Pondering Pokrovsk

As I follow reports of battlefield conditions in Ukraine it seems increasingly obvious that Russian advances are currently so fast and so extensive that Russia will, in effect, have encircled at least one half of Pokrovsk, which is in the Donetsk oblast that Russia has incorporated within the Russian Federation.

Russian progress is still held back in certain places, including by Ukrainian defense of an access route to the centre of the Selydove settlement. I am inclined to think that these barriers to Russian advances are temporary.

Pokrovsk is widely reported to be an indispensible communications, transportation and supply hub for Ukrainian defenders. It is certain that Russia needs to subjugate the city, as it is committed to securing Donetsk and if it wishes to continue its advance to the Dnieper - as it must, given that the Dnieper, regardless of what people warn are the administrative problems of adjudicating river issues between two opposing powers, is probably the most obvious natural border between a “rump Ukraine” (headquartered in Lviv?) and the new, extended Russia, albeit, to be frank, one that may involve the splitting of cities such as Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kiev and Odessa.

Does the city of Pokrovsk need to be invaded? I am inclined to think not. First of all, we have the problem of civilians. Ukraine has ordered mass evacuation but it also benefits from Russian unwillingness to proceed in such a way that large numbers of civilians are endangered. Many of these people, of course, are ethnically, culturally and linguistically pro-Russian. A reckless Russian assault on a civilian population which is significantly pro-Russian would be wholly counterproductive, not to say criminal. In the meantime, remaining civilians, and these are still very numerous (50,000?), to all accounts, function as “human shields” for Ukraine, which is holding this territory against the popular will and the establishment in 2014 of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.

Secondly, I suspect that Russia can achieve many of its objectives without a ground offensive, exploiting its air, missile and artillery advantages. Should it stand back from such an offensive Russia will be in a better position to maintain pressure on Ukrainian forces in Kursk and at all other key points of the combat line. It will better weather any surprise attacks by Ukraine along the northern borders or elsewhere. It will be in a better position to launch new offensives of its own, and to carry on with widespread missile and drone attacks across Western Ukraine (as it has been doing just recently in Lyvo and Poltava. It will be better positioned to adapt to any new pressures, of any sort, from Washington, Brussels or Kiev.

Although Pokrovsk, with a pre-war population of 75,000 is much smaller than, say, Mariupol, with a pre-war population of over 400,000 (now down to approximately 100,000+), I think there is an argument that would recommend against Russia entering and occupying the city, a measure that would hold it down with all manner of administrative preoccupations at a time when it can least afford to be hampered in such a way (the same was true of Kherson in 2022) and opening itself to attack from its western flank. Better to try to encircle troops around the city and control it in that way while maintaining strategic flexibility across the region.

Please note that over the next days I shall be heavily engaged in both teaching and family activities and may not be able to resume longer posts until some time earlyish next week. Thank you all for your forebearance.