Big Shia Fail in the Middle East (Revised)

New readers should know that my Substack posts are dedicated to surveillance of matters related to a central premise, and that premise, put at its simplest, is that the collective West, made ever more desperate and ruthless because of its unsustainable debt load, is attempting to beat back the multiple forces of multipolarity. It is currently doing this on three main fronts: against Russia over the proxy excuse of defending Ukraine; against Iran over the proxy excuse of defending Israel; against China over the proxy excuse of defending Taiwan. But there is no limit to the number of fronts that the West will entertain.

I want to briefly report today on three developments since my last post that I think are especially relevant to our understanding of events in the Middle East on the very eve of the inauguration of President Donal Trump.

Gaza

First of all, it appears increasingly possible that Israel will accede to Trump’s pressure to sign a ceasefire deal with Hamas, virtually the same deal that Hamas would have signed a year ago were it not for constant Netanyahu prevarication under pressure from the most extremist members of his cabinet, Smotrich and Gvir.

Trump’s pressure was a warning that “all hell would break loose” if an agreement was not signed in time for his inauguration next Monday. This was interpreted by Western mainstream media as Trump putting pressure on Hamas. But it is difficult to imagine how Hamas would be perturbed by further Hell, since Hell is what they already have.

That Trump’s real target was Netanyahu was indicated by Trump’s subsequent republication of a portion of the Q&A following a speech to Cambridge students last year given by Jeffrey Sachs in which he accuses Netanhayu of being behind every regime-change war fought by the US in the Middle East since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. (I would start with the need for a more thorough investigation of possible Israeli participation in the events of 9/11 or in the drive for these wars outlined in the Neocon Mein Kampf, Project for a New American Century).

Ceasefire or no ceasefire there is certainly a sort of argument that says that Israel has met with “defeat” in Gaza given that Hamas is still around; that it recruits as fast as its members are killed, perhaps faster; that Israeli soldiers are still being killed in Gaza; that many IDF soldiers refuse to fight in Gaza; that Israel’s economy has taken a major hit; that very large numbers of Israelis have left Israel; that Israel’s genocide has awarded it pariah status in virtually every country except those of Israel’s fellow genocidists, principally the US and Britain; that some, perhaps many IDF soldiers have exhibited the same filthy, inhuman, indescribable horror as the worst of German Nazis in World War 2.

But all this may be of little comfort to the dead and those they leave behind. Even as Trump has invited a party of extremist Israeli settlers to his inauguration. There is little hopeful assurance at this time of a meaningful future for Palestinians in Gaza.

Lebanon

In the meantime, one of Hamas’ principal supporters, Iran and the Hezbollah militia, have been considerably weakened by events in Syria and Lebanon. Former British diplomat Craig Murray emphasized this today in his report of the election of a favorite of the US, Israel, Western Europe (France, Germany) and Saudi Arabia to the position of the presidency of Lebanon. This is General Aoun, formerly head of the Lebanese Armed Forces. He secured election, says Murray, despite the fact that it is directly unconstitutional for a present or former head of the LAF to become president in Lebanon.

Murray, reporting from outside the parliamentary building in Beirut attests that Lebanese politicians were put under pressure from the US (its representative being Israeli-born and former IDF soldier, Amos Hochstein), Saudi Arabia, France and Germany who threatened that if they failed to elect Aoun, Israel would not leave southern Lebanon as it is supposed to do in a couple of months under the terms of the ceasefire deal that was signed by the Lebanese government, Israel and Hezbollah last month. I would be suprised if Israel leaves anyway. Both France and the Saudis had representatives sitting in the room in which the vote was taken. Hezbollah supported Aoun in the final round but only after thirteen months and 14 failed electoral attempts.

Murray concludes, and I think this deserves emphasis, that “The US, Israel and Saudi Arabia have gained massively in the geopolitics of the Middle East. Iran’s position has been very seriously weakened….(New leaders in Syria and Lebanon) did not fire a single shot against Israeli invasion and occupation of their countries”

Saudis and Turks, Murray argues, colluded in this debacle in exchange for trhe suppression of Shia Islam in the remaining Arab territories.

And as though to drive a nail of endorsement through this conclusion, we should take note of the disgraceful address by General Kellogg (the increasingly unlikely savior of anything worthwhile in Ukraine) to a conference organized by the formerly terrorist M.E.K., at one time a Marxist revolutionary group that helped secure the Islamic Revolution of 1979, was later suppressed by the Revolutionary Guards and whose mission, with support from the US amongst others, has become the destabilization of Iran on behalf of the US and Israel.

Israel

As we can see, therefore, there are widely varying interpretations of recent events as to whether they have made Israel stronger or weaker. To the “stronger” side of the ledger we should certainly factor in the fall of Assad, Israel’s invasion of the south of Syria and of the south of Lebanon, its weaking of both Hezbollah and Hamas, Israel’s destruction of Syrian air defenses, the incoming administration of Donald Trump who, though he may be critical of Netanyahu, does appear more often than not to support Zionist objectives - he declares himself to be Israel’s “best friend.” There seems little to prevent Israel taking more control over the West Bank as even the Palestinian Authority joins in the slaughter of Palestinians.

On the “weaker” side, in addition to points that have already been made in the context of Gaza, one should note the growing animosity between Turkey and the US-and-Israeli supported Kurds in Syria. Israel remains vulnerable to Houthi attacks on its shipping in the Red Sea and to implications for energy prices of Biden’s recent addition of yet more sanctions against Russian supplies, measures that have already increased prices by 3% (actually welcomed by the Russian stock market).

Russia-Iran-Azerbaijan

The strategic partnership agreement is still on course, so far as I am aware, towards being signed on Wednesday. Middle East Eye reports an Iranian government source to the effect that the agreement consists of 47 articles:

“Addressing a wide range of areas, including cooperation in technology, information and cybersecurity, peaceful nuclear energy collaboration, counterterrorism efforts, regional cooperation, environmental issues, the Caspian Sea and combating money laundering and organised crime. Other provisions relate to defence and military cooperation, such as training and joint initiatives, though the specific details will require further agreements and contracts”.

There appears to be nothing here that could be construed as a full-blooded mutual defense commitment. A clause prohibits both parties from supporting or assisting aggressors against each other, or allowing their territories to be used as bases for such actions. But that is not a statement of active commitment to arms. Both countries commit to opposing unlawful extraterritorial sanctions, including US secondary sanctions, and to supporting each other in international forums. Even this clause could face challenges if UN Security Council sanctions are reinstated, given that Russia is a Security Council member and is obligated to uphold its own standing.

There are indications of scope for the solidification of positive relations between both Iran and Russia with Azerbaijan, notwithstanding Russian error in the shooting down recently of an Azerbaijani plane. Azerbaijani President Aliyev has grown increasingly critical of and threatening towards neighboring Armenia and wary of Western arms sales to Armenia. He says thst Armenia has become a source of threat to the region. Aliyev has renewed a call for the opening of the so-called Zangezur corridor, a proposed land bridge across Armenian territory connecting Azerbaijan proper to its Nakhchivan exclave over which Baku would enjoy extraterritorial rights. Azerbaijan holds significant leverage as a supplier of natural gas to Europe, especially so since Ukraine recently shut off supplies of Russian gas to Russia’s European consumers.

Ukraine

There were many NATO/Ukrainian ATACMS and drone attacks across Russian territory over the night of January 13-14, of which one, unsuccessful, was reportedly an attack on a Russian chemical plant in Bryansk that, had it actually hit its target, could have sparked a major humanitarian disaster of war-crime status. Another, more likely successful, hit an oil refinery - I believe in Kazan. These attacks are likely to be the last in a long succession of US and NATO attempts to “escalate to de-escalate” the war in Ukraine, not one of which appears likely to achieve its purpose. Trump has reiterated his desire for a meeting very soon with Putin but says that resolution of the war is “up to Putin.” This could be interpreted in many ways. It may be that Trump thinks that earlier comments to the effect that if Russia does not come to the negotiation table now it will face an almighty increase in the supply of NATO weapons and cash will have softened Russia’s position. I think this is highly unlikely, given the economic crisis that now faces Europe, Russian strength on the battlefield and Trump’s evident desire to focus US attention Eastwards. As for the strength on the battlefield I note reports that suggest that Ukraine only managed to achieve 25% of its mobilization efforts in 2024 and the latest indications are that in place of building up new brigades from recruits the recruits will be sent instead directly to support existing units.