NATO’s Hatred of Russia and China, and Other Obstacles to Multi-Polar Order
Agencies of Disinformation
At the beginning of NATO’s war against Russia over the pretext of Ukraine and the Ukrainian dead, a war in which I also regard Zelenskiy as an agent of the West, a patsy to Ukrainian neo-nazis, and a general scapegoat for NATO’s egregious errors of policy and judgment, the lies of NATO and its lapdog media across the mainstream West were just too obvious to ignore. Their total disregard of anything that Russia or Russians had to say was a clear invitation to dissidents in the West to pay more attention to what Russia had to say. What dissidents were able to hear from those quarters made a great deal more sense and was generally backed with more empirical conviction. This was the primary motivation, therefore, behind Western attempts to ramp up censorship, arbitrary detention and harassment of dissidents, manipulation and control over social media, and the like (recent victims of such including Scott Ritter, Judge Napolitano, Dmitri Simes, Richard Medhurst). Anything to obscure the end of any form of investigative mainstream journalism that runs against the ideology and interests of the Neoliberal West.
Ironically, however, the growing mismatch between Western accounts and the empirical evidence on the ground has forced NATO and its lapdog media to allow more realistic assessments of these developments. This in turn has provided a breathing space for both dissidents and analysts more generally to pay more critical attention to both Ukrainian and Russian authoritative sources. What these have to say is always important, either because these reflect actual perceptions and beliefs or because they reflect what these authoritories want various audiences (their own people; opponents; Third Party nations) to believe. Being able to tell the difference between these two things (while noting that sometimes they are the same) is a process of observation, critical comparison and assessment of alternative sources, and cautious suspension of judgment. Without these processes, there is no good reason to wholeheartedly assume the credibility of any side to this conflict.
That said, I am intrigued by the latest Ukrainian claims as to the relative strengths of Russian forces in Ukraine. I am mindful of Ukraine’s interest in highlighting the relative weakness of its forces so as to put pressure on the West for more money and military supplies and, in particular, for further greenlighting by the West of the use of long-range missiles against targets across the Russian mainland. I am also mindful of Russia’s interest in emphasizing, even exaggerating, its ultimate invincibility, particularly at a time when Ukraine is invading Russia in Kursk and Belgorod, hitting multiple Russian airfields and fighter jets (as, in the past day or so, at Oktyatosky and Pktyabrsjy near Marinovka, and Visokij in the north), crippling oil and gas facilities (30 this year; nonetheless, Russia is achieving record oil and gas exports, especially to India and China), destroying the ferry and ferry ports governing the passage between mainland Russia and Crimea; and damaging the Kerch bridge.
The Ukrainian figures are cited today by Alexander Mercouris and include 130,000 in the Dnipro-Kherson region which Ukraine is indicating it wants to try to invade with a paltry four brigades (maximum, 20,000 soldiers) possibly across the dried bed of the Dnieper reservoir leading to the Zapporizhzhia nuclear power plant, possibly and - so incredibly tediously - advancing on Tokmak through Robotyne. Small as such an invasion force would be, it would secure favorable Western media coverage, extend the lines of actual combat with a view to putting pressure on Russia, and work on behalf of the US Democratic Party for November’s presidential election by maintaining the war in something a little less than catastrophic failure mode for a few more weeks. Numbers for other regions include 13,500 in Crimea; 87,000 in the central and northern parts of the Donbass, and 114,000 in the southern Donbas both of which are engaged in the advance on Pokrovsk; 71,000 in the West, including the Chasiv Yar operations; and only 73,500 in the Kharkiv and Kursk areas (where Ukraine has reportedly accumulated a force of well over 100,000). These Ukrainian-originated figures give a total of 514,600 Russian soldiers in Ukraine, up from 440,000 at the beginning of this year and projected to grow to as many as 800,000 by the end of the year, with a further 100,000 combat-ready reserves behind the border.
The current size of Ukraine’s army, according to these Ukrainian figures, is currently between 300,000 to 400,000 in circumstances in which further mobilizations are becoming increasingly challenging (and amid RADA confirmation of the prohibition on mobilization of 18-25 year olds). The total size of Russia’s army has been cited by Larry Johnson this week as standing at 1.4 million. I dont know whether this includes conscripts, but the overall picture is of considerable superiority of Russia numbers (as well as superiority in bombers, missiles, drones, artillery and shells), and a superiority that is growing. This might help explain the recklessness and desperation of recent Ukrainian operations, such as attacks on both Zapporizhzhia and Kursk nuclear power plants in the space of a fortnight. Dima of the Military Summary Channel is expecting to see Ukraine putting F-16s into action as soon as today, firing long-range missiles at Russia from over Ukrainian territory.
Russia may be losing a lot of tanks and other equipment, but only at 50% of the rate of Ukraine. Russia may have a manpower shortage due to its war economy and the rise in real wages, but it has a remedy in the supply of immigrant labor from allies such as China, India and Khazakhstan. Ukraine has no such remedy. Its troops meanwhile, according to the Economist, are exhausted, and outnumbered by Russia at a rate of one Ukrainian to four Russians. Ukraine’s economy is a mess, whereas Russia is one of growth. Russia’s economy continues to demonstrate impressive acceleration and in a manner that is socially equitable. Some of the latest signs of growth include Russian bank profits, which are up 36%, year on year, and Russian oil and gas sales at record levels. Russian trade with Kazakhstan is booming, as is the case also of its trade with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and the four other countries of Central Asia. In recent days, Russia and China have been talking about forging even deeper economic and trade relations.
Ukrainian Independence Day
Widespread international expectations of a major Russian missile and drone strike across Ukraine on the occasion of Ukraine’s Independence Day (August 24) have not been realized, with the small exception of a Russian strike on Snake Island that may have killed some NATO officers located there.
There was no good reason to expect a major strike given the absence of a history of any Russian penchant to strike on particular festive or memorial days. Nonetheless, Dima, who had been expecting Russian action today, looks for explanations as to why there was no action. The most convincing of these was that Russia may have wanted to preserve intact a prisoner exchange process that was due to begin today. This would have returned a large number of Russian conscripts home. The issue of conscripts is a sensitive one for Russia given that although they are not used for the SMO in Ukraine they have had to fight on domestic territory in efforts to repel the Ukrainians from Kursk, Briansk and Belgorod. Dima speculates that Ukraine may have found a weak point here, and persuaded Russia not to launch a missile offensive on Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine agreement to continue promptly with the prisoner exchange.
Other explanations included the recent visit to Kiev by Prime Minister Modi of India. Although Modi may be playing both sides in this conflict, he is a stronger ally of Russia, since both India and Russia are major members of the BRICS. Furthermore, India’s regional dominance in South Asia has been threatened very recently by an effective coup in Pakistan that removed President Imran Khan - a deep thorn in the side of the neoliberal West; an effective coup in Bangladesh against Prime Minister Hasina in favor of a neoliberal cabal, and the return to Thailand of the political nihilism that characterizes the return to power of the Shinowatra party. In short, the bonds between India and its fellow members of the BRICS can only be expected to grow.
Dima notes that Zelenski’s Independence Address today shows him standing in front of a Russian landscape, in a provocative and mocking boast of his regime’s recent successes in Kursk and Belgorod. Dima puts this in the context of a string of Ukrainian humiliations that go back to its failure to honor the Minsk accords, its abandonment of the peace negotiations in March 2022 at the behest of Boris Johnson, its invasion of Kursk even while supposedly in negotiation, under Qatar mediation, to bring about a partial ceasefire concerning attacks on one another’s energy facilities. So this war is not going anywhere, primarily, as Larry Johnson has said most emphatically this week, it is a NATO war, NATO has now invaded Russia, and hands everywhere are itching to reach out for the nuclear buttons.
The Battlefields
In the Kursk area Dima concludes that Ukraine has made little overall progress since the incursion on August 6th, and that most of its advances have been made within the overall contour of the battlefield that it initially established. However, to the north of this area, he notices that Russia has been bombing the Ukrainian settlement of Bachivsk, which he believes indicates a Ukrainian plan to cross into Russia with a view to advancing on the Russian settlement of Dmitriyev.
In Kursk Russia has been bombing Ukrainian positions along the border, including Myropillia, and on the eastern and southern flanks of Sudzha Russia has restored control over Spatnove and Borki, west of Krupets and Kamyshroye which lie southwest of Belitsa. Russia may have reestablished control over parts of the Guyevo district, south of Plyokhovo - which is still under Ukrainian control but may soon fall again to Russia. There are intense clashes in and around Russkoya Konopelke, where Ukraine controls the southeastern end of the village. South of Russkoye Porechnoe, Russia has destroyed a Ukrainian convoy near Kostisa and is subjecting Ukrainian positions to heavy bombing in this area. The battle for Malaya Lochna continues. On the western flank, Russia has reestablished control of Korenevo and is moving east towards Olgovka where it has reestablished some positions. Ukraine continues to bomb Glushkovo, using MiG 29s, hammer bombs and FABs 250 to 500. To the far west of Glushkovo, Ukraine retains control over Ryzhivka and aims to advance on Tyotkino.
In northern Kupyansk, Russia continues to expand its area of control westwards from Makaiivka, Tabaivka and Pishchane to the Oskil river. North of Makaivka Ukrainian forces have re-established control in the areas of Novovodiane and Karmzynivka . Russia continues to make fairly rapid advances east of Pokrovsk, establishing a line of contact from Mykolaivka to Mykhailivka to Marynivka (directly east of Selydove just to the south of Pokrovsk and just north of Krasni Yar and Krutyi Yar), evading the landfill for now, moving further into Novohrodivka (there are already clashes in this town’s center, splitting the settlement into two) which, once taken, will position Russia ready for direct assault on Pokrovsk via its suburbs of Shevchenko and Novopavlivka. Southwest of Hrodivka, which Russia is likely soon to take and from which Ukrainian forces are fleeing westwards, Russia has established control over the villages of Krasni Yar and Krutyi Yar.
I have been skeptical as to whether Russia actually will attempt to take Pokrovsk. One of the reasons was the complication of Ukrainian control of mines and landfills in the area, but Russia so far appears able to make progress by avoiding these areas and shutting down supply roads to the mines and landfills. I had also worried about the population of the town at around 60,000 before the war, but am reminded that the population of Mariupol before the war was 425,000 or so, and that the population of Bakhmut was 71,000.
To the south, Russia has captured 50% of the settlement of Karlivka, from the east, and the last of Ukrainian forces appear to be evacuating from the northwest of Krasnohoriivka. To the north, Russia continues to make substantial gains in the Toretsk area from Zalizne, having established control over the eastern citadel. From Niu-York Russia is expected to proceed to Shcherbynivksa, and from Druzhba to Dylivka. Russia has expanded westwards from Pivnichne. There has been some Russian redeployment of troops from Chasiv Yar to Kursk but Russians have been able to make some progress from Klishchiivka to Ivanivka. Russian forces continue to make slow progress in Kostiantynivka near Vuhledar, and towards Vyrimka near Siversk
Russia’s economy continues to demonstrate impressive growth. Some of the latest signs include Russian bank profits, which are up 36% year on year, and record Russian oil and gas sales.
China
In a recent article for Global Times, Brian Berletic argues that US ability to contain China is doomed by growing Chinese strength and declining US power. This latter is demonstrated by an atrophying military industrial base and, in particular, of its capacity to build ships, warplanes and missiles. A report from The Associated Press finds that the US Navy's warship production is in its worst state in 25 years. This puts the US behind China in the number of ships at its disposal — and the gap is widening, a problem that the report attributes to a “critical labor shortage and a shrinking shipbuilding capacity that has increased over decades of neglect and mismanagement”.
The US labor market lacks sufficient workers with the right skills to meet domestic production. China's navy has more ships than the US including 30 ships it built in the past year. Over the same period of time, the US built only two ships. Whereas the US produces under half a million STEM graduates each year, China produces seven and a half million. US diversion of money from education into the war economy is actually helping defeat the US. Remedies such as “softward-defined manufacturing” are pointless if China is applying the same innovative technologies and at a faster pace.
“The US geopolitical reach exceeds its industrial grasp due to the flawed premise on which its foreign policy is based. The belief in the US' inherent superiority over all other nations has led to the myth that US hegemony over the world is sustainable and should be maintained”.
For Counterpunch, Eva Ottenburg argues that an economic war with China is a fool’s errand on the basis that it is always better to do business with people than to pick fights with them. China is America’s second biggest creditor and is happy to dump US Treasuries whenever Washington rhetoric turns hostile. Other countries follow suit. As in the war of chips, Beijing responds fast and effectively to Washington attempts to exercise temporary leverage in a bid to dampen Chinese growth. And sanctions on China hurt American exports. They also impact negatively on the well-being of US civilians and consumers who are trapped by sanctions into dependence on US monopolistic practices.
That there can be no likely change in US idiotic foreign policy in November is underlined for the World Socialist Web Site by Patrick Martin:
“Harris declared, “As commander-in-chief, I will ensure America always has the strongest, most lethal fighting force in the world.” As for whom this force will be fighting, Harris left little doubt, going on to refer to China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, the same countries that the Biden-Harris administration has targeted in a new document outlining American strategy for a future nuclear world war.”
Iran
The world has be waiting on tenterhooks for Iran’s promised reprisal against Israel for Israeli assassination of Hezbollah and Hamas leaders. Many explanations for its restraint have been canvassed; the one I most incline towards is that Iran has a sophisticated understanding of the damage that Israel could inflict on Iran and that Iran in the meantime has been working with Russia to acquire the necessary air defense systems and advance missiles that will give Iran the necessary punch that it needs in order to retain credibility as an opponent without nuclear weapons (although these are not necessarily off the table).
It may have been prudent for Iran to hold back from its reprisal in order to allow a bit more time for a possible ceasefire outcome to the Israeli policy of genocide in Gaza and in the West Bank. In addition to the mediation efforts of Qatar, China has also been trying to exert influence through its recent Beijing Declaration, the logical follow-through to China’s 2022 commitment to a more outgoing foreign policy. Relations with the Middle East are of extreme importance to China which purchases some 50% of its energy requirements from this part of the world.
However, China’s commitment to a “two state policy” sounds stale, uninformed, conventional and outdated. The lesson of the Gaza genocide is that Israel’s apartheid policies, unless dismantled by external force, are insurmountable and totally incompatible with the two state notion. In the meantime it is becoming patently obvious to anyone who follows the crisis that Netanyahu does not want a ceasefire and does not care sufficiently about the Israeli hostages, but does very badly want the US to fight a war on its behalf with Iran. So if Iran has put its reprisal on pause in the hope of a ceasefire, it will at least have given itself the time required to ramp up its offensive and defensive capability to meet the very dangerous but increasingly likely conflict with Israel and the US on more equal terms, abetted by Russia and, possibly - when it has given itself the opportunity to revise an excessively pacifict and still too passive outlook, China. In the meantime, Iran’s cause may be furthered by increasing conflict between Israel’s military, the IDF, and the Israeli cabinet, although the chances of this leading to a coup are diminished by the robust popularity within the civilian population of a Zionist policy of genocide.