Assessing Kursk, Mourning Europe

Kursk

They Let it Happen On Purpose?

There is speculation that the Ukrainian invasion of the Russian Kursk region is the result of a Russian trap, set by deliberately withdrawing Russian troops from the border area close to Sudzha and leaving it relatively undefended, for the purpose of luring Ukrainian forces into that area so as to surround and destroy them in a stroke that would fatefully redeploy Ukraine’s best troops from areas already subject to Russian advances, mortally discredit the Kiev regime, eviscerate morale and provoke the collapse of the Ukrainian army.

It sounds clever, but is it true? Apart from the absence of any compelling evidence for this theory I would argue that it is very unlikely to be true. First of all, it would be incredibly risky, in a way in which the Russian military leadership generally is not. Secondly, it would conveniently distract attention from the possibility that the Russian army had, in this instance, shown incompetence, carelessness and gross lack of preparation in the face of known risks. Thirdly, it would cause death and injury to many Russian citizens for a very uncertain outcome, not to mention the ongoing evacuation of up to 80,000 citizens from homes that Russia may well have to destroy in its efforts to rid itself of the Ukrainian irritant. Fourthly, the circulation of any such story might just as well be the work of Russia, intended to sow doubt in the minds of the Ukrainian invaders, further sap their morale and encourage them to retreat rather than fall further into the trap.

Narrative Discrepancies

There continue to be major discrepancies of narrative between sources to which I normally resort for battlefield accounts. I continue to prioritize the accounts of Dima of the Military Summary Channel over what I regard as pro-Russian sources, not least because I think that were I a senior commander in the Russian army and I saw that subordinates were proceeding on the basis of the complacency that some pro-Russian commentators exhibit, I would fire them immediately.

Broad Brush

This is not to say that there is not an overall consensus as to where we are now, if we are taking a broad-brush measure. By and large it continues to be true that Russian forces are holding back Ukrainian invaders in a line from Korenovo to the northwest of Sudzha, Bol’shoye Soldatskoye to the north and Martinovka to the east of Sudzha. To the north - rather late, one may complain - Russia is building a defense line around Kursk, south of Imeni Karta Libkokhta and Ivanino.

But there continues to be considerable Ukrainian presence in and around many parts of Sudzha and there are many ongoing Ukrainian attempts to advance to the west of Sudzha and, more spectacularly, to the east. Further, there is worrying evidence, demonstrated by the location of Russian artillery, drone and missile targets, of a possibly continuing Ukrainian presence close to and even north of the line of defense from Kerenovo eastwards that I have just described. From a Russian perspective I would say that complacency on this score would be foolish, dangerous and unprofessional.

Continuing Fragility

Dima, in his broadcast around midday (California time) of Sunday, August 11, summarized the overall situation as one of Russian stabilization, but it seems very clear, at least from his calculations, that this is a fragile stabilization at best.

He cites the Russian MoD as confirming that Korenovo is indeed under Russian control but only after repelling four recent Ukrainian efforts to assault the southeast of the town.

The MoD also cites evidence of Ukrainian success in recent days in reaching as far north or northeast of Korenovo as Tolpino, Zhuravli, and Obshchiy Kolodez, in battles in which Russia destroyed up to 13 military vehicles. Russia also claims destruction of opposing forces in Straya Sorochnitsa, Korenovo, Sudzha and Borki in which Ukraine lost 35 troops, five tanks, 4 armored fighting vehicles and three motor vehicles. Ukrainian assaults on Belovsky, Ozerki and Ivanino were repelled. A Ukrainian BUK MI wss eliminated in Lyubimovka. All or most of these locations are well above Nizhniy Klin which was represented as being the most northerly point reached by Ukraine in the first day of operations.

Further south, there can be scarcely any doubt that Ukraine controls very many villages and territory and is seeking advances west (in the direction of Kalinina) and east (in the direction of Vishrenevo). Ukraine has captured and probably still controls several villages east of Leonidovo, and northeast of Kasachya Loknya, as far as and beyond Pravda. It does look as though Ukrainian forces that reached further than Cherkasskoe Porechnoe (still likely to be under Ukrainian control) have been repelled.

Ukraine still appears to control the southern section of Martynovka, and Russia, having sent reinforcements south from Bol’shoye Soldatskoye yesterday, controls the northern section. Ukraine is likely to be in control of western Plekhovo. Western Sudzha is described by Dima as a “no man’s land,” eastern Sudzha as a contested zone, while areas of central Sudzha still appear to be in Ukrainian control. Ukraine has complete control over Makhnovka, south of Sudzha, as well as over Geyevo, Oleksandriia and Myropillia. Recent Ukrainian offensives in the direction of Goplasovka, Kucherov, Kondretovka, Vishnevo and Vinavaki, have penetrated some thirty kilometers or more from Sudzha.

Russian Plans and Advances

In the meantime it is thought that Russia is planning an attack in the direction of Zolochiv in the Kharkiv oblast, from an area of concentration of Russian troops that extends, possibly, from Kozinka or, at least, Zamoskye in the west, to Vesyolaya Lopen in the east. Ukraine has recently entered, but since abandoned the nearby Russian border town of Poroz, and has tried, without success, to attack Bezymeno.

Elsewhere, we are hardly seeing evidence just yet of stunning Russian advances that are taking advantage of the relative denuding of Ukrainian defenses along the other combat lines. In North Kupyansk, there are Russian improvement of positions in the salient between Novoselivka and Berestove, creating further pressure on Stelmakhivka to the immediate south. In South Kupyansk, Russian FAB bombing currently “favors” Nevske and the road south to Lyman while in the Siversk area, FAB bombing is concentrated at the moment on Zvanivka, Zuzmynivka and Fedoriivka. In the Toretsk area Russian forces are attacking main Ukrainian positions in Pivniche, its coal mine and its landfill. There is confirmation of Russian advances on Ivanivka on the way to Pokrovsk and on Hrodivka and Mykolaivka.

Europe

Britain

Writing for Mint Press News, Kit Klarenberg (Klarenberg) provides further evidence of Zionist instigation of, or participation in, the recent British race riots. In almost every instance, police identified the rioters as members of the English Defence League (EDL), a now-defunct far-right organization comprised of hardcore anti-Islam agitators and football hooligans.

Tommy Robinson, the League’s former leader, denied these allegations on the grounds that “there’s has [sic] been no EDL for over a decade,” yet seemingly traced the violence back to the group he once headed and the streetfighting dogma it espoused. On August 8, the Byline Times probed the race riot instigators mapping “the key players and Transatlantic network” around Robinson.

“It argued he may have instigated the recent British upheaval at the behest of a sinister nexus of wealthy far-right figures in Europe and North America, including wealthy Donald Trump supporter Patrick Michael Byrne. Markedly, not once were Israel or Zionists mentioned – far more plausible candidates for directing Robinson’s incitation to Islamophobic violence.”

The League’s “Jewish” wing has been the movement’s most visible, as demonstrated by a profusion of Israeli flags flying routinely in EDL protests. An EDL-associated company known as EDL English Defence League LTD later became the Jewish Defence League with links to the Jewish Task Force, a far-right U.S. organization that “espouses a hardcore Zionism.

France

An article in the New York Times by Aurelien Breedon published on July 23rd reported how the choice as Prime Minister of Lucie Castets by the French coalition of left-wing parties that supposedly “won” the most recent election had been rejected by President Macron. Macron has retained his current cabinet until after the Olympics.

The French president alone has the power to appoint the prime minister and the cabinet. He is not constitutionally obliged to make his choice in a way that reflects the political balance in Parliament, although this is conventionally expected. This is in part the forseeable result of bartering between Macron’s party and a hastily formed New Left Coalition designed only with a view to blocking the ascent to power of Marine Le Pen and her National Rally party.

No single party within the Coalition represents significant public support. The choice of Castets was far from being radical, given her emergence from the standard elite educational institutions and neoliberal credentials.

“The New Popular Front has about 190 seats, Mr. Macron’s party and its centrist allies have about 160, and the far-right National Rally and its allies hold about 140 — none close to the absolute majority, 289 seats. The remaining seats are divided among other parties”.

Macron claims therefore that “no one won,” and that basically he can continue in power doing what he wants. We are back to a neoliberal, pro-war, anti-Russian French autarky.

Africa

The West African countries of Mali and Niger, which have recently booted out French forces, have also demanded the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces originally sent in to fight Russian Wagner troops. Ukrainian forces have been involved in the killing of indigenous troops and regime change shenanigans. Diplomatic relations are being severed. Ukraine’s role has been described as one of plausible deniability on behalf of Western imperial interests.