Morbid Festive Escalation

One Ceasefire No Peace Makes

Towards the end of October, US News reported that the US had finalized its $20 billion portion of a $50 billion loan to Ukraine backed by frozen Russian assets, announcing plans to start making funds available by year-end for economic and military aid.

At this stage, the US still had $7 billion left out of the April package of $61 billion, and the US still has plans to cancel $4.6 Billion of Ukraine's Debt.

The $20 billion loan commitment U.S. was to be placed alongside a separate $20 billion European Union commitment and $10 billion to be split by G7 allies Britain, Japan and Canada, the loan to be repaid with the earnings from the over $300 billion in frozen sovereign Russian assets.

The Biden administration wanted to make $10 billion of the loan funds available for military aid, a plan that would require the approval of the U.S. Congress. It does not need Congression approval to make available the remaining $10 billion by December. U.S. funds for non-military aid would be transferred to the World Bank Trust Fund, which has agreed to administer the loan. The bank would manage sovereign loan contributions from the U.S., Japan and Canada in the same way that it manages a climate loss and damage fund.

The loan plan was endorsed by G7 leaders in Italy in June, but was delayed by U.S. officials' insistence on assurances that the Russian assets would stay frozen long-term to provide a certain stream of repayment revenues. European engagement in the loan program has been delayed by resistance from Hungary. It is also challenged by signals that a Trump administration would seek an immediate end to US support for Ukraine.

On November 6, Politico reported that the Biden administration was planning to rush the last of over $6 billion remaining in Ukraine security assistance out the door by Inauguration Day, as the outgoing team prepares for the weapons flow to end once President-elect Donald Trump takes office.

But Politico noted that it normally takes months for munitions and equipment to get to Ukraine after an aid package is announced, so anything rolled out in the coming weeks would likely not fully arrive until well into the Trump administration, and the next commander in chief could halt the shipments before they’re on the ground.

The US can only send out equipment that is already on its shelves, which is limited, and much of that equipment requires new artillery shells that are in short supply.

Today, Dima of the Military Summary Channel, reports Ukrainian commander Sryski as saying that Ukraine will launch a new offensive. As to where this might take place, two possibilities include another attempt at Robotyne and Tokmak (this seems to me unlikely given Russian advances well north of Robotyne), and an attack on Belgorod from Kharkiv (which seems to me more likely, although Russian concentrations of forces further south along the Oskil river and Kupyansk might suggest that Russia now has greater potential to push back against Ukraine in this area, from the north, the east and the south).

The Russian Ministry of Defense has reportedly acknolwedged two further attacks on Russian forces in Kursk over the past couple of days, using US ATACMS missiles - six missiles in each attack, with at least one missile in each attack penetrating through air defense to hit its target and causing injury and damage.

Russia’s use of the Oreshnik on a munitions factory in Dnipro at the end of last week has not, therefore, proven itself, as some have argued a “game-changer” or a “checkmate” in any tangible, immediate sense. It is not even really a new weapon. I reported Gilbert Doctorow’s assessment in my post yesterday, which is that the core feature of the Oreshnik that took many commentators by surprise but which should not have done, is its capacity to deliver six independently targetted warheads, each with its own bevy of sub-munitions.

This is a feature of the Russian intercontinental ballistic missile, the SARMAT, which was introduced by Russia in 2018 to loud indifference within a Western political class so deeply engrained in its own sense of superiority that it could not believe that Russia, with a military investment ten times less than that of the West could possibly overtake the grossly inflated, oligopolized and absurdly expensive for-profit Western arms complex. The transfer of this technology to intermediate range missiles and the ability to fire it from mobile launchers are probably the most novel features.

Western response to the Oreshnik, if indeed it is even a response, has been to escalate with more ATACMS missiles on targets in Russia (Kursk), and, in the case of Britain and France, to engage in talk of putting European troops on the ground, while the US continues to build at least one and possibly two more bases in Poland, and plan for the assignment of hypersonic missiles for placement in Germany by 2026. It is not clear to me whether the US actually has operational hypersonic capability at this time, at least at intermediate range, or whether this is something that it expects to have by 2026.

In the light of this escalation, Russia has said that it will respond robustly. Potential targets, it can be speculated, include Britain (although Britain has a nuclear capability - it is not clear to me that Britain considers itself free to use that capability without US permission and/or US assistance); US facilities and/or F16 enabled airfields in Poland and Romania; logistical centers in Moldova currently activated by a pro-European government but not a member of NATO, to support of Ukraine.

Or perhaps Russia will confine its attention for now on Ukraine: indeed, Russia has been dropping leaflets over Kiev advising citizens to leave.

It is frequently said among critics of Biden that the intention of the US Deep State interests that control the actions of his administration is to leave a catastrophe in the lap of Donald Trump.

It is less frequently acknowledged that the end of the world does not have to wait upon the arrival of Trump.

The notion that Trump is some kind of angelic anti-war savior of the world from US insanity is merely fanciful, given Trump’s deep-seated antipathy to China and his clear intention to continue escalation of the conflict with China, and, even more immediately, the nature of his Cabinet appointments which are now, without exception (given the departure of Gaetz), Zionist and paid for in large measure by AIPAC, boding likely conflict with Iran. This in turn would almost certainly, and quickly, pave the way to World War Three, even before there is any resolution of the conflict in Ukraine.

Helping speed along that war will be the crushing of dissent in the US under new Attorney General Bondi who threatens to investigate the content of political speech in terms of whether it is acceptable, worthy of investigation, or worthy of expulsion.

The ceasefire announcement between Israel, Lebanon and Hezbollah may provide some short space of relative peace for all concerned, but it is extremely fragile. It has a life of only 60 days, the terms are sufficiently vague as to encourage violation almost from the time it comes into effect (now) and will almost certainly function primarily as an opportunity for all sides to regroup. Netanyahu has said that the purpose is to give Israel time to prepare for action against what he calls the Iranian “threat,” to receive and integrate new weapons; and to prise Hezbollah from Hamas. He might have mentioned that he is under extreme pressure to make it possible for 100,000 Israeli citizens to return to their homes in northern Israel, to render Tel Aviv and Haifa safer from Hezbollah rockets, to bring back hostages, and to cut the heavy losses of IDF personnel (whose average age in Southern Lebanon, reports Blumenthal, appears to have fallen to around 18 - Zelenskiy may be taking anxious note).