Reflections on Realism, Gifts and Nuclear Weapons
On Ideology and Realism
In the face of the neoconserative ideology that has pushed the USA into many wars over the past few decades, it can be reassuring to think that ideology of this fanatic stripe has its counterpoint in sanity, a view that is sometimes called the “realist” perspective.
The claim to sanity is based nor so much on some idea of moderation or even virtue, when balanced against an ideology that, as in NATO’s proxy war with Ukraine, seems so counterproductive for the welfare of NATO members and the welfare of the entire world. Rather the idea of “realism” in foreign policy and the relationships between nations, invokes a predictable, almost mathematical calculation of what is in a country’s (or an alliance’s) best interests and the extent to which relationships with other nations can contribute to or detract from that basic goal. This is all set within a framework of mutual international understanding and legislation that guides processes of international regulation and conflict-management.
Certainly it is not difficult to see how many reasonable and fair-minded statesmen and stateswomen might find in such a concept (realism) their north pole.
However I propose that the concept of realism, both as a method of analysis and as a guide to action, while quite sound, has significant limitations as well.
First of all it takes as a given the centrality of the State as the basic buiding block of international relations. This Westphalian presumption, while quite attractive in theory hasn’t worked out so well in practice, because it does not handle too well the huge variations in differences of size, power and culture between States: States with power, historically, get a disproporationate influence over setting the rules of the game, and disproportionate influence in their ability to invest in regulatory, trade and other relationships and in that way to secure their advantage over others.
A second issue has to do with the relationship between State, on the one hand, which is a system or machinery of governance, one that takes on a distinctive hue in each different State, is not the same as nation. The notion of nation calls into play very complex and slippery issues of preference, behavior, and memory or, to put it somewhat differently, value systems, clusters of identity, custom, and history. All of these have objective and subjective dimensions and their fit with the State at any given time can be anything from fairly harmonious to raucously antagonistic. In this latter case, States generally fail and fall apart.
Thirdly, all States and nations are characterized by hierarchy and by the potential for fissure. The different parties to these hierarchies have different interests, different concerns; some seek to stabilize and to entrench their advantages while others seek to shake up the hierarchies so that in the ensuing process of collapse and rebuilding, their own interests may be more satisfactorily met. It is not impossible even in such contexts of friction and tension for the different parties to agree what is in the “common interest,” the “National” interest but, even when they do, their perceptions of how this can best be articulated and achieved, which dimensions should be foregrounded or backgrounded, will likely demonstrate important distinctions which from one moment to another feed into or shape the grounds for continuing friction or tension.
Fifthly, calculations of National interest may be based on good or poor evidence, and there will be differing views as to what constitutes “evidence,” as to what constitutes “analysis,” and what kinds of evidence (for example, relating to short, medium or long-term) should be given priority. These differences and distinctions will be differentially expressed and refracted by means of the always emerging, always changing, system of governance.
Last, but not least, there is an alternative dimension beyond the “real” that so often comes into play. It reminds me of the old debate between classic Marxists on the one hand, who argued that the “superstructure” of a given social system was determined by the basic economic conditions for survival of that system, as against those of the Frankfurt School and philosophers of cultural studies, on the other, which maintained that this relationship between economic base and superstucture was a very slippery one, and that the driving potential of the base did not, by any means, have unquestionable control or even causal status over the superstructure even if, as so often is the case and as Marx said: the ideas of the ruling classes are the ruling ideas (even, or perhaps especially, among the ruled). Because, so frequently, values and beliefs and ideas appear to be in control.
On F16’s and Ukraine
These broad considerations play out in many ways in this specific context of Ukraine and I do not have time to explore all of them here. But let us take the question of the nuclear bomb. No mentally stable human beings consider that self-destruction is in their best interests. Where they and their allies are in possession of such destructive power they must balance any measure of comfort they derive from the thought that their capability of unleashing such power is a disincentive for others not to challenge their national security and national “best interests,” against the temptation to improve their interests precisly by wielding such power, and to strengthen the validity of that power in the eyes of their opponents by engaging in behavior that supposedly demonstrates their ability and motivation to use it or even, through the actual use of that power.
Calculations as to nuclear offense and defense are riddled with an amazing number of variables including the technological (e.g. space, air, sea or land baded?), the political (who gets a voice, and what weight does any voice actually have) and the cultural (e.g. are nuclear weapons inherently wrong and therefore to be set aside, or are they an unavoidable factor in the security environment with which responsive governors must deal).
So, to pick up on some of the issues that have come up in my recent posts, I will dwell a little further on the question of the F-16s. We know that F-16s have been used in the past to carry nuclear-tipped missiles and that they can be adapted for that purpose again, perhaps quite easily. I don’t know and I suspect very few people actually do know what would be involved in loading nuclear missiles on to F-16s, either in terms of adaptation of the plane, or adaptation of the missiles, adaptation of the pilots in terms of training, adaptation of digital surveillance and targeting devices required for accurate implementation. We don’t know for example where, exactly, the nuclear warheads would come from, where they might be fitted, and how well they would perform in practice.
We know that the specific F-16s in question have identifiable origins, ages and histories within different military hierarchies of different nations that are different one from the other in their access to nuclear warheads.
There is so much we do not know, so much that is not discussed or even discussible in our media and our political systems, so many points in decision-chains that might allow for more inclusive involvement but do not, so much that is taken, most unreasonably, on trust. We all tend to assume that someone else, somewhere, must know what we do not, whose knowledge is current and multi-dimensional (versed in technology, international relations and intercultural difference, media and propaganda, and human psychology, amongs other things) whose assessments are correct and wise, whose superiors are wiser and that these people have values and experiences, perceptions and customs that are not so dissimilar from our own - and this is important to us because we, after all, are reasonable, reasonably virtuous, and reasonably smart. We think.
Escalation to Nuclear War
We have seen several major escalations in the past few weeks. These include but are not limited to: giving more money and weapons to Ukraine; providing more air defense systems to Ukraine; destruction of elements of Russian nuclear infrastructure that greatly enhances the chances of either accidental or intentional nuclear conflict; provision to Ukraine of advanced fighter jets such as F-16s and Mirages (that may well need to be based in Romania or Poland, necessitating Russian strikes beyond Ukraine in the event of their launch, thus widening the war, enhancing the chances of nuclear triggers); deployment of significant numbers of NATO “boots on the ground,” who are already being slaughtered in Ukraine; giving permission to Ukraine to deploy - always with NATO involvement - advanced weapons against Russian targets in Russian territory; considering negotiation with Russia only in terms, as in Lucerne later this month - of a hopelessly unrealistic demand for a complete Russian withdrawal.
The logic of escalation overpowers many of the factors that in the past many of us have presumed to be major sources of control over bad things happening. For example, because our politicians, businesses and intellectuals claim that they are committed to economic growth, we tend to assume that they will therefore avoid behavior that depresses and impedes economic growth. In this matter of Ukraine, for example, we see that rather than pursue the creation of national wealth, NATO and Europe as a whole have abandoned this goal, depleted their wealth through gratuitous “gift-giving” (to Ukraine, where the gifts are quickly destroyed), voluntarily severed the supply to Europe of cheap Russian oil and gas in favor of more expensive US oil and gas or or of rerouted but more expensive Russian oil and gas; auto-destroyed European energy infrastructure (as in Nord Stream); undermined European military security (e.g. by giving away expensive, complex, hard-to-replace air defense systems, a charity that makes Europe more vulnerable to attack); and wielded economic weapons (e.g. sanctions) against opponents (who never actually were opponents until they were artificially converted to that role) even when these weapons incentivized opponents to be stronger while wrecking Europe’s own economies by deindustrialization, deglobalization, and monetary marginalization.