Collaborating with Genociders, Starting and Parrying Invasions and War

US House of Representatives Loves Genocidal Israel

The US and Israeli militaries are aggressively consolidating their integration through a sweeping legislative proposal known as the “United States-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative” (Section 224) within the House version of the 2027 National Defense Authorization Act. This provision forces an unprecedented physical and strategic fusion of the two war machines, embedding the Israeli military directly into the US national security apparatus. Key integration measures include:

Technology & AI: Mandating the integration of Israeli defense technologies into critical US military supply chains, effectively intertwining American and Israeli assets.

Research & Development: Funding joint ventures for advanced military research across areas like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, autonomous systems, directed energy, biotech, and cyber warfare.

Network Integration & Data Fusion: Creating pipelines for the two forces to share information, fuse battlefield data, and promote joint military training.

Expanding bilateral licensing agreements and manufacturing capabilities to build weapons together rather than simply sending US aid.

Oil Prices

The situation regarding the U.S.-Israel war with Iran remains highly volatile, characterized by escalating military clashes, a fragile and fraying ceasefire framework, and a significant legislative push in Washington to curb presidential war powers. In a rare bipartisan challenge, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a war powers resolution (215–208) aimed at halting unauthorized military action against Iran. Four Republicans joined Democrats in voting to require congressional approval for extended conflict. President Trump condemned the vote as “meaningless and unpatriotic,” claiming it disrupts his leverage. President Trump has privately indicated to aides that he does not intend to resume a full-scale bombing campaign unless American troops are killed. This stance is influenced by a rapidly depleting U.S. munitions inventory and warnings from domestic oil executives regarding spikes in gasoline prices.

The ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz has darkened global economic forecasts. The Eurozone economy shrank by 0.2% in the first quarter, and central banks, including the Reserve Bank of India, are holding interest rates high to buffer against persistent energy market inflation. Putin in Saint Petersburg today reminded his audience that over the past three years the Russian economy has grown by 10% while Europe has achieved only a modest 3%, while Germany is in recession (and, in another sign of decline, has lost its status as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council).

And perhaps recession now awaits the rest of Europe. Falling demand may be one explanation for why, despite the continuation of the Gulf crisis, oil prices are still hovering below $100 a barrel, even though many, if not most, analysts a month or so ago were convinced that by now prices would lie in the devastating $150-$200 range. Other explanations for why the worst has not happened include the possibility of some kind of major miscalculation, a healthier than expected drasw on global oil reserves (but see below), and/or manipulation of real oil prices to ward off the danger of global depression for as long as possible.

On the issue of oil reserves, the situation as formally understood is that countries have drawn down global commercial and strategic inventories at an unprecedented rate. Global stockpiles have plummeted from 8 billion barrels in February to roughly 7.6 billion barrels by the start of June. A coordinated 400-million-barrel emergency strategic reserve release has been heavily utilized, leaving some commentators to conclude that global safety buffers have almost entirely depleted as peak summer demand begins.

But, if in three months we have lost 400,000,000 barrels out of a total of what had been 8 billion, then that suggests that there are reserves sufficient to last the world a further 60 months or five years. Is the apparent delay in the onset of devastating crisis, therefore, a mere reflection of a more sober appraisal of the gravity of the problem? Especially given the relatively high chance that the crisis will be resolved within this time frame, or that new sources of oil will come on line, or the transition to a green economy will accelerate under Chinese leasdership of the EV market, or that workarounds to the crisis will become gradually more effective?

Factors already ameliorating the shortfall include a drop in consumption forced by high prices that have caused global refinery throughput to plunge by 5 mb/d, while Chinese crude imports alone dropped by 6 mb/d in May compared to March. Producers in the Americas (primarily the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and Guyana) have increased their output by 1.5 mb/d compared to the start of the year.

The Venezuela Factor

Another possible consideration lies in the forced conversion of Venezuela into the status of US vassal state and the consequent role of US capital in boosting Venezuelan oil production.

Evidence of increasing oil production from Venezuela is supported by export and output data showing that exports recently reached 1.23 million barrels per day, a seven-year high, reflecting a steady climb since output dropped to below 0.5 million bpd in 2020.

This upswing is also evidenced by a surge in shipments to major international markets like the United States and India. India recently became the second-largest buyer of Venezuelan oil, bringing in 374,000 barrels per day. These developments complement increased sales to the US following the easing of specific energy sanctions. Western oil majors, including Chevron and Shell, are negotiating to launch or expand drilling and upgrading projects, particularly in the heavy crude-rich Orinoco Belt.

Nonetheless, the industry is still roughly 66% below its 2016 production peak, due to long-term infrastructural decay triggered by US economic warfare against the Bolivarian revolution, chronic underinvestment, and systemic issues that prevented immediate mass expansion.

The increase in Venezuelan oil production might seem a relatively minor correction to the overall shortfall of global oil supply that has been experienced as a result of the ongoing crisis in the Gulf which abruptly removed roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply from the market.

The global oil market is currently facing a massive supply shortfall of 14 million barrels per day by comparison with the stable market surplus (surplus of 410,000 barrels per day) that existed in February 2026.

However, the broader annualized net deficit for 2026 is projected by the International Energy Agency (IEA) to average out to a 1.78 mb/d supply deficit, completely erasing the previously expected surplus but which could be compensated for by increased production from Venezuela.

The Role of the US

U.S. sanctions had been the primary driver of volatility in Venezuela’s oil production, dictating fluctuations through a cycle of economic blockades, temporary waivers, and historic regulatory transformations. In the period 2017-2023 initial sanctions restricted refinancing Venezuelan debt, which directly halted infrastructural repairs. In 2019, the US Department of the Treasury froze all assets of the state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), and banned U.S. citizens from buying its oil. This caused output to collapse from nearly 2 million barrels per day (bpd) to historic lows under 500,000 bpd in 2020. Banning the export of U.S. light diluents heavily crippled production, as Venezuela required these chemicals to thin its extra-heavy Orinoco crude for transport.

In October 2023, the U.S. issued General License 44, temporarily lifting oil and gas sector sanctions in exchange for democratic electoral commitments. Following post-election political repression and disputes surrounding the 2024 Venezuelan election, the broad relief was revoked in April 2024. However, the U.S. shifted to a strategy of granting highly targeted individual waivers to specific Western firms—such as Chevron - allowing production to gradually stabilize near 800,000 bpd by late 2025.

Following the illegal US blockade of Venezuela and kidnapping of the country’s President in January this year, U.S. sanctions policy has transformed significantly to redirect (i.e. steal) global energy flows. Under Executive Order 14373, the US established the Foreign Government Deposit Funds, whereby the US now manages and markets Venezuelan oil exports to help stabilize domestic gasoline prices while sales revenue is diverted directly into U.S. Treasury-controlled accounts.

Broad restrictions were eased via OFAC General License 46 (authorizing established U.S. entities to trade Venezuelan crude) and General License 47 (permitting the critical return of U.S.-origin diluents to Venezuela). Restructured sanctions strictly prohibit Venezuela from selling oil to Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, or Chinese-controlled firms, creating an insulated trade loop focused primarily on the Americas and select global markets like India.

In direct response to the new U.S. policy framework, Venezuela’s National Assembly approved sweeping reforms to its Hydrocarbons Law. This dismantled total state control, allowing private energy firms to independently explore, produce, and market oil without PDVSA holding a mandatory majority stake.

Iran

Resolution of the Gulf crisis will certainly be impacted by increasing anxieties related to the volume of global oil supply, but Washington may be holding on to the expectation that before these anxieties reach an unsupportable level by September this year, the Iranian economy will be forced to crash.

An ameliorating factor to this scenario is the already-mentioned recently passed War Powers resolution in the US House of Representatives, supported by a bipartisan vote of 215 to 208, that directed President Trump to end unauthorized military hostilities in Iran.

The politics of the vote centered on mounting economic distress, shifting GOP dynamics, and a direct rebuke of the President’s ongoing war strategy. The resolution successfully passed because four Republicans broke ranks and joined the Democratic majority: Reps. Thomas Massie, Brian Fitzpatrick, Tom Barrett, and Warren Davidson. GOP defectors and Democrats alike cited mounting frustration with the conflict’s three-month duration. Lawmakers faced intense pressure over the domestic fallout of the war, including rising gas prices, inflated grocery costs, and the staggering financial scale of the conflict.

House Speaker Mike Johnson heavily opposed the measure, previously halting floor action in May by sending the House into recess to prevent a vote when it appeared the resolution had enough momentum to pass. President Trump fiercely criticized the resolution, calling it “unpatriotic” and arguing that it would limit his powers to progress what he laughingly seems to think is a delicate, final stage of negotiations to end the war (a war of outright aggression and horror, which he started, unprovoked and illegally, with Israel last February, following an earlier, failed attempt at regime change in Iran in 2025). The White House and House GOP leadership have argued that the War Powers resolution measure would weaken the U.S. negotiating position and embolden Iranian leadership. While this marks the first time the House has successfully passed a war powers resolution regarding this conflict, its immediate legal enforceability faces hurdles. The measure now heads to the Senate, where a similar effort has faced complicated bipartisan dynamics of its own.

Larry Johnson on Judging Freedom ealier today cites the view in some quarters that Israel is building up towards another attack on Iran, even though Pakistan is optimistic that a settlement is on the cards, and Trump’s comments on Iran have been surprisingly mild in recent days. On the question of whether Iran has been given a nuke - something I have posted on earlier this week - Johnson notes that this story has been backed by White House sources accessed by commentator Robert Barnes. Iranian sources say that talks are currently blocked and unlikely to start again until Israel’s invasion of Lebanon comes to an end and the US unfreezes $24 billion of frozen Iranian assets. If the war continues, Iranian sources are cited as having threatened to extend the war to US assets in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.

Russia-Ukraine-US

While pro-Russian commentators focus mainly on Russia’s continuing, incremental advances along various fronts in Ukraine, as I have outlined in recent posts, pro-Ukrainian commentators focus on the drone war, something which gives them confidence, or hope, that it is Ukraine, not Russia, that is winning the war. There is evidence to support both points of view.

Pro-Russian commentators are inclined to be dismissive of Ukraine’s drone swarms on the grounds that they have what is mainly derided as a PR “demonstration” function, do relatively little damage (“pinpricks” is the favorite term deployed by pro-Russian commentators Alexander Mercouris and Ray McGovern), or inflict the kind of damage that is easily repairable, and distract attention from the deteriorating state of the Ukrainian economy and its army - which, as Putin claims in his speech today, suffers very high casualties, is plagued by a high rate of desertion, press gang recruitment and a fall in the available supply of males, inspiring Ukraine to look desperately to what they hope will be a European-backed push of exiled Ukrainian young men home to Ukraine where they can be rounded up and sent to the front lines, probably soon to die.

In retaliation for a Ukrainian drone attack in May on a site in the Donbass that killed 25 school girls, Russia has barraged Kiev with attacks. One recently reported Russian hit on an SBU site is said to have killed several Western intelligence officers. In his speech today, Putin has also referenced the role of Oreshniks, one of which struck an industrial facility close to Kiev a week ago. Putin says that these are being tested on the Ukrainian field of combat with a particular view to assessing how best they can be deployed on areas of urban concentration, implying, first of all, that they can be used with great precision so as to reduce the harm they cause civilian populations and, secondly, that Kiev may very well be a future target.

Pro-Ukrainian commentators can point to the substantial impacts of Ukrainian drones in significantly reducing Russian oil refinery capacity, bringing about crippling shortages of oil in Crimea that may yet lead to mass evacuations, and are already interrupting supplies to Russian forces in Zaporizhzhia, as well as inciting growing unease with the war among the populations of Russia’s major cities.

In his speech today Putin indicated satisfaction with what has been a process of distancing by the US from the conflict in Ukraine over the past year, a conflict to which the US up until yesterday (when a new tranche of aid to Ukraine was voted on in a House vote on a Democrat measure to the tune of up to $8 billion) had greatly reduced the direct flow of US arms (pressuring Europe, instead, to pay US arms manufacturers to keep the flow going). Putin still professes to believe that last August in Anchorage he and Trump had come to an agreement that, had it been implemented by the US and the agreement left alone by Ukraine and Europe, would have led to peace by now. He continues to express hope that Russia and the US can find sufficient economic and political common ground to secure US acknowledgement of Russian security interests on its western borders, even after a final resolution of the Ukraine conflict.