Stalling in Kursk, Waiting In Tehran
Kursk Offensive
There are significantly different narratives about how Ukraine’s Kursk offensive unfolded over the past 24 hours. But they share the conclusions that (1) the main Ukrainian aim was to seize the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant south of Kursk city; (2) this was not accomplished and cannot now be accomplished; (3) that Russia has largely stabilized the situation in its favor at points north and east of Sudzha; (4) that Ukrainian options are now more limited, either to advancing southeastwards towards places like Belitza or to dig in deeper where Ukrainian forces still have the upper hand, closer to the Russian border with Ukraine (south and west of Sudzha), to build fortifications and to continue to try to stretch the Russian front lines and to harrass Russia over the coming months (even though most everyone agrees that the Ukrainian army is hardly in a good position to try to carry this out effectively).
Pro-Russian forces, citing Russian sources such as the mayors of Sudzha and Keranovo, are dismissive of accounts that claim that large parts of Sudzha, parts of Keranovo (northwest of Sudzha) and Martynovko (north east of Sudzha) fell to Ukrainian control as many accounts attest. The latest account from Dima of the Military Summary Channel, based in Belarus, and broadcasting at around midday, California time, of Saturday, August 10th. does not align with these. But whereas pro-Russian accounts deny that Russian reinforcements were seriously impeded and fired upon as a result of traffic blockages incited by Ukrainian demands that citizens evacuate, I notice that Dima has nothing further to say on this topic since his report of it yesterday. The mayor of Sudzha has claimed that what really happened was that Ukrainian forces tried to stall evacuation attempts by firing at Russian vehicles.
Dima does describe the current situation as a “turning point,” in Russia’s favor, and that from tomorrow, Russia is likely to regain the initiative and Ukraine likely to fall back. He reports that there are now doubts whether Ukrainian forces ever did advance westerwards from Lybulinovka to Snagost or that Ukrainians ever reached Keranovo from Snagost, although Ukrainian sources claim to have fire control (by drone) over southeast Keranovo.
Russian MoD appears to confirm that Ukrainian forces did reach close to Kromstiye Byki (north of Anastas’yevka) by reporting a Russian attack on a Ukrainian convoy that was discovered in that area and in which ten Ukrainian armored vehicles were destroyed. Russian reinforcements have arrived and no further Ukrainian advance is anticipated. Likewise, Ukrainian forces did reach the first buildings of Martynovka, but were repelled by Russian reinforcements sent down from Bol’shoye Soldatskouye. Ukrainian troops withdrew to Sudzha. A Ukrainian convoy was destroyed and rebuffed in Cherkasskoye Porechone, west of Bol’shoye Soldstskoye.
In effect the latest Russian line of defense now runs from east of Mikhaylovka through Martynovka up to Pyccko, certainly shutting Ukraine off from an advance towards the KNPP.
Ukrainian forces appear still to be in control of northern Sudzha in the areas of Kasachy Loknye, Zaoleshenka and Gonchsrovka, and appear to have pushed Russia from Plekovo. And many if not most of the rest of Sudzha still appears as contested areas on Dima’s map. To the south of Sudzha, Ukrainian forces may still be in control of the settlements of Kurilovka, Melovoy and Guyevo and certainly control a large area of territory around those locations.
The likelihood of a Ukrainian push in the direction of Belitsa, Giri, Ulanok and Kommunar still exists but seems increasingly weak.
Did Authorities Ignore the Warnings?
I referred yesterday to reports that Russian Chief of Staff Gerasimov had warnings of a Ukrainian concentration of forces south of the border in Sumy two weeks ago and appeared not to have taken sufficiently rapid attention. This may be linked to the account relayed today by Dima who says that some weeks ago Belarus had reacted strongly to the invasion over its territory of Ukrainian drones east of Minsk. Belarus accordingly strengthened its troops in the directions of Gomel and Mozyr and improved its border positions. In July, when a concentration of Ukrainian troops was observed in Ukraine south of the border with Belarus there was a negotiation between Ukraine and Belarus, with the result that Belarus withdrew its forces from close to the border and Ukraine did the same. But Ukraine redeployed these forces towards Kursk.
Elsewhere along the combat lines, it is reported that Russia has established control over most of the northern sector of Vovchansk, has broken through Ukrainian defenses in northern Kupyansk around Tabaivka and Pischane and has encircled Stelmakhivka (south of Pischane). In the Toretsk/Niu York conurbation, Russia has estblished control over 30% of Druzhba, and has moved westward from Yurivka towards Panteleimonivka and Valentynivka. In the Pokrovsk area, Russia has established control over Ivanivka and Russian forces are close to Hrodivka. Fierce clashes continue in the Kostianynivka area but it seems very unlikely that Ukraine can hold out there for much longer. Russia continues to press northwards from Urozhaine, and continues to suppress Ukrainian attempts on the Tendra Spit in the Dnieper estuary.
Imported Weapons
Recent reports in the New York Times and elsewhere that Russia imports large numbers of drones, and will import hundreds of ballistic missiles from Iran, including the Fath-360 and Ababil, and that Russian production of its own missiles are increasingly “hand to mouth” because of the speed with which missiles appear on the battlefield after manufacture, might suggest a significant weakness in Russian production capability.
There are so many previous reports that suggest otherwise, that I think these latest should be taken with a hefty dose of salt. I don’t know for certain what the explanations really are but I would not be surprised that Russia would choose to take advantage of an ally’s existing specialized expertise in certain weapons, or by the ability of an ally to produce certain weapons at a cost lower than domestic equivalents, particularly if this helped consolidate the bonds between Russia and its ally. I suspect that Russian ability to move missiles quickly from the factory to the battlefield is something Russia might celebrate, first of all because of its efficiency and secondly because it would suggest that the most advanced weapons are being prioritized.
The Ababil missile , according to RBC Ukraine and MSN, is a small missile measuring 3.7 meters in length, weighing 240 kg, with a range of up to 86 km. Analysts note that the Ababil exists in two versions: one with satellite and inertial navigation, and another with an additional optical-electronic guidance system for the terminal phase. The Fath-360 missile is 5.1 meters long, with a diameter of 368 mm, and a total weight of 787 kg, of which 150 kg is the warhead. It reaches speeds of up to Mach 4 and has a flight range of up to 120 km. The guidance system includes an inertial system and satellite navigation.
Europe
Writing for Propaganda in Focus today, Stephan Sander-Faes (Sander-Faes) weighs the possibility that US handling of the conflict with Russia over Ukraine, and its increasing lack of respect for European sovereignty, is fomenting a backlash that will break the bonds that have gripped Europe in the bear-hug of the US since 1945.
“Europe, on the other hand, is circling down the maelstrom of economic disaster stemming from its adversarial policies vis-à-vis Russia.
“In the meantime, anti-Globalism and anti-Americanism are beginning to coalesce with the European people’s criticism of the EU Commission’s handling of the energy crisis. Slowly, extra-parliamentary opposition to the increased conferral of power to Brussels is merging with calls for the restoration of popular sovereignty and calls to end Europe’s utter dependence and subservience to US foreign policy diktats.
It appears that the — so far successful — US policy to destabilise Russia to induce the economic suicide of Europe is reaching its next phase: the pushback from the peoples of Europe who, deprived of many of the promised benefits of legacy policies such as increased EU integration and unquestioning Transatlaticism, might be America’s undoing”.
Meantime, Intellinews reports that the level of Russians' trust in President Vladimir Putin stands at 81.5%, according to a poll conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM), TASS reported on July 12. Perhaps this is related in no small part to continuing evidence of robustness in the Russian economy as confirmed yesterday by The Bell (The Bell) in answering the question of why is investment in Russia at a 12-year high? It notes thst Capital investment (expenditure on new construction, higher-tech equipment for enterprises, purchase of new kit, etc.) in 2023 hit a 12-year high of 34 trillion rubles, almost 10% more than the year before. In the first three months of this year, Russian companies invested 5.9 trillion rubles, up 14.5% year-on-year. Russia’s positive “investment gap” – i.e. the difference in growth rates between investment and GDP – has reached a 15-year high, according to the Moscow-based Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-term Forecasting (CMASF). The government is getting close to hitting one of its long-term targets – getting the proportion of investment in Russia’s GDP to 25%. Three reasons why companies are investing so much at the moment: import substitution; Russia’s “Pivot to the East” and government support, especially in military spending and a wide range of social benefits, including subsidized mortgages.
Middle East
Continuing Israeli atrocities in Gaza, including the bombing of schools that are being used as shelters by homeless and displaced Palestinians (at least a hundred dead on this account over the past few days) - on the pretext, for which evidence is never supplied and, even if true, would be obscenely disproportionate, that Hamas fighters have been identified in such shelters - increase the doubts that there is any seriousness in the Israeli cabinet about a ceasefire with Hamas and that, even if there was a ceasefire agreement, Israel would respect it beyond an opening phase of negotiations.
The world has waited now for several days to see if Iran would retaliate against Israel for Israel’s recent assassinations of Hezbollah and Hamas leaders. Equally, it has waited to see if Israel would make preemptive attack on Israel and/or would invade southern Lebanon. Various theories have been canvassed as to why it has taken Iran this long to retaliate. Iran’s Supreme Leader had ordered a retaliation, and this was anticipated to take place within 72 hours of that order. We have long exceeded 72 hours, so what is going on? Some analysts speculate, encouraged by Washington voices, that the US, with carrott and stick, has persuaded Iran not to proceed. Others report that Russia, for different reasons and with different arguments, has also advised Tehran to hold its fire. Still others speculate that in-fighting in Tehran between the political and military leadership, perhaps exacerbated by western media reports (doubtful, if should be said) that IRGC personnel may have collaborated in the recent assassination in Tehran of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, may have led the new President, Pezeshkisan, to hold back.
Or, and this seems to me to be perhaps the most likely, Tehran simply needs to be in a stronger state of readiness before proceeding, on at least three counts: (1) seeking the necessary support from trusted allies and even others in the region, including Saudi Arabia and members of the Organization of Islamic States; (2) identifying locations for missile launchers outside of Iran in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon or Yemen, firming agreements with its allies and delivering the weapons and the personnel required to use them; (3) awaiting delivery from Russia of electronic warfare and radar equipment and advanced missiles, determining the locations for these and accommodating the Russian advisers who would be needed to support these operations. A fourth possibility, much less likely in my view, is that Iran is waiting either to complete a subterfuge nuclear weapon or is waiting for Russia to supply a nuclear warhead for capping missiles already in Iranian possession.
Western Mainstream Media
Melvin Goodman, writing in Counterpunch today (Goodman), noting the New York Times has always favored Israel, focuses on the newspaper columnist Bret Stephens, a former editor of the Jerusalem Post who Goodman says left the Wall Street Journal to join the Times in 2017 because he believed Israel was not getting a fair hearing in the mainstream media. Exemplifying pro-war policies, Stephens’s most recent column supported any Israeli military option that “advanced Israel’s national interests on all fronts.” Goodman notes that Stephens” never refers to the genocidal campaign that Israel is waging in Gaza and to a degree on the West Bank, where land has been appropriated by Orthodox Jews on a daily basis.” He dismisses those who protest Israeli actions as “Iran’s useful idiots” and antisemites. He supports increases to the defense budget that will assure “global primacy.”
Meantime, for Consortium News (Mick Hall), Mick Hall writes that major international media face a dilemma over whether to adapt their reporting to the World Court’s judgment last month that Israel is an apartheid state illegally occupying Palestinian territory or continue to reflect a dominant narrative giving Israel ideological succor. He writes:
“The rule of international law and rule of U.S. hegemony stands diametrically opposed and the non-Western world sees it, a reality Western media thus far has studiously avoided to represent to its own increasingly skeptical audiences.
“Western news leaders now have a choice, assuming they are not themselves as deluded as those wielding power, making rational choice impossible. Either continue as is, or attempt to achieve a semblance of credibility by aligning descriptors in reports with determinations of the U.N.’s top judicial body.
“The decision will ultimately come down to whether any moral agency remains within those institutions, but more likely, whether those states funding them change their diplomatic settings in the way that the ICJ advisory opinion requires.”