Critically Linking NATO'S War (47) June 17 2022
Discussion
Where We are Now
Impact of Western sanctions on Russia has been far less than originally anticipated. Ukrainian authorities predict that the impact will not really be felt by Russia for another three or four years. In which case there is a real question as to whether Ukraine will still exist at that point. A major explanatory factor is the sharp and very predictable increase in oil and gas prices resulting from NATO energy policies (which the energy companies had volubly opposed right at the beginning).
These have greatly increased Russian revenues. So much so that when Gazprom reduced supply to Germany and Italy just recently (much to the disgust of the Germans who seem to think that only the EU has the right to inflict economic pain on others) its CEO pointed out that the increase in prices would largely compensate it for the reduction in sales volume. Russia’s reduction in supply, of course, merely anticipated the EU’s determination to cut demand for Russian oil by up to 90% (of shipped oil) by the end of the year. Russia’s reason for the reduction in supply, by the way, is not that it wants to hurt Germany but because some badly needed spare parts and repairs for the pipeline operation are generally supplied by Siemans which subcontracts the work to plants in Canada, and Canada is not permitting their return to Russia because this would apparently violate North American sanctions against Russia.
The sense that I make of the various sources that I follow therefore with respect to the role of sanctions is that, overall, the impact is less than expected, that the Russian government and Russian manufacturers are adjusting quite well, and that they are producing substitutes or acquiring substitutes from others sources, including China. The most alarming figures I have seen relate to the contraction of the automobile and transportation sectors, and to the computing/electronic sectors, but here too, I suspect that partnership with Asian sources and domestic ingenuity, coupled with existing stocks, will see Russia through the current conflict.
Inflation is uncomfortably high (around 15% if memory serves) but is actually anticipated by Russian sources to fall, along with consumer prices, over the next few weeks.
Impact on Western Economies. For most people in the West, I strongly suspect, the impacts of the war on them personally have come as something of a jolt. Yes, some of the price increases and the pressure of these on the overall rate of inflation, were already trending up from before the current conflict. But now they have been greatly exacerbated by the consequent further increase in oil and gas prices, especially in Europe. These increases coincide with and are in part the cause of decisions by the US Fed and the Bank of England (but not, just at the moment, the ECB, which was even contemplating but has rejected a return to QE), to raise interest rates in larger strides.
Whether these do choke off demand as hoped, or simply push prices even further up, remains to be seen. Either way, they will very likely push the economies of Europe and the USA into recession by the end of this year. (Biden, so sagaciously, opines that this is not certain). Russia too will be in recession, perhaps around 4-6% fall this year in GDP (but less than the 10% or more that was originally expected at the outset of sanctions).
Increasing interest rates in the West will likely trigger debt crises in many countries of the Global South that are in hook to Western lenders, the IMF and World Bank. These countries will also be disproportionately impacted by the food security crisis that has been sparked not by Russia, but by Ukraine’s mining of its ports, such as Odessa, and its arrogant refusal of a Turkish-Russian offer to demine the ports and provide safe passage to ships exporting Ukrainian grain - on the unlikely grounds that Russia would then use the corridors for a sea attack. Ukraine is not nearly as important a source of grain as Russia itself. Russian grain exports are being stymied by the impact of westerns sanctions policies that relate not directly to the food as such, but to everything that is involved in food production and .distribution.
Winning the War. To all intents and purposes, Russia has now won the war for Donbass. A British admiral is cited today as assuring his team that this is really of little significance (!). The struggle for Severodonetsk is concentrated at the Azot chemical factory and it will very likely go the same way as Azovstal in Mariupol. Some 1,000 Ukrainian soldiers will eventually give in to negotiators and allow trapped citizens/human shields to leave through humanitarian corridors and surrender themselves. Russia may very well establish or re-establish control in the the Kharkviv and Kershon areas. Nobody really knows what will happen then. The options include a push-forward by Russia, a staying-put (stagnation) or, less likely, a withdrawal.
Many groups of Ukrainian forces are being surrounded or cordoned off in various places and will eventually be overrun. Ukrainian authorities now admit to taking greater casualty and death rates than even the Russians admit; their fire power in terms of artillery rounds is considerably less, (from 1% to 10%) than that of Russia; their soldiers are very likely becoming less experienced and less well trained, as substitutes replace the casualties. The Ukrainian economy is hemorrhaging, with drastically pruned GDP, loss of agricultural exports, loss of land, air power, reduced Black Sea access and most of its industry.
The supply of western weaponry (not to mention CIA trainers, and US/EU volunteer fascists) is not having the desired impact, it is not coming through at the rate that Ukrainians keep demanding, Ukrainians are not trained to use some of it, and there are problems with instructions and with spare parts; some of that weaponry is being destroyed by Russian artillery, other weaponry is likely being sold by Ukrainians on the black market. Whatever advances or attempted advances that Ukraine has been making in recent weeks seem designed as black theatre to put increased pressure on Western sponsors to cough up aid and weapons, but are militarily doomed and may ultimately seed rebellion and defection among Ukrainian ranks.
There has always been a question as to whether Western media derision of Russian military strategic competence, morale and equipment was propagandistic in intent or founded in actual empirical analysis. There has always been more than one side to these issues, but only one side has been given airtime in Western media. We see this shocking imbalance reflected in western media coverage of many of the Ukrainian accusations against Russia for alleged war crimes (there is rarely any media discussion of Ukrainian war crimes). There is also an issue of intentionality: I believe that many of the casualties of the war relate to Russia’s reliance on artillery over great distances, which greatly reduces the possibility or precision attacks. The same applies to Ukrainian artillery.
I will not now go back to my previous discussions on the issue of whether Russia’s invasion was itself a war crime. Suffice to say that I believe that Russia was massively provoked, and that sooner or later the West was going to make sure that there would be a war and that the war would start with Ukraine. We know this because the West kindly told everybody about its intentions in the G-8 commissioned RAND report of 2019.
That Russia’s first move to Kiev was not so much a failure as it was a feint intended to draw Ukrainian forces away from the Donbass before Russia concentrated its efforts on the most important prize (a land and sea bridge connecting Crimea to the mainland) is certainly a possibility. There was never a serious likelihood that Russia would attempt to take the center of Kiev, which was bound to have been counterproductive. Is Russia’s slow advance in the Donbass just a few kilometers a day really a weakness or is it an intelligent strategy to reduce Russian casualties from Ukrainian artillery, allow more time for consolidating control over captured territory, and provide Russia more time to take out Ukrainian artillery is also a possibility.
Negotiations have not been serious since mid-March when promising moves by both sides were brought to a halt by Ukraine, and by the assassination by Ukraine of one of its own negotiating team, presumably as a result of Washington and Right Sektor pressure on Zelenskiy. Zelenskiy has had nothing meaningful to say on this subject of late, and Russia has probably lost all trust in Ukrainian, EU and Washington authorities to live up to promises. The USA appears for now to be sticking with its stated war aim, which is to weaken Russia and soften up China. The result so far, as we have seen, is that Russia is not that much weaker, China’s resolve to partner with Russia appears to have strengthened, and the Western economies and many countries of the Global South look like they may be headed for steep decline. Many countries of the Global South will surely find a future of partnership with China’s Belt and Road initiative more enticing than reliance on Western powers whose first thought seems always to be a military thought, and in a way that foments local unrest rather than reduces it. In the meantime, the NATO powers look more and more clownlike: accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO membership has still to be greenlighted by Turkey, whose objections should have been foreseen. Neither Sweden nor Finland appear to have properly thought through the economic and political costs. The speed of the whole process, coupled now with talk of fast entry of Ukraine to the EU, and reckless proposals to add the likes of Moldova and Georgia to NATO, threaten to sink both alliances into a quagmire of inefficient, bureaucratic, and fractious wrangling.
The following links were posted on June 18th:
1. China
China doubles down on vision with Russia
Doubling Down on Alliance with Russia
What the world needs to know about China’s outsize role in electric car future: Q&A with Henry Sanderson
China Launches Third Aircraft Carrier, Advancing Naval Ambitions
2. Donbass
Scott Ritter and Ray on Ukraine
Two very important things: in his book The Doomsday Machine, Daniel Ellsburg discovered that Presidents have regularly delegated authority for the use of nuclear weapons to field commanders and subordinates. Also, in December 2021, Biden reneged on a promise he previously made to Putin that NATO would never place offensive missiles in Ukraine: this is not to say that NATO actually did do that, at that time, but that they did not move towards a formal agreement to that effect. Had a formal agreement been reached, Putin may not have invaded in February 2022.
3.Economic Dimension
‘Marching towards starvation’: UN warns of hell on earth if Ukraine war goes on
Schools and libraries face huge cuts after soaring costs create £1.7bn shortfall
Thousands march in London over cost of living crisis
Protests Against Cost of Living
Putin calls Ukraine war sanctions ‘insane’ in combative speech
This Is Going to Hurt
“It seems like every year it gets worse”: Inflation devastates California workers and their families
One in five Canadians eating less due to food price rises, as Liberal government squanders billions on war
The Biden Administration's Ignorant Energy Policies: Higher Gas Prices Are Only the Beginning
In the U.S. and around the world, inflation is high and getting higher
How much does Biden’s $1.9T bill have to do with inflation?
The New Geography of the Russian Elite
New Geography of Russian Elite
A Defiant Putin Says Russia Will Flourish Without the West
4. Empire
The Houthis Still Have the Upper Hand in Yemen
Houthis Still Have the Upper Hand
FOR TURKEY, THE UKRAINE CRISIS MEANS OPEN SEASON ON THE KURDS
‘Sarin Doesn’t Slice Throats’: The 2013 Ghouta Massacre Revisted
Coups and Stolen Elections: American History, Chronicled
Report: US Secretly Reviews and Approves Many Israeli Airstrikes in Syria
US Permission for Israeli Airstrikes in Syria
Report: Russia Warned US Ahead of Strikes Against Fighters at Al-Tanf Base in Syria
Russian Escalations in Syria Risk Direct Conflict With U.S., Military Officials Warn
Russian “Escalations” in Syria
MIKE WHITNEY: MEET THE NEW BOSS; PUTIN REROUTES CRITICAL HYDROCARBONS EASTWARD LEAVING EUROPE HIGH-AND-DRY
Russia switches energy Eastwards
5. Making Sense of the War’
Kissinger and the War in Ukraine: The Messenger and the Master
Ukraine: Some Lemmings Wear Wooden Shoes; & Factoring in China
6. Media, Censorship and Propaganda
Russians Breached This City, Not With Troops, but Propaganda
7. NATO
Saudi Arabia and Turkey: Prioritising Interest Over Ideology
8. Ukraine, Domestic
BEN ARIS: UKRAINE’S DESPAIR INDEX SPIKES, WHILE RUSSIA’S IS ALREADY FALLING
Despair is Greatest in Ukraine
9. Weapons
'Revolting': Senate Panel Adds Another $45 Billion to Biden's Military Budget
Senate Adds More to Pentagon Budget