Red Lines Crumbling

ISIS-K

Controversies persist over the facts and significance of the Crocus City Hall attacks of last Friday. Pepe Escobar notes that this facility belongs to an Azeri-Russian billionaire who is thought to be a friend to Donald Trump. But this in itself tells us next to nothing. Russia is saying that the four gunmen arrested during their flight towards Ukraine (there is no further mention that I have seen so far today relating to the seven other persons that are said to have assisted) were Tajiks, which would be consistent with a connection to ISIS-Khorosan, or ISIS-K, even though the claim of ISIS responsibility has reportedly come from ISIS central rather than ISIS-Khorosan.

Indicative of problems with the official ISIS-was-culpable narrative are, first, that the gunmen did not stand their ground and die in battle, which is the usual hall-mark of ISIS methodology; second, that they say they were paid for this operation, even if not paid very much, something which, again, is not usual ISIS terror methodology that depends on martydom for reward; third, that the gunmen chose to flee towards Ukraine, where Russia says there was some form of “window” ready to assist their quick entry, rather than back towards Central Asia where they could have found readier camouflage; and, fourth, that there is a long history of manipulation of Salafist entities by western intelligence agencies. The notion that somehow the Banderite regime of Ukraine is too good and pure to engage in indiscriminate attacks of this kind is pure nonsense, since that is precisely what they did at the time of the Maidan and the Odessa Trade Union fire, and what they have been doing to the people of the Donbass since 2014, and to the people of Donetsk City up until now. To cite just a few examples.

Missile Duels

There has been a third night of Russian missile and other strikes against targets in Ukraine, which apparently included an airfield in the west of Ukraine that was being modified for the receipt and launch of F16s. A separate Geran strike hit a major gas storage facility in Western Ukraine, with likely implications for the cost of gas in Ukraine and for European clients that it serves. A Ukrainian barrage of drones and missiles was targeted against points in Belgorod and, more significantly, Crimea, where Ukraine claims that it hit two Russian landing ships (disputed by Dima for lack of evidence, midday March 24). In his daily broadcast, Alexander Mercouris speculates that Ukraine may be hastening to inflict as much damage as possible to the Kerch bridge before the completion of road and rail routes across the new landbridge between Crimea and the mainland, which is expected to take place before the end of this year. This doesnt make a lot of sense to me given that long-range missiles that Ukraine will have access to will presumably be able to hit the new road and rail connections once these are complete, or even while still in the process of construction. A danger for Ukraine is that it may quickly deplete Storm Shadows, Neptunes and Czech Vampires even in advance of what may very well be a major Russian offensive over the coming Summer.

Where such an offensive might occur is a hot subject for continuing debate. One notes the (relative!) speed with which Russia, having taken Orlivka and Tonenke to the west of Avdievka, is already moving on settlements to the west of those, and will likely proceed faster once they have completed operations against Berdychi and Pervomaiske. West of Bakhmut might be another possibility once the capture of Ivanivske is completed and the taking of Chasiv Yar - up to the canal, the Popov forest, Bohdanivka and Klishchiivka (semi-encircled by Russian forces) is likewise achieved - all seemingly imminent (confirmed by Dima today), as we have discussed in many previous postings, possibly a harbinger of Russia finally taking Siversk and Bilohorivka to the north. Other analysts point with greater centainty to the northern border regions and the Lyman-Kremmina-Kupyansk-areas.

Biden v. Zelenskiy

The Ukrainian leadership has been warned by western intelligence agencies that Russia’s previous tacit agreement not to go after Ukraine’s leading political and military leaders is no longer operative, according to a Telegram channel thought to be close to former military chief Zaluzhnyi and cited this morning in his daily broadcast by Alexander Mercouris.

A Financial Times article reports a dispute between the Biden administration and the Kiev regime which has to do with Biden’s opposition to Kiev attacks on Russian oil facilties because these create upward pressure on oil prices which in turn may have negative economic impacts that would be harmful to Biden’s electoral prospects. But Kiev is paying no attention. Mercouris is skeptical of this story, noting that while Russia does export some refined petroleum products, most of Russia’s exports are of crude oil, and Ukrainian drone attacks are unlikely to make any difference to these. Russian crude oil exports have been on the rise recently, albeit at somewhat higher prices. Nor do the Ukrainian attacks appear to be impacting domestic availability of petroleum products within Russia itself. Perhaps, Mercouris speculates, the story is another indication of Washington’s attempts to distance itself from Ukrainian terror tactics.

Palestine

Israel persists in saying that it will launch a ground operation against Rafah and is refusing to defer to US pressure for it not to proceed, even though the scale of military activity has been dialled down significantly with only three and a half IDF brigades currently in Gaza (although an increase from 30,000 to 32,000 deaths is a lot more than nothing), creating what Mercouris today describes as a “smoke and mirrors” situation in which not everything is as it seems.

Trita Parsi for the Quincy Institue notes today that though the most recent UNSC resolution fell short of clearly demanding a ceasefire, Moscow and Beijing nevertheless “enabled Biden to shift the blame to Russia for the Council’s inaction, even though Biden has been the key obstacle to progress at the Council for the last six months”.

The clause that the UNSC “determines the imperative of an immediate and sustained ceasefire to protect civilians on all sides, allow for the delivery of essential humanitarian assistance, and alleviate humanitarian suffering, and towards that end unequivocally supports ongoing international diplomatic efforts to secure such a ceasefire in connection with the release of all remaining hostages,” does not demand a ceasefire but determines that it is imperative. Its support is for the negotiation process that the US has been co-leading “and whose parameters the U.S. has sought to determine in favor of Israel”. Further the text indicates conditionality on the release of all remaining hostages.”

The current draft has watered down the language on Rafah, only expressing “concern that a ground offensive into Rafah would result in further harm to civilians” instead of demanding that it be prevented.