NATO is a Nightmare, to Russia
The above table is taken from a publication for the Quincy Institute by George Beebe, Mark Episkopos and Anatol Lieven (Beebe et al). The paper makes a very important argument, one that needs to be assessed carefully by those who may consider that Russia is a force that is unbeatable by the entirety of NATO.
The paper concedes that Russia has no expansionist intentions, but that there is definitely an escalatory danger. This danger calls for diplomacy in view of the fact that in a full-scale war with NATO as a whole, Russia faces a force whose collective GDP exceeds Russian by a factor of 20 and for this very reason Russia could be highly incentivized to reach out for a nuclear option. The paper talks of 3:1 Russian disadvantage in active duty ground forces; 10:1 military advantage (air, naval), and a NATO capacity to establish a naval blockade on Russian shipping. See the table for further details and note that the table excludes North America and Turkey (!)
Much of the confidence that Russia regularly exudes and which it inspires in its defenders lies in the original justness of its cause and in the expectation that ultimately Russia is at war with Ukraine, even if Ukraine benefits from (or is entirely dependent on) western weapons, or that, at worst, it might find itself dragged into confrontations with its immediate neighbors. Consider the following conclusions from the Beebe et al. paper:
Russia has an overwhelming military advantage over the national militaries of the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
In a conflict limited to the militaries of the “Eastern Arc” of NATO states bordering Russian territory, such as Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Finland, Russia would have a 3:1 advantage in ground forces but no advantage in naval vessels or warplanes.
In a conflict against all European NATO countries with no U.S. involvement, Russia would be outnumbered 2:1 in active-duty ground forces and at a much larger disadvantage in air and naval forces.
Perhaps most worrying for Russia is this quotation from the conclusions of a recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies which states that:
“The VKS [Russian air force] is at a distinct quantitative and qualitative disadvantage when compared to the combined airpower strength of NATO. Although some of Russia’s newest fighters have fifth-generation characteristics, none can truly be called fifth generation. … In an air-to-air fight, Russia would be outclassed in numbers and tactical ability by a NATO force. In addition to a numerical disadvantage, Russian forces are not as trained as NATO pilots. Despite attempted modernization, Russia has struggled to build a modern air force. Russia conducts little training at integrated air operations. Most training flights are only formations with small numbers of aircraft. Additionally their pilots generally fly less than 100 hours a year, about a third of what the average NATO pilot flies.”
The behavior of NATO over the past year, and the inclusion now of Sweden and Finland (with its extensive border with Russia) might certainly lend weight to the impression that internal conflicts notwithstanding, the body as a whole is preparing for full-scale war. It is in the light of this possiblity that future discussions must be directed. I anticipate the paper will excite quite a bit of push-back from the more astute of the conflict’s observers and will report on this in the coming days.
One of the most important issues to be discussed at the NATO summit in Washington (in addition to whether NATO should promise Ukraine an “irreversible” - i.e. Trump proof - path to membership of NATO, together with $40 billion aid in 2025) is whether to set up a NATO command in Ukraine itself, which, if agreed, removes any pretence that this is still a Ukraine-Russia conflict and not a NATO-Russia conflict. The idea comes from an address by US National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, to a forum hosted by the US Chamber of Commerce and co-sponsored by defense contractors. This is occurring not only in the context of a recent and important expansion of NATO, but also in a significant growth in the number of NATO members who are complying with an agreement in 2014 that they should dedicate at least 2% of their GDPs to military expenditure. In the past few years the number of countries that fulfill this basic minimum has risen from 9 to 23 of the 32-member alliance. In 2024, NATO allies are expected to “invest” $500m billion in defense (up from $325 billion in 2020). Russia by contrast is expect to spend $391.2 billion in 2024. But I would note that what Russia is able to buy with $391 billion is at least as much as the purchasing power of NATO’s $500 billion.
NATO’s chief Jens Stoltenberg has recently claimed that NATO could have 100,000 forces “where they need to be” within a week, and 200,000 a month, rising to 500,000 within the “ensuing weeks.” These figures have surprised many - and been derided by some.
The Beebe et al. analysis does not take into account how the balance of forces would be impacted by the involvement of China or other BRICS nations in active support of Russia. Since China must know that a defeat of Russia by NATO will precipitate full NATO attention to China (even, or especially under Trump in the US White House) China has considerable incentive to become a more active partner in the defense of Russia against NATO.
The report does not discuss in any detail how a sufficient consensus for full-scale war can be achieved in what is becoming a highly fractious environment in Europe, as exemplified in recent European and national elections, a fractiousness that not only includes the Ukraine skepticism of countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia and Turkey, and now, perhaps France and Italy, but also has to deal with a strong anti-war sentiment everywhere, amidst declining living standards for the majority.
Elections
In follow up to my considerations yesterday as to the significance of recent elections in France for the future of the NATO proxy war with Russia over Ukraine, I note that even in the immediate aftermath of the success of the New Popular Front there are growing indications that the Front itself is disunited, and that it is veering rightwards in compliance, most likely, with the terms of its agreement with the Macron bloc to head off the threat of Marine Le Pen.
Melanchon’s middle class France Unbowed (LFI) is in an alliance that includes the powerful but pro-business Socialist Party (PS). One faction of the LFI, represented by Clementine Autain, may support a government led by the Socialist Party in partnership with the French Communist Party. This would produce a sell-out entity comparable with Greek SYRIZA (formed in 2015) and the Spanish Podemos (formed in 2019) which, in power with the PSOE, has backed Azov and sent weapons to Israel.
As for Britain, the new Labour Party Defense Secretary has already visited Ukraine even as his bosses were headed for the NATO summit in Washington. One might also note the outcome of an investigation by the investigatory outlet, Declassified, which finds that the Israel lobby funded (to the tune of over $700,000) half of the new British cabinet (13 out of 25), including the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary and UK Trade Secretary. This, even as the group of 10 top UN independent experts finds there is famine throughout Gaza that is the result of a deliberate Israeli policy of mass starvation, confirming the latest (June 25) assessment of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC).
The Battlefields
I will follow up tomorrow with respect to developments on the battlefields (basically a story of Russian advances along most but not all the combat lines), but want to note a comment today from Moscow-based analyst Mark Sleboda who reports that the missile that hit a children’s hospital in Kiev on Monday was a US/Norweigan NASAMS defense rocket that was fired on an incoming Russian missile targeted at the ARTEM military production plant. No children were killed in the accident (a handful of adults were) and the missile did not demolish the hospital. Sleboda also notes with reference to the so-called ATACMS rocket attack on a Sevastopol beach in Crimea a couple of weeks ago, that the incoming missile had not been targeted at the beach but had been knocked off course by Russian electronic warfare devices.