Assessing the Front Lines

The Battlefields

Russia’s Kharkiv offensive in June, while not pushed back by any means, and while Russia edges forwards, building by building, in the northern sector of Vovchansk (and has penetrated part of the southern sector, south of the Volcha river), and while it continues to hold off Ukrainian counter-attacks on Hlyboke to the west, and to drop FAV bombs on Lyptsi to the south of Hlyboke, and on Tyke to the east, (where it may establish a cauldron around Ukrainian forces in Vovchanski Khutory) is hardly a spectacular military success.

But it has been very effective in distracting Ukraine and prompting significant Ukrainian redeployment of troops from other parts of the combat line. This largely helps to explain the relative speed with which Russia is edging west from the Russian-held territories to the east, and north from the Russian-held territories to the south of Ukraine. Frequently, Russians encounter little to no Ukrainian resistance. There are stilll fairly large distances from the combat lines to the Dnieper, but as Ukraine’s fortified positions are destroyed and penetrated there seems less possibility of effective resistance to advances from where Russian forces currently stand, to the Dnieper itself.

It is easy to exaggerate the ease of such progress, however, from an arm-chair view, bearing in mind: (1) there are several significant populated areas between Russian forces and the Dnieper (e.g. Pokrovsk, Kupyansk, Slaviansk, Kramatorsk, Vuhledar), and (2) some cities on the Dnieper itself, in some cases spanning both sides of the river, are very large and, (3) considering the enormous investment of men and resources on both sides during Russia’s key conquests of such places as Mariupol, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Robotyne, Urozhaine, etc., Russian progress to the Dnieper is hardly a crapshoot, (4) while also remembering that taking the high-rise areas of city-centers, the so-called “citadels,” is an especially challenging enterprise.

Still, for Russia, the good news is that a number of significant settlements along Ukrainian front lines, as at Makiivka, Noveselivka Persha, Kostyiantivka, Krasnohoriivka, Chasiv Yar, Niu-York, Vuhledar appear very vulnerable or have already fallen.

Russia continues to subject Ukraine to nightly drone attacks, the latest of which appears to be intended to force Ukraine to reveal air defenses in the north and northeast, as well as hitting energy infrastructure. Many drones were shot down. As of today, it appears, moving from south to north of the combat lines, that Russia widening its flanks around Urozhaine in preparation for a move northwards. In Kherson to the west, Russian forces are clearing the Dniepr islands above Kozachi Laheri of possible Ukrainian presence, possibly anticipating a Russian offensive north of the Dnieper or perhaps simply with a view to establishing a buffer zone. In South Donetsk Russian forces are preparing an assault on, have fire control over and may have entered a part of the settlement of Maksmilianivka, east of Heorhiivka. Their next move may be westwards to Kurakhove. Russian forces have taken almost the entirety of Krasnohoriivka, but continue to bomb Ukrainian positions above the Osykove resevoir where Ukrainian soldiers may find themselves in a cauldron unless they escape now towards Hostre. Russia is attempting to take a farm area west of Krasnohoriivka with a view to interrupting the evacuation of Ukrainian troops from Krasnohoriivka to the Lozeva river.

West of Avdivka and Ocheretyne, Russian forces have reportedly taken a part (60%) of Pohres and moving from Lozuvatske to Tymoliivka in two directions. Novoselivka Persha is completely under Russian control. This is all now well to the west of Novooleksandrivka. The settlement of Yozdvyzhenbka is among those that will be most vulnerable to Russian advances, and likewise the M32 connection to the larger settlement of Pokrovsk. Russian artillery can reach Pokrovsk from here. Approaching Bakhmut, in the Toretsk area, Russian forces are in control of Yurivka, a suburb of Niu-York. Russians are widening their flanks on the route fro the south towards Niu-York, encircling two Ukrainian battallions. To the west, Russia is moving towards Novoalexdropil. A little further to the north, Russia has taken most of the settlement of Zelizne and have entered that of Pividinne, taking the important mine of Yuzhnaya. The distance from Niu-York to Pividenne is less than three kilometers. If and when Russia closes that gap, encircling Ukrainian forces the latter will be obliged to surrender. In Chasiv Yar, clashes continue on the west side of the Kanal. Further north, Russia continues to move towards Hryhoriivka, and Siversk. In Kupyansk, Russian forces have reportedly taken the elusive settlement of Synkivka, which is very close to the city of Kupyansk itself on the Oskil river. Russians are close to Holubievka. Russians are also reportedly present in Pishchsanne, sending sabotage groups into Kolisnykivka and Hlyshtivka, challenging Ukrainian concentrations in Novoostynove, Krysharivka, KupianskpVuzlovyi

Of course, at the moment, and probably for the remainder of this active conflict, things are looking very bad for Ukraine. They are losing territory in the east; they are constantly short of men and weapons, their air defense systems and their power systems are seriously degraded, there are protests in the streets against power shortages (and the corresponding decline of food and water security), there are mutinies against army recruiters. There are rumors to the effect that Ukraine’s General Syrsky himself has said he sees no hope of Ukrainian success on the battlefield.

Western weapons rarely, if ever, satisfy the claims of their manufacturers and defenders. Talking last month of anti-tank Javelins, for example, Brian Berletic calculated that only 2,400 of these were made each year, far less than the total of new Russian armored vehicles arriving on the battlefields, and with a hit rate (not even a rate of destruction) of less than 20%. On the issue of Ukrainian shell shortages about which alternative media have been warning for years now, finally we have a mainstream western news source that full confirms these assessments. In an article published by Reuters (Years of U.S., NATO Miscalculations) journalists Grey, Shiffman and Martell conclude that “Since Russia seized Crimea in 2014, policymakers in America and Europe repeatedly failed to address warnings about the sorry condition of the West’s munitions industry. The result: an inability to adequately supply Ukraine with a key weapon, and a shift of the war in Russia’s favor.” The current balance is NATO production of around 1.7m 155m shells, and Russian at over four million. US production is planned to reach a possible ceiling of 1.2 million by the end of 2025.

Contributory factors include gross underproduction (somewhat ameliorated during the first Trump presidency), factory closings, equipment failures, shortages of constituent chemicals and gunpower, very slow progress in the opening of new factories, high expense, delegation of responsibility to private contractors, poor management expertise. Russian production will also expand, from what is already a very competitive and much cheaper base. Meantime, as Ukrainian firing of shells falls to less than 1,000 or 2,000 day, Ukrainian loss rates,according to Russian sources, escalate to as high as 1,500 to 2,000 a day.

But the situation remains very dangerous. The replacement of Biden by Harris seems unlikely, on first glance, to make much, if any, difference, to US policy on Ukraine. The replacement of Biden by Harris will make it less likely that Trump will, after all, win the presidency. (On the matter of the recent assassination attempt on Donald Trump I remain of the opinion that the most probable explanation for why this could have happened is extreme or perhaps even deliberate incompetence on the part of the Secret Service). But Trump’s record for constancy on foreign policy issues is less than reassuring, whatever pacific noises are being made right now by the Trump-Vance ticket. Both sides are enhancing their readiness for nuclear conflict, and the use of nuclear weapons will continue to be an option the longer the conflict continues.

The European Union is seizing Russian assets (or the interest on such assets) so as to be able, in theory at least, to keep Ukrainians dying for NATO for a further eighteen months or so. The total assets are valued at around $350 billion. But the costs to the West, both military and civilian, of keeping Ukraine standing, sort of, upright may be around $200 billion annually. Both NATO and the EU are making the pretense, at least, of being able to sustain the conflict even without Washington support. New “wonder weapons” are arriving in Ukraine this month, notably the F16s, whose use, even if not making that much difference to the overall situation, will invite counter-responses and other escalations. In order to establish what they think may be an effective, offensive, whole-NATO front against Russia, most NATO countries are propagandizing their populations, on the basis of largely incorrect information and presumptions, to prepare for even more sacrifice.

In the domain of peace-talks, Zelenskiy - now described even by some of his supporters as illegitimate leader of a near dictatorship - has generously told Russia that he is going to organize a second “peace” conference to which Russia may be graciously invited. Lavrov has responded with the poignancy such idiotic posturings invite. Zelenskiy has also reached out to Trump by telephone. We do not know the actual contents of this call or, if we do, I have not personally seen them. This may link to new rumors recently afloat of a peace formula that might take the form of creating a buffer zone of autonomous oblasts around Luhansk and Donetsk. This make pick up from indications in the Istanbul peace talks of March and April 2022 that Russia could be open to some negotiation on whether it would insist on the entire territory of the four oblasts it has since absorbed, or might concede to taking just Luhansk and Donetsk. This is not a million miles away in concept from the Minsky accords which were undermined from their start by Ukraine, Germany, the US and the collective West, and are now dead. I am very doubtful that Russia is in any way so desperate that it would agree to such a plan when it is winning on the battlefield, incurring losses far less than those of Ukraine, when its real enemy is not Ukraine but NATO, and when its best interests are served not by any local deal with Kiev but by negotiations for a new global security order.