Israel-Iran
As of early Friday morning (April 19) it appears that Israel has fired drones and/or other projectiles to the cities of Isfahan and either Tabriz (in Iran’s Azerbaijan region,close to the republic of Azerbaijan - the drones could conceivably have been fired from Azeri territory) or Tehran, maybe both, and that Iranian sources are saying that they shot down drones apparently aimed at Iranian military facility, an airfield, and what we should presume is a nuclear enegery facility. According to Iranian sources, all the drones were shot down. The strikes were apparently supplemented by Israeli strikes on pro-Iranian militia facilities in Syria, Iraq and the Lebanon. Strikes may have included a hit on a building in Baghdad in which there was a meeting of militia, perhaps including Iranian officials.
Israel has not officially acknowledged that it was responsible for the attacks but the universal presumption is that they were indeed Israeli attacks and that they amount to the anticipated “response” to Iran’s drone and missile attacks on Israel (although that certainly is not guaranteed).
Iran has previously warned that in the event of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear energy facilities, Iran would have to acquire nuclear weapons. It could do this by enriching uranium to the point necessary for it to construct its own nuclear bomb; or it could acquire, presumably by purchase, nuclear warheads from a country like North Korea to attach to Iranian-made supersonic or hypersonic missiles that Iran may have developed, or it could import a nuclear bomb system. I would interpret some sources as suggesting that Iran by now has its own nuclear weapon or weapons, although this is not generally acknowledged to be the case amongst the best sources: so, for example, the IAEA (a UN agency, like the OPCW that I regard has having been coopted by the globalist camp) regularly confirms what the Iranian government freely admits namely, that it is increasing the level of purity of its uranium; while the US intelligence community has also regularly confirmed that Iran does not possess any nuclear weapons. I would think that if Iran did actually create one nuclear bomb and attach it to a suitably powerful missile, it would quickly attract the attention of Israel’s 200+ nuclear weapon arsenal: in other words, it would be more dangerous for Iran to actually have a single bomb than it would be for it, as at present, to continue its ambiguous status of being a “nuclear threshold” country.
At the time of writing it appears that the Israeli attack, if that is indeed what has occurred, is a restrained counter-measure to Iran’s firing of 300 projectiles on to Israel a few days ago. This latter, of course, was retaliation for Israel’s attack on sovereign Iranian territory at its consulate in Damascus a few days previously, and for the consequent murder of three Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders and a number of civilians. I have come across no information at this time as to any damage that was caused by Israel to Iranian people or assets in the latest Israel attack.
Egypt and Palestine
Egyptian sources are reported to have claimed in Egyptian media that the US has struck a deal with Israel that Israel would conduct only a symbolic attack on Iran in return for the US cooperating with Iran in its planned asssault on Rafah. Here, it is reported, Israel is planning a grid operation by clearing one square area after another, and allowing or encouraging the flight of the people of Gaza to camps already being prepared by the Egyptian Red Crescent in Khan Younis and other parts of Gaza.
I am not inclined to believe the narrative of a deal between the US and Israel on pulling its punches in its assault on Iran: it seems to me that Israel will do whatever it wants, with or without US permission. The story of some kind of deal being struck may simply be intended to provide Israel cover for not launching a more aggressive response to Iran. Isarael avoids looking weak, in other words, for not biting the bullet of a major regional war (or worse), at the same time seeming to do a favor for the Biden Administration.
There is a chance that the manouver may result in a slighly less terrible outcome for the people of Gaza, but only because of the intervention, not of the USA, but of an Egypt that is opposed to the flight of Palestinians onto Egyptian territory in Sinai and that has from the 1978 Camp David Agreements up until now offered itself as a prop to continuing US hegemony in the Middle East. It is difficult to believe that the Egyptian Red Crescent has the resources available to safely care for one and a half million Palestinians, although at least a part of this displaced population in Rafah seems disposed to return to otherwise demolished areas of northern Gaza.
However Rafah is part of the nine mile long Philadelphi corridor that separates Egypt from Gaza and that in recent years has been policed by the Egyptian army and Palestinian authority with a view to closing off any supply routes between the two territories. Israel’s recent threat to take over the Philadelphi strip may finally promote conflict with Egypt with as yet unknown consequences either for the possibility of Palestinians securing access into Egypt or for Egypt’s future policy towards Israel.
The US yesterday exercised its veto to block the Palestinian bid for membership of the UN as opposed to its current observer role. The US forced this status upon Palestine back in 2011 and is sticking to that - even as it formally supports the cause of a “two state” solution to this long-standing Middle East crisis. In effect, the US is now opposed to the formation of a Palestinian state and and backing Israel’s own adamant opposition to a Palestinian state.
Ukraine
Dima reported yesterday three cases of possible Russian sabotage of 155mm shell ammunition factories in the West (1 in the UK, and two in the US) which have burned down, although there are other potential causes. Czech President Pavel appears to be close to conceding that he cannot come up with the number of shells to becpurchased on the international market as he had once promised: the prices have inevitably rocketed since his original declaration of intent.
Germany may provide more Maaders.
There are increasing anxieties both in Russia and in Washington as to what will be the case, legally, if Zelenskiy remains in power after the expiry of his Presidency beyond late May, as no documents carrying his name will have legal weight beyond that date.
This may have some bearing on the supply of further aid to Ukraine from Washington. On this topic it does seem that Democrat support has been essential to the progress of Mike Johnson’s efforts, so far, to bring (I believe this is happening today) to the floor of the House of Representatives separate aid packages for (mainly) Ukraine, Israel, the South China Sea. These will likely pass even if Johnson himself is ousted as speaker by the Republican caucus. CIA Director Bill Burns has said that if Ukraine does not receive more aid, there is a real possibility of a collapse of the Ukrainian army before the end of the year. If Congress does authorize aid, then Burns is confident Ukraine can survive to the end of the year.
The $61 billion is unlikely to make any difference on the battlefields, for reasons I have outlined in recent posts. As Biden makes clear in an opinion piece for the Wall Street Journal today, most of this money will be spent on the US armaments industry and the jobs that will allegedly be created as a result. There is little left currently available to send to Ukraine, so it will first have to be produced, and produced by a country that is very far from being the industrial powerhouse of the 1940s, that charges far too much for the products that it produces, and one that (as Larry Johnson tells Judge Napolitano earlier today) can only produce around one missile a day for Patriot systems, and dares hope to be able to eventually increase this to one and a half a day!
It appears that the strike by Russia on a hotel in Cherniv two days ago did kill a number of Ukrainian army as well as foreign, including French mercenary (Foreign Legion) personnel. The Russian MoD is reporting far less damage resulting from Ukraine’s attack on the Dzhankoy airfield in Crimea earlier this week than initially reported.
There has been a very large country-wide strike by Russia, night of April 18, on Ukrainian facilities, with a particular focus on Dnipro (including hits on several air defense installations, an airfield, three or four MiG 29 fighter jets and missile launchers) and power stations near Kharkiv. Other than in the case of Dnipro, there were few or no air defenses around other Russian targets in last night’s strike.
On the battlefields, there have been reports of Russian progress, albeit often in the face of Ukrainian counterattacks, in key combat zones such as Ocheretyne (north of Avdiivka), and, to its east, Novokalinovo, and, in the general area of Avdiivka, Pervomaiske, Naitailove, Krasnohorivka and a nearby village of Nevelske, Novomykhailivka and, west of Bakhmut, Chasiv Yar.
Ukraine has been firing on the Russian border town of Belgorod, damaging two houses and injuring one or two individuals. Recently-installed Russian air defense systems are otherwise said to be largely successful in intercepting Ukrainian missiles. Previous attacks had been much more devastating, requiring the evacuation of up to 9,000 children.