De-Escalation, The Need For (R)
De-Escalation, for Now
As indicated in my previous post, Russia has reacted sharply to reports (mainly by Stephen Bryen (establishment foreign policy expert) in two recent articles in Asia Times - not in mainstream US media, needless to say) over the weekend that France had already sent troops into Ukraine, was about to send more, while the House leader of the Democratic Party of the US indicated that the US would have to send in troops in the event that Russia broke through Ukrainian fortifications (which it has been doing, regularly).
The Kremlin (1) hauled in French and British abassadors to Moscow for a dressing-down, (2) threatened retaliatory action outside of Ukraine on those who would send weapons to Ukraine that could be used to fire on targets in Russia (which, in effect, has been happening for some time, ony now augmented with the upsurge of Storm Shadows, ATACMS and other long-range missiles, perhaps soon to include German Taurus, in the inventories so generously provided by the West to Ukraine), and (3) initiated exercises for the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
The Russisan reaction appeared to have some immediate effect. France claimed (either falsely or misleadingly, or both) not to have any French foreign legionnaires in France, nor any plans to do so. Further it said that it recognized Putin as legitimate leader of Russia (so too did the White House, which has previously said that it does not consider the recent elections free or fair) and even send its ambassador to the Presidential inauguration ceremony that took place yesterday May 7th. Interestingly, Greece also did, and Malta; Russia’s “NATO” allies, Serbia and Hungary also sent their ambassadors. The USA and Germany called their ambassadors home to avoid having them attend.
Since Macron has been the most aggressive NATO leader in his threats of pushing towards a direct war between NATO and Russia, it was appropriate that Macron did most of the backing down. Dima of the Military Summary Channel sees this less in terms of France backing away from nuclear war and more about negotiation between Russia and France about the prohibition of the Russian flag at the upcoming Olympic Games. Since this would put Russia in a position of weakness, I think the former explanation is by far the more convincing.
The Italian foreign minister has disassociated Italy from Marcon’s tactics saying, even, that it would not send troops to Ukraine. I don’t know about Britiain, other than noting what is now a customary “free” media silence about anything that might remotely embarrass the ever-Churchillian British wannabess of the boomer generation. The Independent, however, did float a story about how destruction of the Kerch bridge was now no longer necessary, given that satellite photos had confirmed that the bridge was no longer being used for military ordnance. Interestingly, and perhaps in anticipation of the alliance’s total collapse in the event of a catastrophic failure in Ukraine, not unlikely, it is reported today that Austria will not be joining NATO. TASS reports that against the backdrop of media reports about Vienna’s plans to expand co-operation with NATO, Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg said the country does not intend to become a member of the alliance.
The West will be relieved to know that Lithuania is prepared to send troops to Ukraine.
Alexander Mercouris in his daily broadcast today suggests that Russia will continue to be moderately tolerant of current levels of troops from NATO countries in Ukraine so long as NATO intervention is not formalized nor aggravated, although such forces remain potential targets of Russian strikes. Moscow understands that there is no practical level of NATO troops that could be sent to Ukraine that would constitute any real threat to Russia. This is even more so in the context of a severe shortage of manpower for forces in Ukraine, and disaffection in the existing ranks, amidst a new law that allows Ukraine to mobilized prisoners.
On the subject of Ukrainian claims that using Ukrainian proxies (two senior Ukrainian colonels), who have been arrested, Russia has conducted an assassination attempt on Zelenskiy and on other senior leaders of Ukraine, Mercouris expresses skepticism but concedes that it would be to Russia’s advantage. But it would also be an advantage to the USA and its allies who have long had serious concerns about Zelenskiy, especially now that his legitimacy as President is about to expire (I believe he has declared a further extension of martial law), while there are continuing reports of troop disaffections and refusals to obey orders (the latest involving the 114th Brigrade). Other potential culprits would include Zelenskiy’s local rivals for power.
Ukraine Hits on Russian Oil Refineries
An article today in pro-Washington foreign policy establishment outlet, Foreign Affairs by Michael Liebreich, Lauri Myllyvirta and Sam Winter-Levy makes the argument for why Ukraine should keep striking Russian oil refineries (Russian Oil Refineries). It claims that Ukraine has launched at least 20 strikes on Russian refineries on Russian territory since October. It does not discuss the missiles (drones, etc.) used in these strikes, nor the scale of damage, nor the quality of the sources of information that we have concerning these strikes. It claims that by the end of March, “Ukraine had destroyed around 14 percent of Russia’s oil-refining capacity and forced the Russian government to introduce a six-month ban on gasoline exports”. The Ukrainian strikes have reduced production by about 900,000 barrels per day and the damage takes considerable time to repair.
The purpose of the article is to rebut attempts by the Biden administration to apply pressure on Ukraine to discontinue such attacks on account of their impact on global oil prices. It argues, instead, that the strikes reduce Russia’s ability to turn its oil into usable products and that they do not affect the volume of oil that Russia can extract or export. With less domestic refining capacity, Russia is forced to export more of its crude oil, not less, pushing global prices down rather than up. In Russia itself, the authors claim, the price of refined oil products, such as gasoline and diesel, is rising.
Russia has been extracting an estimated 10.1 million barrels of oil per day, exporting half to refineries abroad, and refining the other half in Russia. Half of the refined products are consumed domestically, while much of the rest is sold abroad, accounting for around ten percent of global seaborne exports in 2023 mainly to Turkey, China, Brazil and North Korea. The consequences are also severe because Russisan oil storage capacity is limited. Russian producers can choose between increasing exports of crude oil or shutting wells and reducing production. It is less damaging to Russis to increase expots of crude, although this reduces the prices that Russian can charge China, India and Turkey. In the event that Russia shut down wells, it would have to pay market price for the oil refined by these countries, with lower export revenues to cover the cost. Russia has recently been exporting more crude oil at the same time that its refined fuel exports decreased. Ukraine’s strikes have had no discernible effect on international crude oil prices. In Russia, diesel production has fallen 16 percent and gasoline production by nine.
“The average weekly wholesale price of gasoline and diesel in western Russia rose by 23 percent and 47 percent, respectively, between the end of 2023 and mid-March”. This result, the authors argue, helps offset the failure of the collective West’s oil price cap mechanism to hurt Russial, and West’s shipping industry: almost half of Russian oil shipments is carried on ships owned or insured in G-7 and EU countries, and some Western tankers have continued to transport oil priced above the cap.
On the Battlefields
Russia has launched a massive drone and missile attack on Ukraine over the previous night. This included the targeting of air defenses around Kiev and strikes on thermal power plants. There was relatively little of the Ukrainian activity against Crimea or Russia on the day of the Russian Presidential re-inauguration, as had been anticipated, perhaps an indication of concern even in desperate Ukraine about the threat of Russian drills of its non-strategic nuclear forces (tactical weapons - use of which, in wargames, generally leads to escalation to stronger nuclear weapons and the end of the human race as we know it). The most recent reported Ukrainian attack on Crimea has been largely ineffective, resulting mainly in the sinking of a fishing boat. But Ukraine is exercising superior firepower on locations south of the Dnieper in the Kozachi Laheri and Krynky areas, and this may well portend something more ambitious from Ukraine in this region of Kherson, soon. Ukraine had some success with counterattacks on Russian forces in the Urozhaine area of the Vremevke Ledge pushing Russians back from the farms to the south of the settlement, but today, Russian forces have moved well up to the level of Staramaiorske, while Ukraine appears to be abandoning the center of the settlement and may choose, under heavy Russian fire pressure, not to put up further resistance against Russia in Urozhaine.
The situation on the battlefields rarely progesses on a day-by-day basis with significant or discernible steps and much of the time the reports from Dima’s Military Summary Channel sound like reports from the day before re-worded to make it sound like there had actually been some change. Better to take a week’s overview or even longer. Russia does seem to have taken more of Robotyne in Zapporizhzhia area. Only 20% remains in the grey zone, the rest if Russian; Ukrainian forces are perched on the north and north east edges. In Krasnohoriivka, Russian forces are pushing up from the south and pushing east from the west, with the potential of taking the entire eastern half of the settlement and entrapping Ukrainian positions there.
In the Avdiivka area, there continues to be fierce fighting for Natailove. There appears to be a more concerted Russian effort west of Soloviove towards Sokil and Russia has taken a great deal of the territory between Soloviove and Berdychi to the south east. It is confirmed that Russia has takenm territory close to the entrance of Novooleksandrivka, that Ukrainian troops are evacuating from the village and that Russia is taking much of the territory between it and that of Arkhenelivka.
There were reports yesterday of a Russian incursion into the east of Chasiv Yar near Bakhmut, and expansion of the territory controlled Russia west of Klishchiivka and Andrivka towards the Siverski-Dontesk Kanal.
Further north, there are significant and extensive “fire anomalies” in the Lyman-Kremmina areas, affectring among places Krasnolimansky, Kromensky, and Izyum. This is an expression used by Dima, I guess, to cover for both naturally occuring fires as a result of hot weather, and of deliberate conflagrations to enforce troop movements, mainly of Ukrainian troops to places of greater safety. It may facilitate Russian advances eventually on Lyman, Terny an d Sloviansk. In the northern borderlands Russia continues to hit Ukrainian troop concentrations wherever it finds them.
Ukrainian sources are talking of an existing build-up of Russian forces north of the border in Briansk-Belgorod area, currently numbering 35,000 and to be augmented perhaps by another 15,000 to 25,000. This is far too few for Russia to be seriously planning a major offensive to take the Sumy or Kharkiv cities, and may suggest that Russia is more interested - as it clearly stated a few months ago was the case - in creating a buffer zone in the north than in a big arrow offensive of the kind that Dima has been expecting. And/or, this is simply another tactic to divert Ukrainian troops into the area for the purposes of attritional warfare.