Enhancing Western Integration Into Ukraine Conflict

Escalation

Previous recent posts have documented the principal forms of Western escalation. We can briefly summarize these as including the destruction of Russian radar alert systems for incoming long-range nuclear missiles; increasing numbers of NATO boots on the ground in the shape of soldiers, trainers, mercenaries and volunteers; growing support in the collective West for giving Ukraine permission to use Western weapons against targets in Russia; the upcoming delivery of F-16s which can carry nuclear warheads; continuing commitment of weapons and cash to Ukraine; and growing support in some countries for the seizure of frozen Russian financial assets and the use of these assets, or the interest earned by them, for continuing financial aid to Ukraine, maybe of the order to $5 billion to $20 billion a year.

In addition to these efforts we should add evidence of efforts in the collective West to try and catch up with Russia in arms production. Business Insider today reports that the US has opened a new General Dynamics factory for Howitzer ammo near Dallas. This aims to produce 30,000 155mm shells a month, built with the aid of Turkish Repkon technologies. This is expected to contribute to a US army goal of 100,000 rounds a month by 2025. Before 2022, the US produced 14,000 shells a month and had doubled this to 28,000 a month by the end of 2023. The most updated production figures show production of 36,000 shells a month made at two factories in Pennsylvania which, at maximum capacity could produce 66,000 shells a month for the US. The factories in Dallas and Pennsylvania together, therefore, could reach a monthly total of very close to 100,000 or 1,200,000 a year. By strong contrast, Russia aims to increase annual production of 155 mm shells from 3 million to 4.5 million this year. Europe produces one million a year. So US and European production would reach only about two-thirds of the number of shells that Russia is producing this year. The US and Europe have sent Ukraine more than 3 million 155mm artillery shells since the war began. The costs of shell production are $1,000 per round for Russia, but $3,000 to $4,000 for the US.

Canada has just added itself to the list of countries that are agreeing to allow Ukraine to use weapons they have provided for the purpose of striking at targets within Russia. The others on the list include the United Kingdom, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Finland, the Czech Republic, Sweden and Estonia. Denmark has allowed the Ukraine to use its (nuclear-capable) F-16s against military targets in Russia. Only the US has not formally indicated approval, but why does it really need to to stop Ukraine from employing US weapons against Ukraine as Ukraine has done in the past? The US is about to sign a bilateral security pact with Ukraine of the kind that other NATO members have done over recent months, as a substitute for allowing Ukraine to join NATO (which Chancellor Scholz of Germany says might not happen for thirty years).

France is expected to formally announce next week, during a visit to Paris by Ukraine’s President Zelenskiy, that it will be sending up to several hundred trainers to Ukraine. These trainers would work in the areas of demining, keeping equipment operational, and expertise for warplanes. In addition, France would finance, arm and train a Ukrainian motorized brigade. Arrangements for these measures are said to be “very advanced,” which could very well mean that they are already operational in the field. Considering the likely provision, already, of trainers, regular troops, mercenaries and volunteers, and the operation of intelligence agencies of many if not all of the NATO countries, then it is likely we are already or will soon see many thousands of NATO personnel inside Ukraine. Dima of the Military Summary Channel estimates the equivalent of one military corps (20,000 to 45,000 by US definitions of a corps) which is not far off from my estimate two weeks ago. Note that a large number (300) of foreigners were reportedly killed in a Russian strike this week on a training facility near Lvov in western Ukraine, and that in Lyptsi, where Ukraine is holding back Russia’s Kharkiv offensive force, a large number of French, Polish and German fighters have been observed.

Does increasing Western escalation indicate that the West does not expect that Russia will retaliate, even though Putin has said that it could lead to Russian strikes on the facilities of NATO members outside of Ukraine? Has the West fallen for its own propaganda as to what are Russia’s red lines - that is to say, red lines that the West has incorrectly attributed to Russia? If so, and when Russia does not react to these supposed red lines, is the absence of a Russian response considered to be an indication of passivity in the face of Western escalation? Or is the West simply misreading what constitutes a Russian “response” (e.g. more intense strikes on Ukraine; or the build up of weapons production capability).

Dima speculates that recent foreign visits by Russian President Putin or his senior ministers are indicative of comparable alliance-building activity. These include his visit a week ago to meet with President Lukashenko of Belararus in Minsk which was clearly about military cooperation since Belarus is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization or CST , his visit in recent days to Uzbekistan (which is not a member of the CSTO), the recent visit of newly-appointed Russian Minister of Defense, Belousov, to Kazakhstan, and Russian recognition of the Taliban government of Afghanistan. Dima further speculates that one purpose of these visits is to secure recruitment of forces from amongst Afghans, Uzbeks and Kazaks. In addition, of course, Russia has signed a recent mutual security agreement with Iran, which has a common border with Afghanistan.

The Battlefields

Within the past 24 hours there have been both Russian drone strikes across Ukraine using, amongst other things, Iranian Shaheds, and a Ukrainian ATACMS attack on Crimea. Russia claims to have shot down all six of the ATACMS fired. Ukraine also used naval drones, many of which were destroyed by Russian FPV drones; the result from others that did get through was the destruction of a yacht in Chornomorskoe on the west coast of Crimea. Russia has again struck the air field and likely location of soon-to-arrive F16s at Starokostiantyniv.

In Kharkiv area, Russian forces seem close to some kind of operation on Kozacha Lopan in the northeast of Ukraine, and also on Zolochiv and Zrubanka. There are still Ukrainian forces in the northern sector of Vovchansk, above the Volcha city, and Russia may have encircled these. Ukrainian counterattacks have not succeeded, it seems, and Russia continues to pummel both the center and the south of Vovchansk. A Russian Lancet has struck an air defense system just southwest of Starytsia. There has been little recent evidence of Ukrainian strikes on Russian positions north of the border.

In Kupyansk, Russian forces are proceeding west of recently-acquired Kyslivka and Kotliarivka. The idea is probably to advance towards the line close to the Oskil formed by Kyrylivka, Hlushkivka and Kruhiskivke. Further south, Ukraine forces have attempted to strike at Russia’s supply line to recently-acquired Miasozharivka and Stelmakhivka. Ukraine is redeploying forces and supplies to Izium which lies on the west bank of the Oskil. In the Siversk area Russia appears to be in control of Bilohorivka, and to be subjecting the village of Spirne to continuous fire amidst large Ukrainian losses. (The significance of all these villages is that they constitute nodes of Ukrainian defense lines). There is not a great deal of significant new activity to report from around Chasiv Yar. In Avdiivka area, Russian forces are advancing on Novooleksandrivka, Karlivka, Yasnobrodivka and, further south, on Heorhiivka and, further to the west of Heorhiivka, Maksymiliarivka, and they are moving from Solodke towards Vodiane. To the southwestm] both Staramaiorske and Urozhaine can be expected to fall completely under Russian control very soon. Meanwhile Russia has completed construction of its railway from Donetsk to Mariupol, and this should significantly enhance its flexibility in the deployment of men and supplies.