The Fog of War (2)
Ukraine
The towns of Ukraine remain relatively deserted, as men of military age hide in their apartments rather than be picked up off the streets by pressgangs. But it is unlikely that they are gaining much additional time before the pressgangs come knocking on and breaking down their doorways. Escape from a high-rise apartment is not feasible for most.
Zelenskiy wants the collective West to give Ukraine permission to use missiles (ATACMS missiles are the only ones suitably long-range in Ukraine’s possession) on locations within Russia (of course, Ukraine has been doing that already in Belgorod and has been using drones against Russian oil refineries), and wants NATO members, from outside of Ukraine, to fire on Russian missiles flying over Ukraine. Some legislators in the US Congress support such escalation. On the question of refineries, incidentally, Alexander Mercouris in his broadcast today, claims he has seen evidence of a glut of refined oil products in Russia, suggesting that the Ukrainian drone attacks were ineffective and there is no sign of a significant increase in price of refined products. While an ATACMS missile would likely cause a great deal more damage, it is still far-fetched, Mercouris believes, to anticipate that the damage would be of sufficient scale, and would only reinforce Russian wrath and persuade the Kremlin, as it has already warned, to take comparable measures against facilities of the collective West.
The real intention behind these demands, and demands from Zelenskiy for trainers from the West, is to drag the US directly into the war. Russian exercises for the use of tactical nuclear weapons suggest that it will indeed take such aggressive moves very seriously and react accordingly. I, for one, do not consider it wise to assume that these exercises are a form of bluff.
For hundreds of years now, Europe has chosen for different reasons at different times, to engage in a process of negative mythmaking about Russia. Professor Paul Robinson has recently illustrated the process comparing the negative characterization by western historians of eastwards-looking Czar Alexander III as against the far more positive characterizations of Alexander III by Russian historians on the grounds of Alexander’s independence and suspicion of the West.
Making Sense in Conditions of Great Fluidity
The situation on the battlefield overall of course favors Russia but Ukrainian resistance is still remarkably resilient, given the circumstances, and Russian progress is slow at the best of times (sometimes explained or justified as a positive feature of attritional warfare).
The best commentators pick up their information from geolocated video released from military units and from gossip, sometimes from well informed sources on telegram channels, or from more mainstream media sources and from official statements from ministeries of defense; when a given place is being bombed the underlying premise is that the place being bombed is being held or under the control of the party that is being targeted.
And then, invariably, whenever an advance is secured, there is speculation, sometimes well informed but other times less so, as to what the advancing party is going to do next. Such speculation as to future anticipated moves clouds the judgment as to what has actually or empirically been established as the case.
When a town is entered by one side’s forces it is sometimes prejudged to have been taken by the party that is entering whereas, more typically, it may take days, or weeks, or months before a town is actually and fully taken under control. On some occsasions, of course, there is a counterattack which forces the aggressor to retreat. In the meantime, the situation on the ground is both complex and fluid and nobody seems to know what is going on, so adding to confusion of reports. Such is the case with Krasnohoriivka. The Russian advance through the city has taken months; even now, Ukrainians hold positions in the northwest, and the business of fully expelling Ukrainian troops from the northwest may still take many more days.
We have several examples of such confusion today. For example, there are no reports coming out of Lyptsi so we don’t know whether Russian troops are in Lyptsi, or simply around Lyptsi, or have been pushed back or whether there is fierce fighting going on in the town.
Then in Vovchansk there is still uncertainty about whether even the northern section above the Volcha river is fully under Russian control. I suspect not. We dont really know how accurate are the reports of crossings of the Volcha by Russisan forces and to what extent these are advancing, though it does seem incontestable that Russia is flying drones into the center of the settlement.
To the east of Vovchansk there is no doubt that Russia is making advances towards the borders of its own mainland further to the east, but there is controversy as to which side is blowing bridges in this area (in Zybyne, Tykhe, Volokhivksa and one other). Four have been destroyed so far. Each side must balance advantages and disadvantages about blowing bridges.
There has been a great deal of confusion as to what exactly is going on in the eastern microdistrict of Chasiv Yar. I believe that Russia is close to dividing off eastern Chasiv Yar from the area to the west of the Severky Donets-Donbass canal and the most recent reports suggest that Russian forces crossed the canal to the south and have begun attacking the Novy microdistrict on the west bank. Ukrainian forces in the eastern microdistrict may be caught in a Russian cauldron.
West of Avdiivka, we are told almost every day, it seems, and as though it is a new development, that Russia has finally taken full control of Netailove, clearly indicating that it has not actually taken full control. For days, if not weeks, we have been told that Russia has taken the southern end of Urozhaine, clearly indicating that this may be in doubt. We keep being told that Russia has finally won the battle for Bilohoriivka when again, this in itself suggests that there is doubt. And so on.
What can we be reasonably sure that we do know? Mainly that Russia has invaded the north of Kharkiv, has considerably stretched the combat line for Ukraine, that Ukraine is moving brigades from other locations (such as Chasiv Yar) to fight in Kharkiv. We don’t know for sure whether Russia wants to take the city of Kharkiv. Putin says that for now, it does not. It may suit Ukraine’s spokesmen to act as though they believe Russia will attack Kharkiv: then Ukraine can say that Russia has “failed” to advance on Kharkiv while using the threat that it might succeed so as to squeeze more money and aid from the collective West.
Elsewhere on the battlefields, Russia is pumelling Makiika in the Kupyansk area but as for now has not launched a ground operation. Reports that Russia has not taken Bilohoriivka are not considered totally reliable, but there is heavy Russian bombing of Siversk. In the Bakhmut area I have already reported on Chasiv Yar; latest reports suggest that Russian forces have complete control over Klishchiivka to the southeast of Chasiv Yar.
Further south, in Avdiivka area, Russian forces are now bombing Oleksandropil, which lies well to the north of Ocheretyne, seeming to confirm considerable Russian advances in this area. Russians are said to have taken the settlement of Nooleksandrivka, and even to be hitting targets well to the west of Ocheretyne, namely on Novoselivka Persha. Ukrainian forces in this area may be tempted to abandon their positions but to do so, given successful Russian bombing of many bridges, would have to abandon a large quantity of heavy weapons.
Palestine
The governments of Ireland, Norway and Spain have said that they recognize Palestine as an independent State. Malta sand Slovenia may be the next European nations to declare in favor of Palestine. This is the first step towards a “two state solution.” Irish recognition is couched within the umbrella of Ireland’s own struggle for emancipation.
Israel is utterly opposed to a two-state solution. While the stance of Ireland, Norway and Spain is something to be welcomed, I have long argued that the “two state solution,” without a thorough review and reformulation of the 1948 declaration of Israel as an independent nation, is impractical, as it will give birth to a Balkanized territory in which only Israel can prevail. The Israel that prevails will continue to be an apartheid state.
Professor Mearsheimer explains in interview today with Judge Napolitano that for Israel, its policy of ethnic cleansing is seen as the only way that it can solve the “problem” of Hamas, and the only way that it can reconcile its apartheid nature with its aspiration towards genuine liberal democracy.
We should recall that Saudi Arabia, which was making headway towards normalization of relations with Israel before October 7 2023, is also saying that until there is a commitment to a two-state solution there can be no normalization.
Meantime, Israel’s destruction of Gaza according to the most recent estimations, has taken a total of 36,500 Palestinian lives. In overall conditions of famine, the Pentagon has admitted that none of the aid shipped to the newly constructed US pier off the coast of Gaza has yet been distributed. The UN has stopped its own aid distribution through Rafah because it is obstructed by Israel. 600,000 Palestinians remain in Rafah; a similar number is making its way to locations to the north, in circumstances of great insecurity and famine.
All that the US currently seems to worry about is to punish, sanction and harass the ICC prosecutors for issuing arrest warrants against Israeli senior government as well as Hamas leaders (just as Trump sanctioned former ICC’s lead prosecutors), and about violent suppression of student and faculty protests against the US/Israeli genocide on campuses across the nation, even when, as is generally the case, these are entirely peaceful. It is good news that the lead ICC prosecutor is engaged, with the support of a panel of six legal experts, in investigations that incorporate events both in Gaza and in the West Bank.
The documentation of evidence against Israel is voluminous. It is inevitable that survival of the judicial process will implicate not just Israel but also the leaders of the US, Britain and Germany who have been the most assiduous in supporting Israel’s genocide. Indeed, it is no longer appropriate to refer to Israel’s genocide without extending this to Israeli-US-European genocide.
The threats against the ICC will, in the event of an actual trial, be extended to anyone who participates, including investigators and jurors in the judicial process. Sanctioning a leading prosecutor who is a British barrister (whose brother is a British Conversative MP) may, as in the Assange case, nurture a small but growing fissure between the US and its normally steadfast ally, Britain. Khan has declared that law that is not independent is not law at all; law that is applied only against some but not others is not law at all.
This is freakish government, the result of a form of governance that is driven much less by the logic of human beings capable of original and critical thought, and more a form of governance that is answerable mainly to the interests of corporations and the inhuman logic of corporations for whom profitability is the only serious criterion for anything. The result from a human perspective is freakishness.
In Israel there are more reports of suppression of free speech as in the banning of Al Jazeera and the prohibition yesterday of an AP news feed from Gaza.