Countdown (2)

Nuclear War

When penning my original post, Did Putin Just Blink, a couple of days ago, I wasn’t totally sure how significant was Ukraine’s successful attack on (at least one) Russian nuclear warning radar position (one in Crimea, one on Armavir in mainland Russia - causing slight damage, apparently), and I had begun to think that there might be something to Western reports of a turn in Moscow’s thinking towards a more favorable outlook so far as the prospects go of a “frozen conflict” resolution.

Today, Monday 27th, I am much more inclined to think that yes, the attack on Russian strategic nuclear weapons infrastructure is highly significant and highly dangerous. I am less inclined towards the view that there is any softening in Moscow’s position as to the low likelihood of a “frozen conflict” resolution to the conflict between NATO and Russia over NATO’s proxy, Ukraine.

An actual strike on Russian nuclear infrastructure on the Russian mainland is a significant escalation beyond Russian exercises in the use of tactical nuclear weapons which may be read by some as a threat and, if so, is only a threat without specific target and it is a threat, precisely, against escalation, to which the wise response would be to not escalate.

Once more, I hold to the central tenet of my postings over the past two years which is namely, that this is one of the most stupid and unnecessary conflicts ever fought. Russia wanted of Ukraine what the US wants of all of its neighboring states namely, neutrality at least, and a firm commitment of mutual security at best. In no way did the Russian Federation pose the least threat to Ukraine before 2014 and in many ways they maintained a mutally advantageous relationship, as in Russia’s payment to Ukraine for the transit of Russian oil and gas to its European clients. All it wanted of Ukraine was neutality, that Ukraine would not bring NATO to Russian borders. NATO was already placing nuclear facilities on Russian borders in Poland and Romania on the ridiculous pretext of needing to protect those countries from possible attack on Europe by Iran, an utterly preposterous deception - not least, given that Iran did not possess a single nuclear warhead then nor does so today.

So, we are where we are. I will refrain from rehearsing one more time how it was that Russia had to respond to Crimea’s request for protection from the neo-nazi fanatics who, funded and instructed by NATO, staged the coup d’etat in 2014, and how it was that Russia had to respond to the increasing threat that NATO’s provocation, through its proxy, Ukraine, posed to the independent republics of the Donbass (who had sought only greater autonomy from Kiev and from the coup regime’s anti-Slav racism) provoked Russia to the point that Russia was forced to conclude that it had to strike, and strike at what Russia judged, rightly or wrongly, was a point of least disadvantage to Russian interests.

There is no reasonable doubt that the Ukrainian regime, now an illegitimate dictatorship, is wholly dependent on Washington, NATO and the collective West for its continued existence, for the salaries of its administration, for its war funding and weapons, for the deployment, management and effectuation of the more sophisticated of those weapons, for its overall battlefied strategies and, probably, tactics. For some time now, Ukraine has been using NATO weapons on targets within Russia. Occasionally NATO will argue that Ukraine has done so without NATO’s approval, even in the face of NATO disapproval. Had that truly been the case, of course, NATO would have stopped its supply of weapons and would not have escalated its provision of missiles and other weapons to more and more dangerous varieties. Instead it has done this, and is currently making a play of deliberating whether to “allow” Ukraine to use long-range missiles on Russian targets when, of course, any reasonsably intelligent person will by now have concluded that this is a policy that is already in place and has firm support from most NATO members, barring Hungary, and Italy, and with the possible exception of Germany, whose chancellor, Scholz maintains, for now, German opposition to the sending of its Taurus missiles which have a longer range than the most sophisticated missiles that NATO has so far delivered to Ukraine, namely ATACMS (mostly if not entirely launched from HIMARS missile launchers, which might be a limitation of sorts).

In striking a component of Russian strategic nuclear infrastructure, NATO has now provided Russia with the legal justification under its own law, to strike back at NATO or NATO facilities anywhere in the world with nuclear weapons. I referred in my post of Friday to the previous conclusion of Ted Postol, MIT missile expert, and which he has confirmed to the Schiller Institute yesterday or today namely, that Russia, with its ground-based network of ground stations and satellites and more dependent, I understand, on ground-based radar than is the case with the USA, is at a disadvantage so far as early warning of ICBM attacks are concerned, with the result that Russia has far less warning time of such an attack than does Washington, reducing decision-making time and hugely increasing the chances of error. Nuclear strike forces will almost certainly now be at a higher stage of alert.

Further evidence of collective West doubling down on the road to war has come from France, which has already agreed to send French trainers to Ukraine (more NATO troops on the ground, therefore), the Baltic States which are indicating they may join this urge to train, and Spain, which is providing a significant aid package in the form of 19 Leopard 2s and “dozens” of Patriot missiles.

The Battlefields

Dima of the Military Summary Channel at midday today (Pacific Daylight Time) reports intensifying clashes in western Kharkiv area, with Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian villages of Novostroyevke-Vtoraya and Dobropolye and Russian Lancest attacks on Ukrainian drone operators on Perovske and Odnoronbivka, and, further east, on Shevchenka and Hraniv. Dima speculates that Russia may be planning an offensive on the town of Zolochiv either through Perovske or through Kozacha Lopan or both.

There is no further Russian ground operation reported near Lyptsi but a Ukrainian counterattack has moved Ukrainian forces just south of Hlyboke, which Russia captured very early on in its Kharkiv offensive. There are significant artillery duels. Further east in Vovchansk, Russia is making further progress, block by block in completing its attack on the northern sector of Vovchansk, north of the Volcha river, and has destroyed two bridges over the Volcha in an effort to terminate supplies to Ukrainian forces in the northern sector. Heavy clashes continue in the “Citadel” or high-rise area.

In the Kupyansk area Russia is moving westwards from the settlement it recently acquired of Kyslivka, and, either from there or from Ivanivke, to the immediate north and may move west on Stepova Novoselivka. Further south, Russian forces continue to work on a process of encirclement of the area from Miasozharivka to Stelmakhivka.

In the Siversk area it is confirmed, once again (!) that Russia has established complete control over Bilohorivka and has been moving towards and even by-passing, the settlement further west of Hryhorivka. To the immediate south, in the Chasiv Yar area, Russian forces have extended their territory well to the west of Bohdanivka almost, and perhaps even into, Kalynivka, but also by-passing Kalynivka to the north where forces have almost reached the canal, so that Russia is preparing to take the main part of Chasiv Yar both from the north and from the south (from Kleshciivka and Andrivka, both now under Russian control). Intense clashes continue in the eastern microdistrict east of the canal.

In the Andriivka area, reports show small advances of between 50 and 200 meters in practically every direction of Ocheretyne - towards Novooleksandriva, Kalynove, Prohres, and Sokil. Russia is extending its control around Netailove considerably and improving its preparations for a move westwards towards the Karlivka Reservoir.

In Krasnohorivka, Russian forces have still to take what Dima calls the “Citadel,” by which I think he means the high-rise area of the city and he notes that these “citadels” have been problematic everywhere for Russian forces, which have had success in taking only the citadel of Bakhmut. There are no reported changes of significance in the Kostyantynivka are, but Russian forces are reported to be four kilometers from the important supply road between that settlement and Vuhledar. Russian forces have much of Staramaiorske to the south and west, and are pummeling Urozhaine. In Zapporizhzhia, a Russian attack on Zherebrianky, along with other recent attacks in this area, suggests the possibility of a Russian offensive on Kamianske.

Putin

Putin, en route between Belarus and Uzbekistan (likely to be invited into the Eurasian Economic Union) has talked of the massive increase in Russian military production (x22 in some categories of weapon) over the period of the SMO, which is envisaged to be permanent, not just for the needs of the SMO. Securing this growth, he argued, strengthens the civilian economy by generating more investment in such areas as digital and electronic domains of defense that also have hybrid benefits for the rest of the economy.

Palestine to Georgia and the Decline of the Neocon West

The leader of Saudi Arabia, always courted by the US in the hope that the Saudis will somehow help it out from the morass of the US genocidal policy in Gaza, has instead decided to visit Iran, following the tragic death of former President Raisi, reminding the world of the Saudi reprochement with Iran and of the membership of both these countries in BRICS. Other signs of consolidation of BRICS power include Argentina’s dispatch of a delegation to Beijing; the collapse of the Swiss peace conference in a favor of a BRICS-led initiative (involving a meeting on Ukraine between China and Brazil) and, from Tbilisi, the news that a Georgian parliament committee today rejected the president’s veto of the “foreign agents” legislation (which is, essentially, a victory for those who want to put an end to Western “NGO” meddling in Georgia’s internal affairs. This sets up the possibility of a vote of the full legislature on Tuesday to override President Salome Zourabichvili’s veto of the measure.