have been set up to examine Hunter Biden’s business activities, the activities of some social media companies, and to look at the President’s own handling of classified documents. From a political, military point of view and an economic point of view (the current stability will be ephemeral) the conflict makes less and less sense. Ukraine by its own admission cannot intercept ballistic missiles, cannot intercept supersonic or hypersonic missiles. Western equivalents will either not be available, or in only very supply and tardy supply.