Nuclear Escalations
On February 24, 2026, Russia’s foreign intelligence service (SVR) accused the United Kingdom and France of preparing to provide Ukraine with nuclear components or a “dirty bomb.”
This allegation should be placed in the context of numerous, reckless NATO/CIA/Ukraine assaults on Russia’s nuclear triad.
These included, most recently, a massive drone attack targeting one of President Vladimir Putin’s residences (also serving as a nuclear command and control center). Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reported that Ukraine launched 91 drones at one of Putin’s official residences in the Novgorod region (specifically near Lake Valdai) between the night of Sunday, December 28, and Monday, December 29, 2025. Russia stated that its air defense systems intercepted all the drones, resulting in no casualties or damage to the residence. This incident follows drone attacks on the Kremlin in May 2023 and December 2024.
Additionally:
Operation Spider’s Web (June 2025). This has been described as Ukraine’s most sophisticated long-range operation, a swarm of 117 drones that targeted multiple strategic airbases, but most expert analysts assess that this, as in all Ukraine attacks on the Russian mainland, is supported with intelligence and other NATO assets and should be ascribed to their facilitation primarily. The attack hit at least four airbases. Ukraine claimed to have damaged or destroyed 41 aircraft—roughly 34% of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet, including Tu-95 “Bear” and Tu-22M “Backfire” bombers. Satellite imagery confirmed substantial damage, though Moscow initially reported fewer losses.
Early-warning radar sites (May 2024): Ukraine (doubtless backed by NATO and the CIA) conducted a series of drone strikes against Voronezh-series radars in Krasnodar and Orenburg, which are critical for detecting incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
The Engels-2 strategic bomber base in the Saratov region has been attacked several times, damaging Tu-95MS bombers and hitting cruise missile warehouses.
A drone detonation near the Kursk nuclear plant in August 2025 reportedly damaged an auxiliary transformer, though it can be argued that this should be considered civilian energy infrastructure rather than a direct strike on the military triad.
Returning to the most recent SVR claims, Britain and France are said to believe that giving Ukraine a wonder weapon would allow Kyiv to negotiate more favorable peace terms. The plan reportedly involves the secret transfer of European technology and equipment, to make it appear that Ukraine developed the weapon independently (similar to the logic of “Ukraine’s” flamingo ballistic missile developed by Britain and manufactured in Denmark but launched from Ukraine). The SVR claimed the nations are considering full-fledged nuclear weapons or a radioactive “dirty bomb”. Intelligence allegedly suggests the French TN75 warhead normally used on M51.1 submarine-launched missiles—is being considered for transfer. The SVR stated that Germany was aware of the plan but refused to participate.
In response, Dmitry Medvedev has warned that Russia would be forced to use non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons against targets in Ukraine and potentially the supplier countries involved. Russia has called on the UK and French parliaments, as well as the UN and IAEA, to investigate. The French Embassy in Moscow, Downing Street in London, and Ukraine have denied the allegations.
Some skeptical voices wonder that the US could possibly greenlight such a plan but they may underestimate the fanaticism of British and other European agencies that have gotten them into the mess they are already in but cannot escape.
The following is an AI generated list of all attacks on Russia’s nuclear triad since 2021:
Since 2021, and particularly following Russia’s SMO, Russia’s nuclear triad—consisting of land-based ICBMs, strategic bombers, and submarine-launched missiles—has faced several unprecedented strikes. These attacks have primarily targeted the aviation and early-warning legs of the triad.
Below is a list of documented attacks on components of Russia’s nuclear triad since 2021:
1. Strategic Aviation (Bomber Leg)
The most frequent targets have been the airbases housing Russia’s strategic bombers (Tu-95MS and Tu-160), which are capable of delivering nuclear cruise missiles.
Engels-2 Airbase (Saratov Oblast):
December 5, 2022: A long-range drone strike damaged at least two Tu-95MS strategic bombers.
December 26, 2022: A second drone attack reportedly killed three Russian servicemen; while aircraft damage was not confirmed, the base’s operations were disrupted.
2023–2024: Multiple drone incursions were reported, forcing Russia to relocate some of its fleet to the Arctic.
Dyagilevo Airbase (Ryazan Oblast):
December 5, 2022: Occurring simultaneously with the first Engels strike, a drone damaged a Tu-22M3 bomber and an fuel tanker.
Soltsy-2 Airbase (Novgorod Oblast):
August 19, 2023: A “copter-style” drone attack completely destroyed a Tu-22M3 long-range bomber on the tarmac.
Olenya Airbase (Murmansk Oblast):
July 2024: Long-range Ukrainian drones reportedly struck this base, located over 1,100 miles from the Ukrainian border, which serves as a major hub for Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers.
“Operation Spiderweb” (June 1, 2025):
A massive coordinated strike reportedly destroyed 41 Russian aircraft, including Tu-95s and Tu-160s, causing an estimated $7 billion in damage to the strategic fleet [19].
2. Early-Warning Infrastructure
These attacks target the “eyes” of the nuclear triad—the radar systems designed to detect incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
Armavir Radar Station (Krasnodar Krai):
May 23, 2024: Drones damaged a Voronezh-DM over-the-horizon radar. This station is critical for detecting nuclear launches from the south and southwest.
Orsk Radar Station (Orenburg Oblast):
May 26, 2024: A drone targeted a Voronezh-M radar station near Orsk, over 1,100 miles from Ukraine. This was notable as it monitors the southeastern direction, far from the conflict zone.
3. Land-Based ICBMs (Silo/Mobile Leg)
Direct attacks on ICBM silos or mobile launchers have not been confirmed, but related infrastructure has been hit.
Plesetsk Cosmodrome (Arkhangelsk Oblast):
While not a “hostile attack,” Russia’s land leg faced a significant setback in September 2024 when a test of the RS-28 Sarmat (Satan II) ICBM ended in a catastrophic explosion in its silo, leaving a massive crater and causing significant damage to the testing facility.
4. Naval Leg (Submarines)
Sevastopol Shipyard Strike (September 13, 2023):
While not a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the Rostov-on-Don (a Kilo-class attack submarine) was destroyed by cruise missiles. This was the first time a Russian submarine had been destroyed in combat since WWII, signaling a vulnerability in the naval infrastructure that supports the triad’s ports