Missiles with Nuclear Warheads; a Pro-Russian Right in Europe
Steadfast Skepticism
NATO’s recent four month Steadfast Defender (such curiously romantic/feudal associations!) exercises around Russia and its current Steadfast Foxtrot (hotter sex?) exercises include nuclear attack simulations including one on Kaliningrad, Russia’s only Baltic Sea port whose isolation from Russia makes it difficult to defend. This provides more context to Russia’s upcoming naval visit (by the hypersonic missile armed warship Admiral Gorshkov and a nuclear submarine) to Cuba and Putin’s indications that Russia may supply weapons to allies anywhere in the world.
In the meantime, in the course of a meeting between US President Biden (“Genocide Joe”) and Le Poseur (President Macron on France), the noises coming out of the Biden Administration suggest there is an attempt to reassure Americans that it does not intend for a direct engagement of the US in the proxy war over Ukraine. If for no other purpose this is addressing a distinct lack of public enthusiasm for such a development.
I think this has to be a manifestation of strategic ambiguity, and I dont give it too much importance. It is not unhelpful that Germany, Italy, Austria and some other members of NATO are resisting calls for sending trainers to Ukraine and we need to consider the extent to which recent moves by European politicians may best be seen as manouvers designed to impress the electorates of Europe on the eve of the European elections (scheduled for today, Sunday June 9).
Further, Macron has been badly bruised by the resurgence of what the media popularly call the “right,” in the European elections - a designation that often indicates pro-Russian attitudes on the Ukraine conflict - and he has announced the dissolution of the National Assembly and a call for new legislative elections, not a good period for eccentric or extreme action of any kind on Ukraine. In Germany, too, the AfD has done well and the party was ahead of Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats making it the second most popular party in Germany. This trend may also work in favor of Donald Trump’s campaign in the USA.
But I see no good reason at this stage to reduce the volume of alarm over the dangers of nuclear outcomes. Since US dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, both the Soviet/Russian and US parties have, in the past and now, again, in the context of Ukraine, flirted (both for rhetorical purposes and in contexts of actual war planning - Cuban missile crisis in 1962; and Nixon’s admonition to Kissinger re. Vietnam - “think Big, Henry!”) with the use of nuclear weapons. And in the short term it is not inconceivable, but still terrible to contemplate, that a limited exchange (e.g. one to one) would create such enormous damage that a ceasefire would immediately result. However, the problem then is that such exchanges would come to be seen as do-able in future contexts. The world would not long survive.
A lot better to talk peace; and a lot better, once again, to take up the idea of an abolition of nuclear weapons very seriously.
In this connection, I have been puzzling over Mark Sleboda’s recent statement that Russia has no means of distinguishing nuclear-tipped missiles from missiles equipped with conventional warheads. Warning - I have no technical expertise in this matter whatsoever; indeed, I am woefully ignorant of a matter that should be of concern to all of us.
If Sleboda is correct we should put this alongside that which we do know, with somewhat greater - though by no means sufficient certainty - which is Russia’s weakness in terms of early warning detection of ICBM launches when compared with that of the USA. Russia gets to know of an incoming ICBM only when that missile has entered into the Russia’s radar field which, as I understand it, is limited to the horizon and presumably does not supply warnings of launch, as opposed to trajectory. Ted Postal has done a great job in helping us understand how this has come about. So when Ukraine or its Western sponsors start destroying the infrastructure on which Russian early warning is dependent then, in nuclear terms, it is not just creating blind spots for Russia but increasing the risks of accidental nuclear war exponentially.
Now the other major change that has come about in recent days is the permission that Western countries, inlcuding the USA and Germany, have given to Ukraine to use western weapons, in particular advanced cruise missiles, on Russian targets in Russian territory.
I have indicated in previous posts that this has already happened on numerous occasions already. In all cases we should be mindful of NATO involvement in providing the necessary surveillance, intelligence and, probably, technical launch assistance for such advanced weapons. More and more, when we refer to “Ukraine” in the context of this war we are talking about NATO and Washington.
For the time being and in the spirit of high ambiguity, Biden has limited the US permission to the forces engaged in the Kharkiv area. I suspect that this would extend to targets far away from Kharkiv that nonetheless can fire on targets in the Kharkiv area. I put little faith in the likelihood that Biden’s restriction means much on the ground but we will see.
Cruise Nuclearized
So, can cruise missiles be nuclearized? Let me first introduce the concept of nuclear triad defined by Wikipedia as a strategic nuclear arsenal which consists of three components, traditionally strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. So this definition seems to exclude cruise missiles, but is that really the case?
Which missiles can be nuclearized? The Center for Arms Control tells us (2017) that Ballistic missiles are powered initially by a rocket or series of rockets in stages, but then follow an unpowered trajectory that arches upwards before descending to reach its intended target. Ballistic missiles can carry either nuclear or conventional warheads.
Cruise missiles on the other hand, are unmanned vehicles that are propelled by jet engines, much like an airplane.
“They can be launched from ground, air or sea platforms. Cruise missiles remain within the atmosphere for the duration of their flight and can fly as low as a few meters off the ground. Flying low to the surface of the earth expends more fuel but makes a cruise missile very difficult to detect. Cruise missiles are self-guided and use multiple methods to accurately deliver their payload, including terrain mapping, global positioning systems (GPS) and inertial guidance, which uses motion sensors and gyroscopes to keep the missile on a pre-programmed flight path. As advanced cruise missiles approach their target, remote operators can use a camera in the nose of the missile to see what the missile sees. This gives them the option to manually guide the missile to its target or to abort the strike”.
Can cruise missiles be nuclearized? Larger cruise missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, while smaller ones carry only conventional warheads. The US has several nuclear-armed cruise missiles: the AGM-86 ACLM, carried on the B-52 Stratofortress, or the AGM-129A, the TLAM-N. The BGM/UGM-109 Tomahawk submarine-launched cruise missile is capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The AGM-86 is the US Air Force’s current nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile.
Cruise missiles may also be launched from mobile launchers on the ground, and from naval ships.
Can cruise missiles such as HIMARS or ATACMS be nuclearized? The HIMARS is a launch system that can carry a single pack of GMLRS rockets or one TACMS (ATACMS) missile. The MGM-140 ATACMS is a tactical ballistic missle that can be fired from LMRS and HIMARS launch systems. I note that the ATACMS launch container has one rocket but a lid patterned with six circles like a standard MLRS rocket lid to prevent an enemy from discerning what tyope of missile is loaded.
Nuclear F-16s and Mirage Fighter Jets?
The F-16s have for some time been described by Russian sources as nuclear-capable. “Russia will regard Western F-16 fighter jets sent to Ukraine as a "nuclear" threat because of their capacity to carry atomic weapons, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in 2023. F-16s have been equipped in the past by the US for carriage of B61 thermonuclear gravity bombs. Modern F-16s can easily re-adapted for that or comparabe purpose but no country, apparently, uses the F-16 in nuclear mode at the moment.
Likewise with the Mirage one of whose variants, the Mirage 2000N, is a dedicated nuclear-strike variant, intended to carry the Air-Sol Moyenne Portée (ASMP) nuclear stand-off missile. When we are talking about such machines, therefore, we care certainly talking about nuclear possibility even if the more standard situation is for the Mirage to be used for Storm Shadows and Scalps and, in the case of the F-16, comparable missiles. Apparently the F-16 does not carry Storm Shadows or Scalps but could easily be adapted so to do. Instead, it carries air-to-surface Maverick, HARM, and Shrike missiles, anti-ship missiles. By the way, there is no current interoperability between the F-16 and the Mirage. Macron’s introduction of Mirages to the mix in Ukraine may be regarded in Ukraine as an unnecessary complexity.
Nuclear Conclusion
So it would seem that (1) the US has nuclear capable cruise missiles; (2) both cruise and ballistic missiles can be nuclear; (3) that ATACMS are ballistic and therefore can be nuclear; (4) that fighter jets such as F-16s (note that their successor, the F-35A, is a fifth-generation fighter with a nuclear-capable platform) and the Mirage are designed for or can be fairly easily adapted for the carriage of delivery of nuclear bombs or missiles.
Should this worry Russia which is limited in it ability to distinguish nuclear from conventional warheads on incoming missiles? Absolutely. Should this therefore worry us? Absolutely. Poor information increases uncertainty. Uncertainty enhances nervousness. Nervousness can impair judgement and enhance the likelihood of error.
My tentative conclusion (knowledgable readers are invited to educate me further) is that HIMARS launchers plus ATACAMS missiles can be nuclearized but are almost certainly not nuclear in the field in Ukraine at this time.
Understanding the Impact of Nuclar War
For a much better informed and even more alarming insight into the abyss please do yourself favor and read this interview by Mother Jones with Annie Jacobsen:
https://thebulletin.org/2024/04/an-interview-with-annie-jacobsen-author-of-nuclear-war-a-scenario/
Palestine
And on the latest chapter of the US-Israeli genocide in Gaza:
https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-news-06-09-2024-61eb1be9a9d0cf2dbf250cd4a8ed4dbf?user_email=5d1e0062510168e9ac5dd92b8ac5976cb576e71157c387e41a93d6e69291327e&utm_medium=Morning_Wire&utm_source=Sailthru_AP&utm_campaign=SundayMorningWire_June9_2024&utm_term=Morning%20Wire%20Subscribers
(Gaza)
From what I have seen so far it appears that the slaughter of another 300 Palestinian people involved US deployment of its US recently constructed pier (which the US claims is for “aid delivery), use of an “aid” truck for military purposes, and US soldiers. But we need more information.
See this from Popular Resistance:
https://popularresistance.org/us-army-aided-israel-in-bloody-military-op-launched-from-gaza-aid-pier/
(Pier)
A rapidly developing additional crisis concerns Israeli escalation of its conflict with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and the prospect of an Israeli invasion. Hezbollah has defended itself from IDF attacks and as a means of diverting Israeli attention from Gaza. This does not seem to have been successful but it may have mitigated the genocide somewhat. Israel has evacuated 50,000 citizens from northern Israel in effect giving Hezbollah a buffer zone inside Israel similar to the kind of buffer zone Russia is establishing in Kharkiv. Israel wants it back, but at what price? And at what point might Russia start upgrading weapons available to Iran, Syria and Lebanon in a bid to force Israel out of Gaza?
The resignation today of Benny Gantz from the Netanyahu government will likely impact on how a government that is even more right wing but whose ruling coalition has a more fragile hold on power is likely to behave on this and other issues. But in what direction I cannot say.