Russia in Reverse

Battlefield Update (2:30pm California Time, August 8)

I am bringing forward the most recent developments, so please read the sections that appear below this one with the latest developments in mind. Much of this information is based on the most recent midday broadcast by Dima of the Military Summary Channel, which I consider one of the best sources for battlefield news given its location in Belarus and its very wide catchment of Ukrainian, Russia and neutral sources, and its use of both geolocated confirmations and insider reports.

The big picture is that Ukrainian forces are continuing to expand their area of control, into the Russian Federation, specifically in Kursk oblast. They are advancing in some ten or more different directions. Their most dramatic potential target is the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant which is now only 30 kilometers from the nearest Ukrainian forces (last night it was sixty).

Equally worrying for Russia is (1) Ukraine’s continuing expansion of control (perhaps now up to 70%) of Sudzha, especially in its Zaoleshenksa area; (2) Ukraine’s building of fortifications; and (3) the constant flow of Ukrainian armored vehicles and other equipment into Russia through Sudzha. Further (4) military analysts see a potential for more Ukrainian offensive moves from the Sumy settlements of Trotkino and Hlukhiv which, if successful, could increase Ukrainian control in Kursk by at least 100%.

As this is happening, on the other hand, Russia is taking a tactical decision not to redeploy its forces from other parts of the combat lines but is, instead, pressing its advantage in the area west of Avdiivka, and advancing on towards the city of Pokrovsk.

The Ukrainian offensive in Kursk is, nonetheless, a significant setback for Russia in territory, material, morale, and negotiating advantage. The apparent lack of Russian foreknowledge, preparation and adequate resistance, is a significant failure in the Russian war record in the course of this conflict. It may indeed have significant political consequences, most likely strengthening the war hawks in Russia who want to see a fiercer and less accommodating attitude in its war with NATO over Ukraine.

As the days pass, it may be that the speed of the Ukraine’s advance will be offset by its lack of preparation for consolidating control over civilian areas, whereas in the eastern combat lines the slowness or deliberateness of Russian advances does allow time for consolidation of the territories behind the front lines.

More specifically, Ukraine has established complete control over Kursilovka and Guyevo. Ukraine has control over Kossachya Loknye and moving on Korenovo and Anastas’evka. Ukraine controls Kruglentse (northeast of Novoivanovko) and Sverdlivko, southeast of Nizhniy Klin (which only yesterday seemed almost the furthest point of advance).

Ukraine is making significant progress towards Pogrebki (northesast of Novoivanouke). A Ukrainian advance towards Snagost, well to the west of the original attack zone, has been repelled. Ukraine has also threatened the settlements of Bol’shoye and Soldstskoye but its advances have been repelled. Ukraine has entered Martynovke (northeast of Sudzhe) and had also entered Korenevo, but in both instances has been repelled. As a result of another line of offense, Ukraine took two villages well to the north, Kayyx (spelling to be determined) and Levshinka village, as well as Kromskiya Byki, endangering the nearby settlement of Durovo-Bobnik. Ukraine breached two fortification lines in Kurshchyne that cost the Russian government 15 billion rubles to build.

Meanwhile in Kharkiv, Russia took two villages on the border: Lukashivka snd Sotmytsky Kozachok. Neither has great significance. In Pokrovsk on the other hand, Russia is in the process of taking Lisichnoye, Ivanivka, Veseloye, Grodovka, Novoloretske sand Hrodivka, and Russian forces almost certainly have in their sights the settlements further westwards of Orlivka and Mykolaivke

The Battlefields

The Ukrainian invasion of Kursk remained unstable as of the morning (California time) of August 8. There have been previous Ukrainian invasions during the course of the war, including in Briansk and Belgorod, regions upon which Ukraine regularly pounds drones and missiles. But these previous attempts were spearheaded by supposedly Russian dissident forces aligned with Ukraine. The Ukrainian forces in Kursk were yesterday identified by Dima on the Military Summary channel as special forces answerable to Ukrainian military intelligence chief, Kyrylo Budanov. I have not seen this claim repeated. Instead, I have heard commentators claim that a brigade of Ukraine’s best forces, NATO trained, were used.

Russian military chief Valery Gerasimov yesterday told a meeting of the Russian security council that 1000 Ukrainian forces were involved, and that as of his report, over 300 of these had been killed or wounded (other reports say 40% of Ukraine’s first wave of attacks). Other have been pushed back. There have been captures and surrenders of Russian troops, notably of 40 Russian border guards west of Sudzha.

We should assume that many more Ukrainian troops have entered Kursk since yesterday.

Motivations for the invasion have been attributed to a campaign of distraction so as to enforce Russian re-deployments from other parts of the combat line to Kursk (making it easier for Ukraine to resist Russian advances elsewhere).

This aim does not appear to have been successful. But it does appear to have brought about the arrival into the area of significant Russian reinforcements, presumably from other parts of the mainland. Another purpose is said to be one of morale building, both for Ukraine (whose mobilization efforts are creating considerable social unrest and resistance in Ukraine itself) and for Ukraine’s Western sponsors, whose further financial and military aid Ukraine badly needs, but which is treatened by the US presidential campaigns in which former and possibly future President Trump is expressing a distinct lack of enthusiasm for continuation of the war.

Some analysts (e.g. Gilbert Doctorow) believe that the Ukrainian incursion also serves NATO, offering a field for military experiment and target practice. Sources vary as to whether Ukraine is interested in specific assets. If so, these might have to do with the relevance of Sudzha as a hub for energy transportation or with nuclear facilities in the region.

On this count, the New York Sun reports today that two strategic prizes include a chokepoint for half of  Russian gas going to Europe by pipeline, and Russia’s westernmost nuclear power plant.

Sudzha is the junction hub for the Trans-Siberian pipeline and the 5,000-mile Brotherhood pipeline from the Arctic. Following enemy destruction of Russia’s twin Baltic pipelines two years ago, Sudzha is the sole entry point for Russian gas into Ukraine’s pipeline system bound for Europe. Currently, 40 million cubic meters of gas passes daily through this hub.

The European Union has recently pressurized Ukraine to shut down pipeline delivery of oil and gas to two EU members that the Brussels burocracy wishes to punish for their dissident views on war and other matters namely, Hungary and Slovakia, even though the EU allowed these members a dispensation from sanctions for their continuing dependence on Russian gas. The Zelenskiy government has said, in any case, that it will not renew the transshipment contract with Russia’s Gazprom when it expires this December 31.

Even more seriously there are concerns that Ukraine could be aiming to reach the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, one of 10 working power plants in Russia, and which supplies electricity to 20 regions in European Russia. Ukraine could take the plant hostage in order to win the liberation of Ukraine’s Zapporizhzhia nuclear power plant. But the plant is 60 miles from the Ukrainian border and a few miles from Kursk, a city of 440,000 people.

A prime and more immediate motivation for the invasion may be to provide Ukraine with additional bargaining counters in the event of negotiations.

As of Dima’s report, in the early hours of today, California time, it appears according to a report from Russia’s Northern forces that Ukraine had pushed towards Victorovka, Nikol’shii, and Loknya. It took control over Gonchsanovka and Podol and most of Zaoleshenke and the western Sudzha which, like Vovchansk to the east, is divided by a river. Ukraine was said to have entered Guyevo and Plekhovo.

Dima reports that Ukrainian forces had reached north of Nizhniy Klin to a line between Lyubimovka and Novovanovka, where seven Ukrainian tanks have been sighted and also attacked by Russian Iskander missiles. A Ukrainian “recconaisance-in-force” mission was sighted on the road northwards to Korenevo; this was pushed back towards Novovanovka. A similar mission eastwards towards Victorovka was also pushed back.

The other major destination of Ukrainian forces (the first was Nizhniy Klin) was Sudzha, which is said to be a large town or city. Ukrainian activity has been spotted north of Sudzha in the direction of Kossachya Loknye where it appears that a number of Russian tanks were destroyed.

In Dima’s assessment Ukraine has failed to achieve the breakthrough that it hoped for.

Russia in concerned by a concentration of Ukrainian forces in the Ukrainian settlement of Hlukhiv which might be a source for an attack on the Russian settlement of Russian-controlled Rylsk. Putin’s remarks yesterday indicated that there may be a possible move by Russian on Sumy in order to begin the establishment of Sumy buffer zone.

The main area of activity on other parts of the combat line is in the area of Donetsk that lies to the West of Avdiivka and Ochertyrne. Russia continues to exploit the military advantage here that it has enjoyed since the fall of Avdiivka. It has advanced further west beyond Pohres, taken the settlement of Tymolivka and is moving towards Lysychne, while improving its positions in the eastern part of Ivanivka, Zhelanne (which it mostly controls), Vesele (which it controls) and, south of Zhelanne, Novozhelanne. Russian forces have taken Novoselivka Persha and, to the south, Mezhove. So Russia is now getting very close to the city of Pokrovsk. Between the current combat line and Pokrovsk (which is a major supply route to Ukrainian forces in the region) and still to be captured lie Hrodivka (now entered by Russisan forces), Novohrodivka and Zhuravka.

Russian Media Consumption

A report by Denis Volkov in Russia.post from Russia’s Levada Center (Volkov) notes a very gradual decline in television news audiences over the past 10 years. Only 65% of the country’s adults now say that they depend on television as their major source of news, down from 90% in the 1990s and 2000s. But Russians continue to watch a lot of television. There has been no sharp drop in viewership. The role of Russian television in covering and discussing current events has actually expanded over the past two years.

Changes have been more dramatic in the case of print media. Over the past 15 years, the audience of newspapers has decreased sixfold, from 37% to 5-6%. in 1990, 90% of RSFSR residents read the press more or less regularly. The audience for online publications and for online news, on the other hand, in the last 15 years has gone from 9% to 28-30%. The growth in number of those who say that social media are an important source of news has tripled in just 13 years, jumping from 14% in 2011 to 38-40% today.

Finally, the rise of Telegram channels now impacts a quarter of the population. About 15% of Russians use YouTube for news. Fewer people trust online sources than trust television for newss. The trust level for Telegram channels is 18%, for online publications and social media 16-17%, YouTube 7%, whereas for Television it is about 50%. Slightly more than half of Russians who get news from various online sources continue to also watch TV news programs and talk shows. Television shapes a person’s views to a greater extent than the internet does.

“About a third of Russians get news almost exclusively from television, meaning their views on current events are strongly influenced by what is said and shown on TV. Two thirds of them are 55 years old or older and three quarters live outside big cities. Among these people, support for the authorities, the special operation in Ukraine and the results of past presidential elections is most pronounced (at about 90% for each point).

Another third of the population gets news from both television and the internet, using various online sources. Their views, reading of the situation in the country and attitude toward the authorities should be more diverse, it would seem, but this is not the case – the opinions across both the abovementioned groups on most social and political issues are practically indistinguishable. Despite the growth in the number of active internet users, television clearly surpasses the internet in its ability to influence andindoctrinate and continues to shape the worldview and political attitudes of most Russians”.

Middle East: Peace for Arms?

Writing in Asia Times yesterday James Davis reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin has sent a personal letter, delivered by Sergei Shoigu in Tehran on Monday, to Iran’s leaders asking them to refrain from military action against Israel while he attempts to mediate between the two countries. Reuters had previously reported on August 6 that Putin had asked Iran to avoid civilian casualties in any prospective military action on Israel. Reuters has also reported that Iran asked Russia to sell it Su-35 fighters, one of Russia’s most advanced airframes. A day before, a New York Times report claimed that Russia was sending air defense systems to Iran, while also citing Russian sources to the effect that Russia does not have weaponry to spare from its ongoing operation in Ukraine. Davis’ sources claim that Iran has asked for Russia’s S-400 air defense systems, which have a range of up to 400 kilometers and capacity to track multiple targets. This would replace Iran’s existing S-300. Some analysts believe that the S-400 can track American stealth aircraft like the F-22 and F-35.

Nuclear Weapons

Writing in Tom Dispatch this week, Hekmat Aboukhater and William Hartung discuss a $2 trillion Pentagon multiyear plan to build a new generation of nuclear-armed missiles, bombers, and submarines. Much of the $2 trillion funding will go to Bechtel, General Dynamics, Honeywell, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman.

The authors note that a review of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program found that the missile, which involves 450 missile-holding silos spread across five states, is already 81% over its original budget, and will now cost nearly $141 billion. Instead of closing the Sentinel program, the Pentagon review doubles down on it. This, in spite of the fact that, according to a 2020 poll by the University of Maryland’s Program for Public Consultation, 61% of Americans would prefer to op out from ICBM systems like the Sentinel.

That the public voice counts for nothing is in part the product of a strong nuclear weapons lobby which employs between 800 and 1,000 lobbyists, well more than one for every member of Congress. Most of those lobbyists hired by ICBM contractors come through the “revolving door” from careers in the Pentagon, Congress, or the Executive Branch. ICBM contractors have made contributions to 92 of the 100 senators and 413 of the 435 house members in 2024. The nuclear lobby paid special attention to members of the armed services committees in the House and Senate and to Think Tanks such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies. During the last four election cycles, ICBM contractors spent upwards of $226 million on 275 extremely well-paid lobbyists.

A commonly employed “public interest” argument that lobbyists employ to justify their activity is that nuclear weapons are good for jobs (ignoring the likely greater numbers of jobs that could be created if the money was spent differently). Northrop Grumman claims it will create 10,000 jobs in its development phase alone, jobs which it can distribute across many different states, even if their number is miniscule in relation to the American workforce of 167 million (many of whom would be killed in a nuclear war).

While the US is pushed along towards ever deeper commitment to nuclear weapons, it is, of course, as the authors acknowledge, pushing towards a deeper commitment to nuclear war and, even, accidental nuclear war, issues that I have discussed many times in these posts. Potential causes of nuclear war are of course exacerbated by the presence of and commitment to the building and modernization of nuclear weapons. And now, NATO is doing its best to multiply the pretexts that might justify both the weapons and the wars. Admiral Robert Bauer, head of NATO’s military committee, announced in June that NATO planned to recognize state-backed cyberattacks on its members as a dedicated pretext for activating Article 5. From now on, foreign hacking can be countered with a collective NATO response heralding, as Kit Klarenberg notes in his most recent contribution to Covert Action, a modern, digital form of “false flag.”

Europe

For World Socialist Web Site, Alex Lantier (Lantier) reports that President Emmanuel Macron is preparing to form a right-wing government, trampling on the results of the July 7 election and even though Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s New Popular Front (NFP) won the election amid a surge of opposition to Macron’s policies and to the far-right National Rally. However, Macron is considering naming right-wing politician Xavier Bertrand as prime minister. Lantier opines:

“These plans amount to a conspiracy against the people and, above all, against the working class. They are discussed behind the backs of the masses, with the media almost entirely focused on the Paris Olympics, and at the height of the French summer holidays. But even after Macron’s party has been reduced to a small minority in the National Assembly and his policies have been rejected by an overwhelming majority of the French people, moves are afoot to name a government based on the same forces as before the July 7 election.

“The main enabler of this conspiracy, however, is Jean-Luc Mélenchon and the NFP coalition. The NFP holds the largest single bloc of votes in the National Assembly, after carrying the votes of the bulk of the urban working class in the 2022 presidential and 2024 legislative elections. Yet the NFP has proven itself completely incapable and unwilling to call on its millions of working class voters to mobilize and strike to bring down Macron’s right-wing conspiracy”.