East-West Consolidation of Alliances for the Coming World War

The Battlefields

Ukraine has inflicted significant damage within the past 48 hours on Russian facilities near Rostov-on-Don, where a drone attack set ablaze oil storage sites. Ukrainian sources say that overnight drone attacks on 17-18 June set fire to fuel storage tanks containing petroleum products in the city of Azov, Rostov Oblast. Ukrainian sources also reported that Ukrainian "kamikaze" drones attacked a metallurgical plant and other facilities used for military purposes in Russia's Belgorod, Voronezh, and Lipetsk oblasts overnight on June 17. One of the targets was the Novolipetsk metallurgical plant and a local tractor plant in Lipetsk Oblast, according to the source. Patrick Lancaster told Judge Napolitano earlier today that Ukraine continues (after at least 10 years) to target civilians and civilian structures in Donetsk.

Russia’s performance in the northern borderlands is less than sterling. Russian sources have indicated that Russian forces may need to withdraw from Hylboke. A Ukrainian counterattack appears to have retaken Starytsia. Both these settlements were occupied by Russia within the first day or so of its May offensive. East of Lyptsi, which remains securely under Ukrainian control, Russia has been bombing an area of the borderlands north of Izbytske, possibly preparing the groundwork for some form of invasion there. In Vovchansk, Russian forces declare 50-80% control over the Aggregate plant in the northern sector.

In the Kupyansk area, Russian air forces have destroyed a strategically significant bridge near Borova (west of Russian-held Svatove), and pushed back a Ukrainian counterattack on Noviehorivka. Some reports suggest that Ukrainian forces are withdrawing from the eastern end of Pishchane as Russian forces enter from Berestove. Russian forces have captured the forest area of Lyman Pershyi.

It looks as though Russia may have started a significant new offensive between Bakhmut and Avdiivka (both now held by Russia) in the area of Toretsk (U), which lies west of Maiorsk (R), by advancing from Maiorske through the villages of Pina and Druzba on the route to Toretsk. Toretsk is surrounded by many other settlements including, to the north, Krymske and Dachne and, to the southwest, Pivnichine, Zalizne, and Pivdenne, and to the south, Niu-York and Sukha Balka. There have been Ukrainian counter-attacks which Russia says have been repelled. Closer to Avdiivka, a little further south, and east of Ocheretyne, there are indications of Russian offensives, first from Novokalynove in the direction of Oleksandropil and, secondly, by Russia’s establishing control of more of the territory that bridges Keramik (R) and Novobakhmutivka.

There is little news of significance from Chasiv Yar, other than that Ukraine yesterday staged a counter-offensive towards Kleshchiivka, reestablishing control over some of the forest between the settlement and the Kanal but Russia retaining control over the settlement itself. In the Siversk area: Russian forces continue encircling the settlement of Rozdolivka; bombing the settlement of Spirne; struggling to prise the northern hills of Bilohorivka from Ukrainian forces; and encroaching on Ukrainian positions east of Verkhnokamyanske.

Elsewhere, the Military Summary channel reports that Russian forces have dug in deeper around the settlement of Sokil, to the west of Ocheretyne, and may have captured a Ukrainian stronghold north of Sokil. Clashes for control are taking place around, and to the south of, Novoselivka Persha. If and when Novoselivka Persha falls, then the likely direction for Russia is the next Ukrainian defense belt at Selydove (which is well to the west of Karlivka and Umanske).

There has been no significant development of the situation in Krasnohorivka, but, a little further south, west of Marinka (R), Russian forces are consolidating their hold of Heorivka, partly to establish a movement westards towards Maksymilkianivka, but mainly to acquire more territory to the south and to close the gap between Heorivka, Pobieda and Kostyantynivka, this last being central to an eventual bid for Vuhledar. For the moment, Russian forces are in reconnaissance mode around Kostyantynivka with a view to eventually moving into the village.

No changes are reported on the Vremevka Ledge (Staramaiorske and Urozhaine).

Russia and North Korea Partnership

Dima of the Military Summary Channel attaches considerable significance to the visit over the past 48 hours of President Putin to North Korea, mainly because he expects that the accords between the two countries will produce a sudden increase in the availability of shells for Russia to employ in Ukraine. He speculates that the increase in supply of shells following the previous talks between Putin and Kim Jong Un made possible the Russian success in the taking of Avdiivka. I find this account exaggerates the role of shells in the relationship, as it seems to contradict fairly well sourced accounts last year of greatly enhanced production of Russian shells, levels of which left Europe and the West in the dust so far as 155mm shells were concerned. However, yes, if reports of North Korea having a stockpile of five million shells that they could make available to Russia are true, then sure, added to Russian production of five million a year, such a sudden increase might be put to very effective use on the battlefield.

Of greater significance, I believe, is the fact that the agreement in Pyongyang is a mutual security agreement, a partnership, that would require North Korea to assist Russia in the event of an attack by the West on Russia (which of course in real terms has already effectively occurred). Soviet and Russian relations with North Korea have been positive for a very long time, apart from a frosty period in the 1990s. The agreement might boost North Korean nuclear technology and supplies, something that a few years ago, Russia, a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, was trying to contain. Russia has been so badly punished by western sanctions (even if its economy has shown great resilience in response), that it no longer has anything to lose by breaking Western sanctions against North Korea. China may have more to lose. Russia and China signed off on these sanctions in a very different time decades ago and there are clear indications that they have cooled on these earlier commitments.

But, if not nuclear, there are many ways in which Russia can augument North Korean strength, including assistance in the area of fighter jet and missile technology. The partnership likely has the support of China, and China has an overall good, long-standing, relationship with North Korea although there was something of a blip at the time that North Korea decided to become a nuclear power. Russia has had a good relationship, also, with South Korea, with which it has conducted a much greater volume of trade than with North Korea. However, South Korea upset that relationship when, under pressure from the US, it sent shells that it had bought from the US back to the US so that these could then be forwarded to Ukraine.

Such are the consequences of the collective West’s liberal authoritarian reach for global hegemony: alliances form that once seemed unlikely. Gilbert Doctorow observed yesterday that North Korean assistance to Russia in the event of an attack on Russia might entail aggressive moves against NATO allies in Asia, including Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. I cannot say I find this very likely, as North Korea’s main offensive weapons are its nuclear warheads (it also has a substantial fleet of submarines) and these of course can only be used sparingly, to say the very least. But they might be sufficient to discourage NATO’s Asian allies from active engagement against Russia (or China) in the event of World War Three.

Of greater significance perhaps is that Russia’s partnership with North Korea comes within a few months of Russia’s security agreement with Iran, within a few days of indications of a much stronger Russian relationship with Cuba, and a few days ahead of a Russian visit to Vietnam and the prospects that Vietnam’s historically important relationship with Russia might be strengthened.

Palestine

The White House peace ceasefire initiative, adopted by the United Nations Security Council, and which the White House, in a spew of weird Keystone Cops shenannigans as purposeful and as robust as the US “aid pier” to Gaza, falsely claimed to have been Israel’s initiative, has been rejected by Israel. At one point it appeared that Hamas had informally indicated its approval of the initiative, but it is unclear as to which version of the initiative it was approving. I don’t believe it was the version that went to the UNSC. In any case, the collective West is maintaining the pretense that the success of the initiative depends on Hamas acceptance of the deal, as though Israel’s concerns with it were of no consequence.

It seems obvious to me that Hamas will never agree a deal that does not guarantee an immediate and permanent ceaefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, a deal that involves complicated phases of negotiation that would leave Israel free at any time to claim a lack of Hamas collaboration and declare a return to war.

In the meantime, Netanyahu, following the resignation of Bennie Gantz from the war cabinet a few days ago, has dissolved the cabinet, returning direct control of the war to the full security cabinet. This development, in an already febrile combustible climate, enhances the likelihood that its more fanatical wing will push for an Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon, plans for which have already been confirmed.

Hezbollah has maintained intense pressure on Israel by means of its threat to the security of northern Israel (in support of the people of Gaza), enforcing the evacuation of large numbers of Israeli from the northl and causing significant, additional, economic damage to Israel. An Israeli invasion of Lebanon just by itself could dangerously stretch Israeli forces, which are still struggling against Hamas in Gaza, and re-introduce Israel to a conflict that Hezbollah won the last time that Israel invaded Lebanon in 2006.

A few days ago Hezbollah fired more than 200 projectiles on Israel in response to Israel’s latest assassination of a Hezbollah leader in Lebanon. Yes, the US has just voted another military aid package of $18 billion to Lebanon. What this aid simply makes more likely is that Iran will see itself called on to engage in defense of a force with which it is commonly associated and which it helps fund.

While Syria has been subject to scandalous economic abuse by the US in punishment for Syrian (and Russian) victory over the collective West in the battle between Assad and Jihadism (the collective West’s favorite go-to false flag ally), Syria could provide meaningful support to Iran in this struggle, as might Iraq (shia Islam prevails in both Iran and Iraq). Egypt, meanwhile, has been thoroughly angered by White House presumptions that it might help the US wriggle out of culpability for genocide if Egypt kindly stands by and allows in a million or more Palestinians to decamp on Egyptian desert territory.

Knee-jerk Egyptian subservience to Washington requirements is a little less to be taken for granted. This is even more the case for Saudi Arabia, which has now allied with Iran and which, like Iran, is a member of the BRICS, and which has just formally abandoned the petrodollar.

Turkey is a very loose cannon in all this but cannot be expected to side with Israel. It will likely vote for the future and the future is with the BRICS of which it wants to be a member.

The most important mover over all of these, however in the event of a wider regional war that many Zionists will see as part of their destiny to construct a greater Israel, provided they can get the US to do it for them - is Russia, which is already engaged in the defense of Syria. Russia cannot not join in, should things come to this pass - a pass that will, in effect, initiate World War Three.

At this stage I would predict that China has to act on the political realization - one that it has already digested and acknowledged - that, for the US, the only acceptable global order is it own (We Invent the Rules) ‘rules-based’ US-dominated order. China has been given ample indications of US intention to weaken and fragment China by provoking it into a conflict over the question of indendence from China of Taiwan. Most Chinese are strongly supportive of the view that Taiwan is an integral part of China.

So China cannot afford to allow Iran and Russia to lose the battle in the Middle Eastern leg of the collective West’s three-pronged counterrevolution against multipolarity.