Chinks of Light in the Graveyard
So far as I can tell, Russian hypersonic nuclear-capable kinzhals and zircons, along with nuclear-propelled and nuclear-capable burevestniks and poseidons and the non-nuclear but nuclear-comparable oreshniks together represent an armory that puts Russia at a significant advantage over the US in the stakes of nuclear war.
All but the two most recent of these are in production and stocks have been accumulated; the two most recent have recently gone into production or are about to do so.
Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov was absent at two important top level meetings last week. Some commentators have suggested that he was being marginalized by Putin. Others speculated that Russia was afraid of a decapitation strike and had taken steps to ensure the continuing survival of at least one very senior official.
I don’t find either of these explanations very compelling. As for fear of a decapitation strike, I am very doubtful either that the West or Ukraine would want to take that risk, as it would certainly ignite nuclear war and the utter destruction of Kiev, and I am also doubtful as to a non-nuclear capability that would achieve this goal, given failed Israeli attempts at this kind of thing in Yemen and Tehran. And I don’t think it likely that Lavrov would be singled out for special treatment.
As to a split between Putin and Lavrov: I see no evidence of such a divergence. Both seem to converge, even now, in the direction of settling the war on the fairly modest terms set out by Putin in June 2024, which, far from being “maximalist” as Western media like to call them, refrain from pursuing attainable and perhaps thoroughly sensible security goals such as taking Cherniviv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Odessa.
Both men were keen on the promise represented by Anchorage, and even after the White House failed to follow up on the possibility of a settlement that had been broached and advanced in Anchorage and then sabotaged the possibility of a further summit in Budapest, both Putin and, very recently, Lavrov. have continued to express openness to talks with the US.
In short, both Putin and Lavrov should be counted among those in Russia who occupy the more liberal end of the political spectrum, no longer so naively pro-western as they and many of their class once were, and much more patriotic, opposed mainly by those, exasperated, who are keen to see a far more determined effort to win and terminate it once and for all.
Putin and Lavrov must of course be aware of their nuclear superiority although they will feel more secure once sizable numbers of burevestniks and poseidons are coming off the production lines.
I propose that Putin’s and Lavrov’s continuing “softness” on the matter of remaining open to talks with a congenitally agreement-incapable, murderous rogue state no longer comes from a place of naivety or weakness but, first of all, from a desire to be seen to be doing everything they can possibly do to project reasonableness to the world at large, so that, should Russia consider itself obliged or provoked enough to use its weapons, nobody can argue that fair warning was not given and with generous reaction time to boot.
Secondly, Putin and Lavrov must understand that no American administration now or in the foreseeable future will back away from the main foreign policy goal of US hegemony, a single mindedness that might seem the product of radical lobotomy, as its fascination with Venezuela demonstrates. The USS Gerald Ford having now arrived in the Caribbean, if it is not too tempting a target for an early application of the poseidon, signals the hardening of US military resolve for a bid, first and foremost, to take control of Venezuelan oil. This will help when the US shale oil revolution tapers off and it no longer has the supplies it has had up until now with which to force European and Indian purchases at grossly inflated LNG prices (when compared with the previous low prices for Russian crude supplied by pipeline). It could also be important if, for some reason, Iran does not cave into US/Israeli aggression. Or if the green revolution advances even faster than it is already doing. If Venezuela is subdued, Washington (or, rather, Rubio) presumes, Cuba will be next, and Colombia. US power in Latin America would intensify and help push China back. And no, drugs have absolutely nothing to do with it.
Russia may consider that temporary truces at the broader geopolitical level, perhaps on the back of mutually beneficial economic projects, will extend the period of pre-climax tranquillity and allow Russia, China and the BRICS more time to prepare themselves for the final war of the Titans.
Or perhaps Russia is already sitting on a plan for a major demonstration event that will prove to the US that it can be devastated almost anywhere without detection, while conventional ICBMs fired on Russia can be impeded by air defense, deflected electronically, fooled by decoys and often don’t work.
Ted Postol has just discussed how a single Poseidon nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable drone fired underwater from a submarine could destroy the entirety of Hawaii. Were something of this magnitude to occur and it was made clear to the US that Russia’s other new weapons were poised for instant follow-up attack upon the first hint of retaliation, even an administration as ignorant and dystopian as Trump’s might sue for peace.
Putin and Lavrov must also be acutely aware that whatever advantage they think they have it is not necessarily permanent or even of very long duration at all. If they fail to take action while they still have an advantage they may condemn themselves to forever subordination. And as they look out at the world from Moscow they must ponder some of the forces aligned against procrastination: Western measures against Russian energy trade (although somewhere in the medium future lies the prospects of micro nuclear reactors for revolutionizing the energy calculus very much in Russian favor); India’s reduction in oil imports from Russia; US cowering of almost all countries, allies and competitors alike, with actual and threatened massive tariff spikes; US/Western success in compromising countries like India, Pakistan, Belarus, Serbia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Central Asian economies, that might otherwise be firm allies of Russia and China.
These are among some of the factors that weaken both Russia and China. And some of their allies. Iran, for example, is beset not just by the threat of another attack from the US/Israel but by intense water shortages and air pollution pressures on the sustainability of Tehran. The Middle East is assaulted by US legitimization of and economic support for Al Qaeda leadership in Damascus (soon to be home to a US military base); Israeli killings in southern Lebanon; continuing Israeli genocide against Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank; US manouvers to seize authority in Gaza (half of this occupied by the IDF) and the building of a US military base on its border.
Europe’s combination of irrational fear of Russia, determined support for Ukraine (willing to shoulder almost any amount of debt on the backs of European citizens to do so), and crippling economic crises in the UK, France and Germany are further destabilizing factors.
So if Putin and Lavrov still insist upon their interest in continuing to talk with Trump or Rubio, what is it that they really want to talk about, and that they clearly think Trump and Rubio should be talking about?
What could it be about, other than an appraisal of Ukraine and NATO in the light of the fall of Pokrovsk, Russian occupation of both sides of the Oskil, Russian troops surrounding the cities of Lyman and Siversk, and Russian advances towards the cities of Dnipro and Zapporizhzhia and Kherson, the insistence of its drone attacks on Odessa, etc?
All within the broader context of Russian geopolitical security interests and its advocacy for a new security architecture for both the West and the East?
Not to forget that tiny little matter of Russian capacity to strike the USA off the map of the world.
It seems improbable that the knuckleheads in Washington have the brainpower to get their brain cells around all this although, just possibly, Western pressure on Zelenskiy via the anti-corruption agencies that the West incubated in the first place (and which are now arresting Zelenskiy colleagues) while they were taking over Ukraine’s intelligence apparatus, might represent a chink of light in the graveyard of common sense.
