Continuing Kursk

Later on today I will post a more detailed evaluation of what I believe is going on in Kursk but for now I will limit myself to a few broad-brush comments.

I expect to report that the Ukrainian incursion still advances towards the Seym river in the Glushkovo area with a view to continuing on towards Ryl’sk from which, with a suitable concentration of forces it may attempt an eastwards advance with the ultimate objective of the KNPP.

While I don’t think this will be successful, I also don’t think it can be ruled out. The more threatening Ukraine can be, the more Russia must attend to it and, if necessary redeploy troops from other parts of the combat lines in addition to reserves.

For the moment it would seem that Russia has the advantages of air, artillery and drone superiority. Plus the flat terrain affords Russia excellent surveillance.

Ukrainian forces numbered 11,000 a few days ago: Russian sources calculate that their losses so far are over 3000, but in the meantime Ukraine will have moved at least that number and probably a lot more into Kursk together with tanks, armored vehicles, HIMARS launchers, drones and the like.

Ben Aris, writing for Intelinews today, claims that because Russian railways are digitized, the seizure of Kursk railway stations has given Ukraine the wherewithal to cripple or at least severely disrupt the entire network. He further claims that Ukraine is in possession of more capable electronic warfare that offers them a better measure of protection against Russian missiles and drones.

Ukraine’s current forces in Kursk are operating in relatively small numbers in multiple directions. This greatly extends the overall length of the lines of combat, facilitates speed across relatively sparsely populated regions, and reduces visibility.

Further Ukrainian incursions are anticipated into Kursk, Briansk and Belgorod regions. These may have already started this morning with a force of 200 men that was repelled.

Belarus meanwhile is hardening its forces along its border with Ukraine further west to face off against possible Ukrainian attacks. 110,000 Ukrainian forces are said to be positioned along this border. The Belarusian army is small, at 48,000, so demands for Russian supplementary aid to Belarus could be substantial and will further add pressure on Russian forces which may soon, with China, have to respond also to requests for assistance from Iran, Syria and Lebanon against US/Israeli aggression.

Ukraine is thought to have concentrated one third of its army in the Sumy/Kharkiv area. Russia is of course leveraging the reduction of Ukrainian forces elsewhere for its own advances in Donetsk towards Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk and Vuhledar.

The Ukrainian invading force should be considered a NATO force since Ukraine is fighting it with NATO weapons, NATO advisers and 2000 or so NATO “mercenaries.” US intelligence must have been aware of and was probably, with Britain, engaged in the overall plan of attack. Russian intelligence must also have been aware, but Russia either took a decision to allow Ukraine to enter what Russia considered to be a trap, or that Russia was grossly incompetent in failing to better fortify this area. Given the necessity to evacuate up to 200, 000 people, to prepare for extensive damage to Russian assets along the border, the risks to the KNPP, among other considerations, I suspect incompetence to be the more compelling observation.