NATO Nightmares (Repost)

(I am reposting and further developing this entry which I originally sent out around 7:00pm yesterday - California time - as it does not appear to have been sent out, as programmed by Substack, to all subscribers, an event which appears to happen at least once a month)

President Modi’s visit this week to Moscow, in the immediate aftermath of Modi’s electoral success in being the first Indian president after Nehru to be voted in for a third term, consolidates the view that India very much favors Russia over Ukraine in the NATO proxy war with Russia over Ukraine.

Modi’s public statements indicate his strong admiration for Putin. Russia is the principal source of weapons for India. One item on the two leaders’ agenda has to do with Russian dissatisfaction with the place of the rupee in trade of Russian supply of energy (oil and gas ) to India, the volume of which - as is also the case with Russian supply to China - has risen very considerably over the past two years.

The growth of trade has helped compensate Russia for the loss of Western markets and has helped Russia avoid some of the consequences of Western sanctions and caps on the sale of Russian energy products. So Russia is paid in rupees, yet there is not so much that Russia wants to buy from India that would help compensate for the low level of rupee convertibility. Since both Russia and India are, of course, members of the BRICS, and given that the BRICS countries, as their next summit will attest, are making headway in the development of a new, non-dollarized, trading currency, I sense that this issue of rupee convertibility will not be a game-changer.

India has, over the years, greatly strengthened its relationship with the USA and, like a number of other countries in the Global South, tries to balance its growing commitment to a de-dollarized future of multipolarity or multi-modality with maintaining passably good relations with the existing global hegemon. We can inquire whether the US is still the hegemon, even if its economy on a price parity basis is smaller than that of China, and even if its weapons production and military competence have taken a severe hammering as a result of its proxy support for Ukraine and in the light of its direct participation, through the supply of 14,000 2,000 bombs, in Israel’s policy of genocide.

But I would say that it is in the realms of global corporate leadership, cutting-edge digital technologies and, above all, finance capital - in the form of Blackrock and its competitors Fidelity Investments, Berkshire Hathaway, Charles Schwab, Edward Jones, Vanguard, State Street and Northern Trust - that the argument is best made for a continuing US hegemony - albeit one that is increasingly destabilized by mounting debt (currently $35 trillion, or around 40% of annual GDP).

India may see some advantages in maintaining a good working relationship with the USA as a potential source of support in India’s perpetual state of enmity with Pakistan (both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers, so relations between them are of critical importance, especially given Pakistan’s smaller population and smaller army) and as cover in the event of a major war along its extensive border with China. However, with one major exception in recent decades, border tensions between India and China are, if anything, surprisingly mellow.

Similar ambiguities that cut across the collective West/BRICS divide are increasingly discernible elsewhere, notably in the case of Turkey which, at the present time, appears to be moving towards the BRICS and the relinquishment of its long-standing NATO membership. Turkey at one time mistakenly thought NATO membership would buy it easy access into the EU but did not factor in the stubborn and hypocritical European attitudes to anything that does not conform to their idea of civic virture. A similar problem has been encountered by Hungary, although Hungary is in the EU and may contribute ultimately to its disintegration.

Turkish foreign policy is exceptionally mercurial but, despite it all, Putin and Erdogan have managed to sustain a cordial relationship for the past ten years or more. Much the same might be said for Saudi Arabia which for decades has been in the Washington camp but, disillusioned by scant Washington concern for Saudi interests in the price of oil, has closed a solidarity deal with Iran, and moved towards the BRICS.

In the light of the recent outcome of parliamentary elections in Iran, the new president, Pezeshkian, represents a neoliberal wing of the Iranian middle class that has long advocated for trying to restore better relations with the US, particularly with a view to persuading the West to lift economic sanctions. Pezeshkian wants to revive the 2015 nuclear accord but does not have an action plan towards that goal. He wants to see massive Western investment in Iran. But this is not the time for the collective West to want to help out Iran’s economy nor to want to risk the wrath of what is now a deeply unstable and dangerous, nuclearized, Israel and its rudderless hegemonic ally, the US.

I have previously argued, and still maintain, that improving relations with a Washington that is implacably opposed to Iran and everything that it stands for, is a fool’s errand. If Pezeshkian really wants to talk to the collective West from a position of sufficient strength to prise the collective West off of Iran’s back, then he needs the Supreme Leader to give the green light for a further intensification of uranium purification to nuclear weapon standards. I dont think that Khamenei is going to do this, for religious and perhaps for political reasons. In any case, Iran is now far too advanced in the direction of the Shanghai Cooperation Council and the BRICS, which would seem to offer Iran very considerable long-term benefits, and far too close to an open conflict with Israel and the US, to turn around mid-stream.

Similarly, we see continuing indications of a tussle of force between a neoliberal turn towards Washington in Venezuela, led of course by a right-wing opposition (recall the farce of Guaido whom the US one day decided should be Venezuela’s president but later dropped that idea) that would like to see a military coup, and the more dirigiste, socialist aspirations of the chavist Maduro. With the survival of the Bolivian government of Arce against a recent attempted coup (CIA meddling?) the distinctive pro-BRICS leadership of Lula’s Brazil, the left-wing turn in Colombia under pro-Palestine Gustavo Petro, and the embarrassing fanatic neocon idiocy of Argentina’s Milei, I doubt if the people of Venezuela - a diminished population, and a sanctions-battered economy as it is - will be much in the mood for a pro-Washington turn. Since the elections are due on July 28, we will soon find out.

And now of course recent elections in Europe are impacting the fate of NATO’s proxy war in Ukraine. In Britain, pro-Ukraine fanaticism will continue relatively unmolested by a Labour government that won only 33.7% of the vote, barely more than in the previous general election in 2019. But there are signs of wear at the edge, including the relative if modest success of Nigel Farage, leader of the Reform party which achieved 14% of the vote - that it acquired mainly from former Conservative Party members. He is the bearer of considerable culpability for the dirty, tiring and counterproductive shenanigans of Brexit, but the only leading British politician (George Galloway of the Workers Party is another) to articulate the real reasons for the NATO war in Ukraine and to advocate withdrawal.

In France, out of 577 French parliamentary seats, the Popular Front won 182, Macron’s bloc 163, Le Pen and her allies 143, and the Republicans 68. These numbers are the result of panicked horse-trading in the week between the first and second rounds of the election, which saw the Popular Front collaborate with Macron’s bloc to head off Le Pen. This means (1) that no bloc or party has a commanding majority; (2) France has entered a period of parliamentary chaos, pending, possibly, a coalition between the Popular Front and the Macron bloc or the formation of a minority government but (3) obstructing the possibility of stability are inevitable tensions between the parties that make up the Popular Front, while taking into account (4) that the Le Pen bloc will justifiably feel that the election has been stolen from them (the percentage of the vote they gained in the second round was actually higher than in the first, while the Popular Front’s share fell), constituting a dangerous, resentful force across a considerable proportion of the French electorate.

So far as Ukraine is concerned, President Macron, who has been among Europe’s most aggressive politicians in NATO’s proxy war againt Russia over Ukraine - and has recently declared (it is unclear) either having sent French forces into Ukraine or the intention of doing so - continues to hold responsibility for foreign policy and defense, but now faces a total electorate three quarters of whom are fed up with Ukraine. The leader of the Popular Front, Jean-Luc Melanchon, has in the past even advocated an alliance between France and Russia. He is bitterly opposed to the sending of French forces to Ukraine, the expenditure of more money on Ukraine, and allowing Ukraine to use French weapons against Russian targets in Russia. Some others in the Popular Front (this might include Raphael Glucksmann, the only leader in the Popular Front who has come out so far in favor of a coalition with the Macron bloc) are more “moderate”.

Like the US, the future of both the United Kingdom and of France is blighted by the accumulation of debt, heading to unsustainabe levels. Their commitment to giving away national wealth for the benefit of Ukraine’s unwinnable war against a much stronger and more resilient Russia, will simply makes things a great deal worse. French total debt to GDP stands at 112%; in the United Kingdom the equivalent figure is 104%. Both these figures are a great deal higher than the already frightening US debt level which, as already noted, stands at around 40% of GDP.

I noted with interest the following information shared yesterday by Gilbert Doctorow namely, that Orban’s Hungarian team has been building a bloc of like-minded deputies to the EU Parliament. He has signed up MEPs from 12 countries under the name Patriots for Europe, and they will constitute about one-third of the Parliament.

The group will oppose the status quo domination of European politics by the Center Left-Center Right coalition of the European People’s Party and the Socialists and Democrats party.  The rallying cry of the Patriots for Europe is less Europe, meaning less intrusive EU Institutions, legislation, regulation and debt financing. They are calling for restoration of national sovereignty, stricter control of the borders to keep out illegals, and other causes that have broad popular backing but have been opposed, suppressed or marginalized by the EU powers that be these last five years.  None of this bodes well for NATO, of which nearly all EU Member States are participants (Doctorow).

Another indication of the emergence of the multipolarity era appeared last week in West Africa. Leaders of Burkhina Faso, Niger and Mali m- having kicked out French and US imperialists who proved incompetent in dealing with or largely indifferent to the Al Qaeda terrorism that they themselves unleashed across the region following NATO’s illegal bombing of Libyam - have formed the Alliance of Sahel States.

NATO

The NATO summit in Washington convened today (Tuesday) until Thursday. German Bunderstag representative, Sevim Dagdelen, notes today that for NATO the denial of its true nature (an aggressive Atlanticist prop to maintain Washington global hegemony) is part of its essence. NATO claims to be about defense; that it is a community of democracies and that it exists to safeguard human rights. In practice, it is about offense; democracy means nothing to it (look at the Zelenskiy dictatorship in Ukraine); and it commits many more abuses than it prevents (recall NATO participation in the bloody debacles of Iraq, Libya and Syria).

The summit opened in somber mood, at a time in which Western leadership is dangerously rudderess, no less in Washington where Biden insists that he will hang on to the Presidency, even as many in the Democratic Party and in the media (including the New York Times and the Washington Post) urge him to stand down. The White House has confirmed that there will be no NATO membership for Ukraine at this time. French President Macron, perhaps in a spoiler mood after his electoral setback on Sunday, has disclosed that since 2008, it has been the USA and Germany who have been primarily driving opposition to NATO membership (France took this position too, earlier, but has since changed course). The White House has also retained its restrictions on the use of Western weapons to target Russian assets in Russia (i.e. limiting this use to the aggression on the Kharkiv area).

NATO claims to have 300,000 troops in a high state of readiness around Ukrainian/Russian borders were derided by former CIA analysts Ray McGovern and Larry Johnson, citing among others Scott Ritter, in interview with Judge Napolitano last Friday. Nonetheless the accession to membership of Sweden and Finland and a NATO claim to have 15 bases along the Finnish-Russian border certainly may be seen in an escalatory and threatening light, especially as Russia gains the view, as argued by George Beebe recently, that the US no longer fears nuclear war. This strengthens the view of those in Moscow who argue that the collective West therefore needs to be awakened to the real danger of such a war, by means of a “demonstration” of some kind.

Carl Bildt (Co-Chair, European Council of Foreign Relationa) has recently asked in Foreign Policy what will happen if Russia wins the war with the collective West? Note, incidentally, that it is indeed a war with the collective West, not just with Ukraine, a consideration that I think undermines Nicolai Petro’s recent advocacy for a negotiation that takes place directly between Russia and Ukraine with a view to securing Russian guarantees of a (rump) and NATO-neutral Ukrainian sovereignty. Be that as it may, Bildt’s asking of the question certainly makes one think that this view from pro-NATO positions is somewhat dejected.

Yes, Bildt is right to say that Russia would have trouble digesting Western Ukraine and having to confront a Ukrainian government-in-exile, perhaps in Warsaw, and that occupation would be a strain on Russian finances. I do not agree that it would necessarily make Russia any more “dependent” on China - and I think this notion of such “dependence” needs a great deal more unpacking if it is to be anything more substantial than wishful. That it would create a new wave of refugees (perhaps ten to fifteen million) into neighboring countries and into Europe generally would indeed be a burden for Europe (although a boon, too, for those European countries suffering demographic declines in adults of working age). But not for Russia.

NATO’s defense expenditure, Bildt argues, would double. This would be very much a burden for Europe and I dont think Europe has shown any sign yet that it can build up weapons production capability, and at an appropriately modest cost, that can come near to competing with what Russia has already achieved and will continue to achieve. The story of dire shortages in the production of 155mm shells by both the US and Europe is a case in point (at a rough guess I would say Russia is at least doubling the combined US/European rate of production).

Bildt asserts, on the basis of no evidence whatsoever, that Russia has expansionist ambitions far beyond the Donbass (Poland, the Baltics, etc.) and also asserts, on the basis of even less evidence, that its expansionist ambitions would inevitably result in the break-up of the Russian Federation.

The real fear, I argue, is not that Russia is inherently expansionist - it simply isn’t, and is a great deal smaller, by the way, than was the Soviet Union - but that European and US leaders will become so bedazzled by their own propaganda about Russian expansionism that they will - or perhaps already are - create the very condtions wherein Russia, for national security reasons, will be obliged to create an ever wider buffer zone between itself and its neighbors.

Putin’s offer on the table is for Ukraine to give up ambitions of NATO membership, withdraw its troops from the four regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zapporizhzhia and Kherson, and to concede that Crimea - as for the most of the past several hundred years - is Russian, in order for real negotiations to begin (these would tackle such issues as demilitarization and denazification, amongst others).

Under pressure from the Banderite Azov brigade and its nazi collaborators, Ukraine is disdainful. The war, therefore will go on to utter defeat of Ukraine at the cost of, what, another 100,000 or so Ukrainian lives? Where, in such circumstances, will Russia draw the line on its advance, if only for security reasons? I think Kharkiv and Odessa and possibly, even Kiev, will end up Russian. It has been argued that one under-researched consideration is the (un)suitability of the Dnieper as any kind of sensible border, given that rivers require collaboration between the populations of both sides of them. Particularly in view of the flatness of central Ukraine, problems of the river-related economy, fresh water supply, river traffic regulation and sewerage, to name but a few, are considerable. For this reason alone, Russia may consider itself obliged to cross the Dnieper and take in all the river, its banks and its watershed.

Into the mix will come calculations of the threats that would remain for Russia from an enemy that has access to long-range missiles. Ritter recently writes that when Trump took the US out of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 2019, Russia was at first disinclined to respond. But then in September 2023, the US placed two Mk 70 launchers in Denmark and in 2024 a Mk 70 launcher in the Philippines. Let us not forget the US stationing of nuclear capable “defense” systems in Poland and Romania and its earlier plans for the same in Ukraine.

This year Russia, in response, has resumed production of short and intermediate range missiles in Europe and the Pacific with a view to countering US Mk70 containerized missile launchers capable of firing the SM-6 “Typhon” dual-capability missile, and the Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missile. The Typhon has a range of 310 miles; the Tomahawk has a range of 1,800 miles.

Furthermore, as former Ukrainian spokesman Oleksiy Arestovyich appears to argue, Russia cannot possibly agree to peace conditions that leave the current government structure and (many of them nazi) personnel in place; nor can it negotiate while these people are still in power; a root-and-branch coup must come first.

Palestine

It comes as no great surprise, that the esteemed British medical journal, The Lancet, calculates that the real number of deaths of Palestinians for which Israel’s genocide in Gaza (and, increasingly, in the West Bank) is responsible is of the order of 186,000 (far higher than the 38,000 that is most commonly cited) and it might well end up proving to be much higher, even half a million. The Lancet performed a comparable service in calculating the number of deaths for which the Washington-led coalition was responsible during its invasion (on false pretext) of Iraq in 2003. Its methodology is far more sophisticated than the calculations of other sources but we have only to imagine the bodies that still lie beneath the Israeli-razed buildings of Gaza to know that 38,000 could only be an initial and conservative estimate.

Within days of the Lancet study, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz has belatedly confirmed that the claims by Max Blumenthal of the GrayZone, and others that, in their response to the events of October 7, the IDF applied the Hannibal Directive, which entitled it to the slaughter of many Israeli citizens (perhaps half, or more than half, of all those killed on October 7) so as to relieve the Israeli government of the burden of having to deal with all those additional hostages.

I note that Lt. Col. Macgregor is still undecided on the issue of whether the Palestinian assault was something that Israeli authorities “allowed to happen,” and I join him in my unwillingness to let go of just that possibility. Hamas was formed with the encouragement of Netanyahu in order to reduce the influence of the Palestinian Authority, and I cannot believe that in the process of its formation Mossad lost the opportunity to plant some of its own people close to the center of Hamas power both in order to monitor what was going on and, perhaps, to direct the organization towards the covert agenda of Zionist sponsors.

Israel - despite having lost half a million people who exited Usrael and the occupied territories after the start of the conflict; despite the fact that it clearly has not “won” the war against Hamas, even in Gaza; despite not showing itself able to effectively suppress the forces of Hezbollah in northern Israel; despite being torn apart internally over the Goverment’s seeming indifference to the plight of the hostages and over its decision to mobilize the ultra-orthodox; despite the grave damage that the war has served upon the country’s economy - still persists with the conflict. It refuses to provide Hamas with written guarantees that negotiations can proceed to the second phase with the assurance of a continuance of the ceasefire. Netanyahu is increasingly reckless in his embrace of “greater Israel” Zionist aspirations in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and perhaps further afield, and in his pursuit of US engagement in regional war upon suitable provocation of Iran - to what Netanyahu’s stupidly calculates would be Israeli benefit.

The Battlefields

Moscow has been heavily targeting Ukrainian energy facilities, airfields and air defenses. Energy production in Ukraine is so degraded that the country has to import electricity from its neighors, including Poland (16%), Hungary (17%), Romania (17%), Moldava (3%) and Slovakia (17%). This gives Hungary and Slovakia (two voices of reason within the liberal authoritarian ideologial bubble of the EU) considerable leverage as winter approaches.

Attacks on Ukrainian airfields appear to be motivated in good measure by a Russian determination to make it as difficult as possible for Ukraine to launch F-16s from Ukraine. And in order to do this, Russia increasingly attacks the air defense systems that protect these airfields, and these air defense systems include Patriot batteries.

Ukrainian claims that the Russian daytime missile attack yesterday (Monday) morning hit a children’s hospital are contested by the Russian MoD which claims that whatever fell on the hospital was debris from a Ukrainian defense missile and that Ukraine always comes up with such claims at the beginning of a NATO summit so as to be able to squeeze more money and arms out of the collective West. Caitlin Johnson has wryly observed that when Russia hits a hospital in Ukraine western media are quick to paint Russia as the cradle of all evil but that when Israel hits a hospital in Gaza, western media say they are waiting for Israel to tell them whether it was Hamas or Israel that did it.

One dangerous consequence of these recent developments, and I have referred to it many times in the past, is that the lack of suitable conditions in Ukraine may force NATO to place the F-16s - due to arrive from the Netherlands any day - in Poland and that Russia, not necessarily able to tell the difference between a Ukrainian or a Polish jet, and unsure whether or not they are nuclearized, will inevitably and necessarily for its own security, find itself firing on F-16s still on the ground in Poland or in flight over it. Adding to the dangers is the invitation by Zelenskiy in his meeting with Polish premier Duda yesterday (Monday) for Poland to shoot down Russian missiles over Ukrainian territory if Poland considers that they pose a danger to Poland.

The possibility of a direct extension of the war to include Poland is therefore becoming very immediate. On the other hand, working in a contrary direction, is the deep unpopularity of the war among Polish citizens and Polish interest in re-establishing control over parts of Western Ukraine in the event of a collapse of the Kiev regime or, possibly, even in collaboration with Kiev (in return for the friendly invasion of Ukraine by Polish forces to ‘protect’ it against Russia).

Russian missile attacks on Kiev have inflicted considerable further damage to the Artem Kiev Production Amalgamation, which produces many military goods. In addition to downing several Patriot missiles recently, and attacking Patriot launch sites, Russia - using Iskander-M missiles fitted with cluster warheads (a response to Biden’s greenlighting of Ukrainian use of cluster weapons a year ago), that Ukraine finds very difficult if not impossible to shoot down - has in the past few days destoyed four HIMARS launchers (which can also launch ATACMS missiles, one at a time).

Russia has recently destroyed a 20-vehicle Ukrainian convoy in the area of Sumy, close to the border, and possibly in the context of an unannounced Russian incursion into Sumy. Elsewhere on the battlefield, Russia is unable to hold back Ukrainian forces that are in control of 40% of the village of Hlyboke (mainly the farmlands), but continues to subject Ukrainian forces to very heavy (FAB 3000) bombing in Lyptsi (specifically, Slobozhanske, in the south of the settlement).

In Vovchansk, Russian forces have been identified in the southern sector of the city, south of the Volcha river, possibly a major breakthrough. Russia is bombing Ukrainian troop concentrations to the east of Vovchansk. Russian forces still control enclaves near Prytipka and Starytisa.

In the Kupyansk area, Russia is bombing Hiushkivka, and a supply road from that settlement to Pishchane. Russia controls the settlement of Stelmakhivka. In Siversk area, Russia is approaching Siversk from Makiivka, Rozdolivka, Verkhnokamianske, Bilohorivka and Zolotarivka. In Chasiv Yar the main center of fighting is now in the center of the settlement. Southwest of Bakhmut in the Toretsk and Niu-York area, Russia has established fire control over the supply road to Toretsk and is bombing the center of Toretsk. In Avdiivka, Russian forces have entered a bigh trench network east of Vozdizhenka (north west of Novooleksandrivka) and its forces are within 500 meters of Lozuvatske from which Russia can cut the supply road between Lozuvatske and Prohres to the south. Russia is forcing Ukrainians from their positions around Novoselivka Persha. A little further south, Russia is now (finally!) in control of Yasnobrodivka and remains a very short distance from Karlivka. Russia has FPV control from Nvohrodivka down to Kurakchivka, west of Krasnohorivka. It is edging ever closer to Pokrovsk via Selydove. In an additional advance, Russia has now physically cut the supply road between Kostysantynivka and Vuhledsr (the T05-24).