Bridges, Starlink, and Nukes

Ukraine and its Western powers sometimes seem to structure their entire war effort around PR. The strike on the Kerch bridge is an example. But one should not underestimate the advantage that corporate-controlled but government- (or rather Deep State-) friendly media give the propaganda machineries of Western governments.

The Kerch Bridge

Mercouris today (Mercouris 10.08.2022) notes that the bridge was completed in 2018, providing a connection between the Kerch region in Russia and Crimea, much to the irritation of Ukraine and its western sponsors, following Ukrainian terroristic attacks against Crimea after its annexation by Russia in 2014 that threatened to isolate the peoples of Crimea.

The recent attack, doubtless planned for some time, comes at a convenient moment to divert public attention from Ukraine’s setbacks in the battlefields around Bakhmut.

It was not a missile attack, since Ukraine does not have missiles with sufficient range, since long-range missiles ,have so farbeen denied them by the US (probably because Russia will have warned Washington of retaliation against US facilities in the event that such weapons are provided).

The Kerch attack looks to be truck borne. Russia says there have been no fatalities (I have seen references to three dead - OBB). So what happened to the driver? It was a large device that damaged the road surface on one side of the bridge (there are two roadways) but not to its structural integrity. A train was passing at the time of the explosion and some of the gas tankers on the train caught fire. These fires have now been extinguished. The bridge could be back in operation between a few days to three to six weeks. There is another part of the bridge that has undamaged road surface. The overall severity in impact to supply routes does not seem to be fundamental to the Russian military in the Kherson region or to Crimea. It is the rail connection that is most important in this respect.

What about the political implications? The Kerch has a totemic significance for Russia. There is widespread talk of a Russian retaliation on Ukrainian infrastructure, perhaps on Ukrainian bridges across the Dnieper river, though it is said that this would require a thousand missiles which Russia could scarcely afford (though there has been no sign of a lack of Russian missiles so far) and who really knows how many missiles it would take? Russia seems to have a good supply of Tomahawk missiles which are significantly more dangerous, by comparison with HIMARS. Russia also has the powerful KH22 anti-ship supersonic missile, and has a growing arsenal of hypersonic missiles.

From a security point of view it must be of great concern to Russia that the truck managed to get on the Kerch bridge. In answer to just such security challenges we are beginning see a global review of the command structure of Russian forces, and there have already been some critical replacements.

Military Command

At the beginning, in February, Russia did not appoint a single overall commander for Russian troops in Ukraine. Up until recently there were many local commanders reporting to Moscow where they were coordinated by General Gerasimov, Chief of Staff. Perhaps in March the forces were so spread out that this arrangement of separate commands made sense. But the underlying reason may have more to do with the structure of the SMO and its reliance on the Donbass militia (rather than seeking to integrate the militia into the Russian army). Such problems are not unusual: during World War II, the German army never succeeded in sorting out its command structures. But now we have an appointment of one overall commander for Ukraine (General Surovikin - spelling is temporary!).

Battlefields

On most battlefronts the situation has been relatively quiet except for Russian activities around Bakhmut and Donetsk City. If Ukraine’s forces are surrounded in this area then that will be the biggest, perhaps the decisive, defeat of the war. There is general consensus on this. There is also a systematic clearance by Russia of Ukrainian fortifications around Donetsk City and Adiievka. The reports of Patrick Lancaster, currently in Donetsk, suggest that when the shelling of Donetsk City is finally brought to an end, that in itself will cause a major improvement in morale that could be a game changer. The Wagner group and the Donetsk militia have made significant progress over the past few days.

Ukrainian attempts have been made on Russian positions in Kherson, without success, and its looks as though Chechnyan forces are now in Kherson. Around Lyman the most significant settlements are still in Russian hands. There has been talk of a Ukrainian offensive on Zaporizhzhia, in a bid to cut off Crimea, but this has yet to take shape.

Maybe there are things that Ukraine can still do but, for the moment, it seems that over the last couple of days the Ukrainian offensive has come to a total stop. Time is not on Ukraine’s side given the changing weather conditions. Recent articles in both the New York Times and the Financial Times have noted how this factor is now Ukraine’s biggest challenge.

Mobilization and Communication

The Russian mobilization is continuing: there have been lots of issues and concerns about this process raised in Russian media (and played up to a ridiculous degree by western media). But most, if not all, these reservists have had previous military experience. In a week or so we should see some of these people redeployed to their former units, units already on the battlefronts, beginning to increase the numbers of Russian combat forces and providing compensation for the loss of men that arose from the expiry of contracts over the summer.

There do seem to be serious problems with Ukraine’s communications: there is overwhelming consensus that over the past few months Ukraine, with extensive western assistance, has shifted its communication system towards total reliance on Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite system, which is owned by Musk. This was partly developed with the help of the US military. It was even the subject of a Russian You Tube program about a year ago, expressing concern as to the military implications.

There are now very serious, even catastrophic failures of the Starlink system. There have even been suggestions that Musk himself is responsible for this, following his spat with Ukraine over its rejection of his peace proposal for the war, or out of annoyance that (he claims) he has not been paid. But the problems may have started to manifest themselves before the spat with Musk hit the headlines. It may be that what triggered Musk’s sudden interest in peace in Ukraine was triggered by the problems with Starlink. There are indications that Russia has managed to interfere with Ukrainian communications and this would be a major problem for Ukraine, a much bigger problem that whatever logistical hiccoughs Russia will experience following the attack on the Kerch bridge.

About Biden’s strange Armageddon comments

These were not made in a speech to the American people, not even in a public venue, but were made over the course of a Democratic Party fund-raiser in the runup to the midterms. Nuclear war was not even the main topic of his speech. His main topic was the alleged threat to American institutions of the Republican Party (!). His comments were followed by reports that US intelligence was baffled by his remarks, as they had seen no signs of Russian preparations for nuclear war, and Russia, says Mercouris, has never issued such threats (I think Mercouris is wrong about this - much depends on what one means by the term “thereat” - OBB).

Threats by the US to use tactical nuclear weapons are numerous, including plans by Eisenhower during the Korean War; and in 1968 General Westmorland in Vietnam pushed for the use of tactical nukes in the battlefield. There is no evidence of comparable incidents among Soviets or Russians. Why is there, then, all this talk about Russia’s intention to use nuclear weapons? Perhaps such talk is intended to shake Russians’ confidence in Putin, and to shake the Global South’s preference for Russia in this dispute - exacerbated by western annoyance over Saudi Arabia’s role in the recently announced OPEC oil production cut.

So smearing Putin appears to be the main goal of a lot of western media coverage. Another example is the story of a confrontation within Putin’s circle between Putin and a critic of the Ukrainian war, probably Prigozin, founder of the Wagner group. Mercouris thinks the idea of such a political challenge is very unlikely to be true, but concedes there may be tensions between Chechnyans, regular military, and the Wagner group: but the idea that Prigozin is the leader of some kind of hard line faction is sheer fantasy.

The constant harping on Russian threats to use nuclear weapons, Mercouris says, is reckless and will start backfiring before very long: in the US, some prominent Republicans (e.g. Byron York) are getting very critical of Biden’s comments, which York attributes to political strategizing for the midterms. People in the intelligence community are beginning to get annoyed as well. Mercouris acknowledges Zelinskiy’s outrageous call for the use of preemptive tactical weapons. All this will do is to harden the view of the Global South that it is the West, not Russia, which is talking recklessly. In France, Macron appears to agree.